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Summary 
 
This thesis explores the politics of knowing the body at war. It argues that the exclusion 
of the body from certain political discourses actually involves the assumption of a great 
deal of knowledge about the body, and correspondingly, a series of decisions about 
what the body is. I argue that these judgements about what the body is are entailed in 
much strategic studies literature, which seeks to emphasise the instrumental utility of 
war, a project which stands at risk of being undermined by the intrusion of the body. I 
also argue that the exclusion of the body cannot be remedied by a simple act of 
inclusion, because this fails to deal with the attendant practices of regulation and control 
which render the body an excludable/includable component of a system of thought.  
The thesis uses the body at war as a catalyst for the development of a particular way of 
thinking about the body which refuses the distinction between the material and the 
discursive, or the biological and the political. Rather, it uses the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari to develop an understanding of the body which is immediately social and 
political. In the context of shell shock in the First World War, it traces the way in which 
the disordered body is constructed as such, and the practices which occlude the extent 
to which the body is political, seeking instead to return it to realm of the personal. 
Contrary to this tendency, it adumbrates the ways in which the body has the capacity to 
destabilise social systems and regimes of knowledge. Because it remains ultimately 
unknown, the body undermines generalising systems of thought and offers a less 
totalising way of thinking about war and International Relations.  
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Introduction 
 
War touches on the most basic questions about who ‘we’ are and how we organise 
ourselves. Military discipline aims to construct a soldier for whom there is no doubt as 
to what his identity is and where his allegiance lies. On the other hand, the horror of 
war may seem to imperil our very sense of what it is to be human. In one respect, then, 
war seems to solidify questions of identity, and in another to imperil and complicate 
them. War seems to be directly concerned with the body, but how we are to make sense 
of this concern in a productive way is not immediately clear, especially if we are to 
avoid essentialising or objectifying the body, as I will suggest we need to do. This 
thesis aims to address this constellation of issues, though it does not to aim to reconcile 
or resolve these competing and contradictory impulses, or to come up with a definitive 
model for understanding war and the body. Rather, I seek to dramatise the very 
impossibility of such a conception by emphasising the fugitive, fragmentary and 
contingent nature of our understandings of war. I aim to do so by deploying the figure 
of the body, which, as I will try to show, always frustrates and evades our desire for 
categorical knowledge, exceeding the categories which we prepare for it, and thus 
presenting both a challenge to and an opportunity for thought.  
 
In my introduction, I discuss the concepts of identity and war, and some versions of the 
relationship between them. I choose ‘identity’ as a starting point for analysis due to its 
currency in political thought, and due to the extent to which its frailty and contestability 
creates the space for a consideration of ‘the body’ as a productive focus for thinking 
about war. I argue that the body has both been under-theorised, in the sense that it has 
been neglected in certain categories of political thought and at the same time over-
theorised, in the sense that we tend to assume we know everything about it, or that we 
could know everything about it, given sufficient time and scientific sophistication. 
Similarly, it is possible to suggest that ‘there are no theories of war or—depending on 
what you are willing to accept as a “theory”—there are far too many of them’. 1  
Treading a path through these approaches, I aim to re-animate the body as a new 
perspective on war and politics.  
 
                                                 
1 Barbara Ehrenreich Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War London: Virago 1997 p. 1 
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I begin by outlining some of the issues associated with thinking about identity. I do so 
in part to provide some context for my interest in the body. ‘Identity’ is a central 
political concept, but one which I will try to show is also intensely problematic. An 
uncritical acceptance of the predicates of identity requires an elision of the political 
work needed to construct identities and to regulate conformity with them. So ‘identity’ 
cannot be understood as being pre-social, or as the foundation for society, but rather is 
fabricated by a set of social norms the political provenance of which should be subject 
to enquiry. I then move to a discussion of the ways in which the body has tended to be 
excluded from political theory. The body has been conceived as the silent other to 
politically significant identity. Where identities signal difference, the body is presented 
by Hannah Arendt, for example, as being a repository for material uniformity. I suggest 
that there is more to the politics of the body than a simple question of inclusion or 
exclusion, and that suggest that the facile distinction between the material and 
discursive may not hold up to scrutiny, and that there may be more to a politics of the 
body than first appears.  
 
From here I move to a consideration of war, security and biopolitics considered first 
from the perspective of identity. I suggest that the Clausewitzian understanding of war 
presents war and identity as being formally independent, whereby war is pursued in the 
service of goals established with respect to a given entity with a given identity (a state). 
I challenge this image with reference to the work of David Campbell, and through the 
security paradigm of ‘biopolitics’. In this way I try to show that one may understand 
war and identity as having a far more intimate relationship than is presented by the 
notion of war as instrumental. Rather, war and security may be understood as being 
intimately concerned with governing the conditions of emergence of certain forms of 
identity. Biopolitics is of particular interest here because of the way in which it presents 
itself as being ‘post-identarian’, concerned with life itself rather than with bodies of any 
particular identity. As a mode of governance, biopolitics is concerned with emergent 
life, meaning that it does not seek to fix and secure identities but rather to trace the 
patterns of transformation that they undertake. The object of security is life itself, and 
what this means is that rather than trying to impose a kind of stability on any identity, or 
to reinforce the borders of any particular body (of the individual or of the state), 
biopolitics is concerned to calculate the degrees of contingency, which is to say 
uncertainty, rather than to eradicate them.  
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I dwell on biopolitics because of the way in which it dramatises a particular tension 
which I aim to raise in the introduction. The majority of ways of conceiving of the body 
present it as an object which can be known. In other words, the body has fixed and 
determinate properties upon which we can bring a range of scientific techniques to bear 
and thereby know the body. Even those frameworks for political theory which take no 
account of the body, or expressly exclude it, do so convinced that it cannot enlighten or 
transform political life in any meaningful way—they purport to know the limitations of 
the body. I argue in the thesis that these formulations of the body are partial, and insist 
that one cannot fully know the body, and further, that it is ethically significant that we 
cannot. From this perspective, biopolitics is significant because it describes a system of 
security which takes the unknown, or contingency, as its core concern and as an object 
of calculation, providing a ‘technological’ understanding rather than an ethical one. I 
discuss these issues briefly in the introduction: I return to them in the conclusion having 
expanded further on the notion of the body as unknown in the thesis.  
 
Politics and identity  
 
The idea of ‘identity’ touches on our understanding of ‘what it is to be a human agent, a 
person, or a self’.2 In this sense it appears that ‘identity’ is a fundamental category for 
thinking about politics, one which is indispensible for considering the impulses behind 
human organisation and behaviour. ‘Who are you? Who am I? Who are we? In 
answering these questions, we locate ourselves and others in social space... And in this 
way, we orient ourselves practically: we regularly decide what to do, and how to treat 
others, at least partly on the basis of who we take ourselves, and them, to be’.3 Political 
Theory has often presented ‘identity’ as being a core organising concept which 
determines the framework for social interaction. Hannah Arendt argues that politics 
may be understood as the sphere in which individual identities are displayed and 
experienced. She says that ‘[i]n acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal 
actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human 
world... This disclosure of who in contradistinction to what somebody is—his qualities, 
                                                 
2 Charles Taylor Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2003 p.3  
3 Patchen Markell Bound by Recognition Princeton: Princeton University Press 2003 p. 1 
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gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which he may display or hide—is implicit in 
everything somebody says and does’.4 The distinction made here between who and 
what we are posits a natural foundation for political being: we are all human bodies, and 
political difference begins from this basis.  
 
This is problematic, however, not least because ‘identity’ is not only the cause of a 
certain pattern of social relations, but also their consequence. For example, speaking is 
taken by Arendt as being a way in which ‘men’ can display their identities. However, 
this framework instantly runs into difficulties. If I speak, I do so using words, and in 
accordance with conventions which existed before me, and these determine what I can 
say. Pierre Bourdieu says that ‘[t]he official language is bound up with the state, both in 
its genesis and in its social uses’.5 The point is that the language that we speak is not a 
neutral vehicle for self-expression, but rather is thoroughly infused with power, and 
therefore when we speak we do not express an identity as much as affirm a position 
which is not of our choosing. In this sense, we may understand identity not as 
something we have, but as something we must assume in order to be recognised and to 
function politically. This is because in order to speak out in politics in the way 
envisaged by Arendt, one must first have been authorised and sanctioned as one who is 
licensed to speak. This does not take place through some prior act of authorisation, but 
is immanent to (occurs at the same time as) the act of speaking itself. This makes it very 
questionable whether, for example, ‘the law allows room for any voice that has not been 
woven into its fabric’.6 
 
Speaking is but one example of the multiple ways in which identity is a double edged 
sword in the sense that it is both necessary for political action and a constraint on 
alternative modes of being which are not governed by the principle of identity. To 
expand on what might be meant by ‘alternative modes of being’, I want to explore the 
Platonic idea that ‘identity’ may be defined as a stable marriage between a name, or 
idea and a material entity. The idea allows some judgement as to the value of the 
specific thing relative to an ideal. For example Arendt says that ‘[t]he standard by 
                                                 
4 Hannah Arendt (intro. Margaret Canovan) The Human Condition Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
1999 p. 179 
5 Pierre Bourdieu (trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson) Language and Symbolic Power 
Cambridge: Polity Press 1991 p 45 
6 Sandra Berns. To Speak as a Judge: Difference, Voice and Power Aldershot: Ashgate 1999 p 13 
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which a thing’s excellence is judged is never mere usefulness, as though an ugly table 
will fulfil the same function as a handsome one, but the adequacy or inadequacy to 
which it should look like... its adequacy or inadequacy to... the mental image’.7 In other 
words, if I take seriously the identity ‘woman’, then I am likely to feel inferior relative 
to the idea of what a woman should look and be like, and in this sense identity is part of 
a process of judgement whereby the value of things is measured. This already 
introduces an element of slippage into identity whereby it is possible for things to fail to 
measure up to, or to fully embody, their designated identity. Judith Butler suggests that 
this may provide the space for a critique of identity according to which one refuses to 
act out the prescribed or expected identity. Her example is men who wear drag, as they 
refuse to strive towards the ideal of ‘man’ and instead subvert this by performing the 
tropes of masculinity/femininity in alternative hybrid ways. In so doing, she suggests, 
they reveal the extent to which all identities are dependent on our rehearsal of them (the 
idea only exists insofar as we strive to achieve it 8) and are porous, malleable and 
fragile.9  
 
Identity begins to appear as something more repressive than emancipatory, and this 
creates certain dilemmas for thinking about politics. As Judith Butler puts it, ‘the 
feminist subject turns out to be discursively constituted by the very political system that 
is supposed to facilitate its emancipation...an uncritical appeal to such a system for the 
emancipation of ‘women’ will be clearly self-defeating’.10 But the extent of the problem 
has perhaps been concealed by the way in which I have presented it. I suggested above 
that I may feel that I fail to measure up to the ideal of womanhood, and may therefore 
choose either to struggle to more closely approximate it, or to act out other identities 
and thereby distance myself from the regulatory function of the identity ‘woman’. This 
raises the question of who I might be, aside from the identity ‘woman’, and others like 
it. But this may be a false problem, or at least an erroneous formulation. I am capable of 
saying ‘I’, and through this act of enunciation I enact myself as an individual agent who 
takes on the name of I. Luce Irigaray says that ‘Man seems to be able to attribute the 
signifier to himself, and become the master of his own identity, freed from dependence 
                                                 
7 Hannah Arendt The Human Condition p.173 
8 Judith Butler Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity London: Routledge 1990 p. 96 
9 Ibid. p. 137  
10 Ibid. p. 2  
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on the word of the other’.11 In other words, it may be the case that there is no stable 
being with a coherent identity which says ‘I’, but that the act of speaking thus is 
creative of this stable being. This leads to the possible conclusion that the individual 
subject is no less a consequence of linguistic and political fabrication than is an identity 
such as ‘woman’.  
 
This is not intended to create the impression that there exists a purer, more authentic 
form of being which is uncontaminated by power and politics. The very reverse. It is to 
draw attention to the politics which is inherent in every identity and every instance of 
subjectification. Jenny Edkins makes a distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’, 
and while this distinction will not be rigorously adhered to in this thesis, it is interesting 
from the point of view of setting up its terms of engagement. Summarising a complex 
discussion, we might say that politics is the ‘technologized’ work of organising society 
according to certain rules. So, for example, elections, parties and the state apparatus 
belong to the domain of politics.12 In terms of identity, politics in this sense would not 
include an investigation into the conditions of identity formation. But if one were 
concerned with, for example, the underrepresentation of women in parliament, then this 
would be a political question and one which it would be possible to raise and contest. 
The issue thus stated enquires into neither the legitimacy of the parliament and the state 
structures more broadly, nor into the integrity or value of the category ‘women’. ‘The 
political’, on the other hand, is the work of constituting the domain of politics so that 
certain activities and concerns may be deemed to be non-political: it is active in creating 
and sustaining its own parameters.13 And the former tends to conceal the latter so that 
all ‘political’ questions appear to be questions of procedure, and the conditions of 
possibility for the existence of the social order as such are not exposed or available for 
critique or review.  
 
The idea of identity may be thought of as ‘political’ in this sense, if it is understood as 
standing for a moment of indeterminacy, in which the outcome is unclear. So, for 
example, the political origin of a community is concealed or naturalised by the politics 
of that community, as that ‘origin’ would reveal the extent to which it could have been 
                                                 
11 Luce Irigaray (trans Gail M. Schwab) To Speak is Never Neutral London: Continuum 2002 p 16 
12 Jenny Edkins Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing The Political Back In Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers 1999 pp. 1- 2 
13 Ibid. p. 2 
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otherwise, and therefore that society as it stands is not the necessary or proper outcome 
(of history or of human decision) but only the contingent one. Similarly, in the case of 
identity, operating at the level at which identities compete for supremacy in a social 
system (which may be organised according to patriarchal, racist, religious, or any 
number of other identity-based criteria) conceals the way in which these identities and 
societies are formed. Focusing on the political and contingent nature of identity, this 
allows the processes by which identities are formed to be brought into consideration 
and to consider different ways of organising life. We are not required to return to the 
origins of society in search of these different forms of life, but have only to look 
differently at the way in which politics is conceived, and how the political is being 
concealed by this conception.  
 
Politics and the excluded body 
 
I have suggested that in Platonic philosophy, one may consider the world to be split 
between material things and their ‘ideas’ which represent the eternal essence of the 
entity. Real knowledge is the knowledge of unchanging kosmos which is achieved 
through contemplation,14 whereas material things are rooted into the world of change 
and activity and therefore serve only to complicate thinking and knowing. The most 
intimate and the most problematic such material thing is our own body. Elizabeth 
Spelman says that in Platonic philosophy, ‘the body, with its deceptive senses, keeps us 
from real knowledge’.15 The body is regarded as being a hindrance to real knowledge 
and understanding, in part because it is always changing: we feel dizzy, ill, jubilant, 
tired, and these feelings lead us to perceive the world differently. However, this 
changing perception does not speed us on the road to truth but leads us from it, as we 
are unduly influenced by the transience of bodily life which distracts us from the pursuit 
of immutable truth. Genevieve Lloyd says that the body ‘wanders about blindly, and 
becomes confused and dizzy, like a drunken man, from dealing with things that are ever 
changing’.16 Moreover, we are given the sense that the body just is, a necessary but 
potentially disruptive entity which grounds the philosopher in earthly life, but which 
                                                 
14 Hannah Arendt The Human Condition p. 15 
15 Elizabeth V. Spelman ‘Woman as Body: Ancient and Contemporary Views’ pp. 109-131 in Feminist 
Studies Spring 1982 Vol. 8, No. 1 p. 111 
16 Genevieve Lloyd The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press 1984 p. 6  
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should not be permitted to intrude into thought. Arendt points out that the ‘time-
honoured resentment of the philosopher against the human condition is not identical 
with the ancient contempt for the necessities of life’ 17  because the Greeks could 
appreciate the body as an aesthetic ideal. This illustrates the way in which the idea of 
the body competed with the intrusive, problematic reality.  
 
For Hannah Arendt, the philosophical denigration of the body can lead us directly to 
appreciate the reasons for the need to exclude it from politics also, because the body is 
not politically interesting. In one sense, the body is undifferentiated. We all have bodies, 
and all bodies have approximately the same needs in terms of nutrition, rest, and so on. 
The care of the body, therefore, is merely the work of reproducing life, and the ‘burden 
of biological life, weighing down and consuming the specifically human life-span 
between birth and death’18 must be alleviated as far as possible in order to create space 
for extra-biological activity such as is proper to politics (and philosophy). The political 
sphere is that in which people (men, in the Greek case) reveal themselves in all their 
uniqueness, and this would be undermined by a consideration of the body, which is 
something that we all share, and which is consumed by the natural rhythms of life.19 In 
addition, politics is a profoundly public activity, for Arendt, and the body resides in the 
domain of the private, due to the radical incommunicability of its sensations: ‘all bodily 
sensations, pleasure or pain, desires and satisfactions... are so “private” that they cannot 
even be adequately voiced’.20 Finally, politics is founded upon a kind of formal equality, 
so that all participants have the right and ability to speak and be heard. In contrast, ‘the 
household’, which is the rightful place of the body, is a place of ‘strictest inequality’21 
organised so that those at the bottom of the hierarchy are the most heavily burdened 
with duties pertaining to the body, while the person at the top (the senior male) is only a 
transient figure in the household who is free to leave it and enter the territory of 
politics.22  
 
It is timely to turn to the ‘political’ underpinnings to this conception of politics. In 
Arendt’s reading of Plato and Aristotle, it becomes possible (or necessary) to exclude 
                                                 
17 Hannah Arendt The Human Condition p.16n  
18 Ibid. p. 119 
19 See Ibid. Ch. 5: Action  
20 Ibid. p. 141 
21 Ibid. p.32 
22 Ibid. p. 32 
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the body from the political sphere because of the way in which the body has been 
imagined. For her, the body does not contribute to the acquisition of knowledge, and 
nor does it form a component of the community of men engaged in politics. Arendt is 
fearful of the idea that the ‘biological body’ could be exploited by politics. She says that 
‘[r]ecent political history is full of examples indicating that the term “human material” 
is no harmless metaphor’. 23 The body should simply exist in a different world to 
politics, neither intruding nor being exploited. But the problem is that this analysis 
actually assumes a great deal of knowledge about the body, albeit in the guise of 
‘common sense’, and creates a number of problems for thinking about how we could 
know this body, and organise it politically (even if this involves placing it outside 
politics) in ways that are not themselves political. In other words, just as naming 
someone as ‘a woman’ is not a neutral descriptive gesture, but actually enables and 
constrains various possibilities of action and behaviour, so excluding the body from 
politics actually involves a series of political decisions which demarcate the body from 
what it is not, before concealing themselves in the technocratic work of ‘politics’.  
 
One way in which it is possible to demonstrate the erroneousness of the supposition that 
the body is a stable, nameable object, is by turning to the work of Judith Butler. Butler 
critiques the impression that the body is a stable object whose existence is not 
accounted for by politics, and she does this through an evaluation of the sex/gender 
distinction.24 The sex/gender distinction suggests that sex is a biological fact, whereas 
gender is the social meaning of this fact. While the latter is variable and constructed, the 
former is grounded in material reality and therefore cannot be contested: it is somehow 
outside politics, providing a foundation upon which politics builds. The underlying 
schism is between materiality, which refers to the body, and discourse, which is the 
concern of politics. The problem arises when we focus on the boundary between these 
spheres, and the way in which this boundary comes into being. Butler says that ‘[t]he 
moderate critic might concede that some part of “sex” is constructed, but some other is 
certainly not, and then, of course, find him or herself not only under some obligation to 
draw the line between what is and what is not constructed, but to explain how “sex” 
comes in parts whose differentiation is not a matter of construction’.25 The same goes 
                                                 
23 Ibid. p. 188n  
24 See Judith Butler Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’ London: Routledge 1993 
25 Ibid. p. 11 
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for the distinction between sex and gender: how does this distinction come into being if 
it is not constructed in discourse?  
 
I would suggest that the same applies to the exclusion of body from politics and 
philosophy. Although this tends to be undertaken in such as way as to posit the body as 
an a priori entity to which one can unproblematically refer, I want to argue that the 
process of exclusion is actually intensely political, and moreover that it is active in 
constructing the body in a certain way. That is to say, the process is a circular one 
whereby the body is referred to as an immutable and unproblematic entity, and the very 
reference to its solid materiality as uncontested in this way reinforces the contention 
that it ought to be excluded from politics. Having constructed or imagined the body as 
something which ought to be excluded from politics, it is then excluded; the point being 
that the political moment in this move is being effaced by the apparent logic of the 
move itself. Judith Butler says that ‘[t]he body posited as prior to the sign, is always 
posited or signified as prior. This signification produces as an effect of its own 
procedure the very body that it nevertheless and simultaneously claims to discover as 
that which precedes its own action’.26 The need to consider the body and politics is 
reawakened by an awareness of the fragility of the boundaries of the body and the 
extent to which they are not themselves natural. The corollary of this may be the need 
to think the body as being more fluid and elusive than certain discursive conventions 
may lead us to suppose.  
 
Security/War  
 
Julian Reid says that ‘[w]ithin theories of International Relations we are still taught to 
think about issues of military organisation, strategy, and tactics as discreet enterprises 
that concern, specifically, the interests of the sovereign power of states in extracting 
efficient force from bodies of men for the deployment of organised violence toward 
rationally grounded and objectified political ends’.27 It seems legitimate to suggest that 
the dominant form of thinking about war in International Relations scholarship adheres 
                                                 
26 Ibid. p. 30 
27 Julian Reid The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life struggles, Liberal Modernity, and the Defence 
of Logistical Societies Manchester: Manchester University Press 2006 pp. 22-23 
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to the Clausewitzian notion that war is a continuation of politics with other means.28 
This orientates war with respect to politics and identity in certain ways. Firstly, it 
presupposes that war is a tool of politics—it is a means to a politically designated end. 
This in turn indicates that war is functionally independent from politics, and that ‘war’ 
and ‘politics’ do not contaminate each other to any significant degree. Finally, and on a 
related point, it tends to suggest that war is predominantly a matter for the conduct of 
international relations which takes place between states, and is authorised and 
legitimised by being conducted according to certain conventions (the use of uniforms, 
for example) upon which states agree. In other words, the formation of the state and its 
political space is analytically independent of, and prior to, war in the Clausewitzian 
sense.29 Of course, within this framework it is possible to recognise that war may have a 
secondary effect on intra-state politics, as with ‘rally round the flag syndrome’. 30  
However, it is primarily understood as operating between entities which have a prior 
identity and organisation (states), and indeed it is this feature which distinguishes war 
from other types of ‘violent conflict’.31  
 
In the ‘classical’ account, war may be thought to organise power relations between pre-
existing identities (states). While the identity of a state may conduce to, or require, a 
certain kind of stance in foreign policy and war, this identity is formally independent 
from, and prior to, the act of making war. In other words, identities exist apart from the 
policies (including war) which may be followed in their interest. The work of David 
Campbell re-conceives of the relationship between war, security and identity. He argues 
that one cannot think in terms of objective dangers which exist independently of those 
who perceive them. And ultimately, ‘there need not be an action or event to provide the 
grounds for an interpretation of danger. The mere existence of an alternative mode of 
being, the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible and thus 
denaturalizes the claim to be the true identity, is sometimes enough to produce the 
understanding of a threat’.32 In this sense, the naming of a risk or danger is at the same 
                                                 
28 Carl von Clausewitz (ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret) On War Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 1976 p. 605 
29 The Clausewitzian framework for understanding war is discussed in greater depth in Chapter 1.  
30 John Mueller War, Presidents and Public Opinion Lanham: University Press of America 1985. Note 
that this landmark study refers only to the American example.  
31 Colin S. Gray Modern Strategy Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999 p. 56 
32 David Campbell Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity Manchester: 
Manchester University Press 1992 (2nd ed) p. 3 
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time the enactment of the identity of those said to be under threat.33 This follows from 
Campbell’s commitment to Butler’s conviction that identities do not exist 
independently from the behaviours which seem to follow from them: identity has ‘“no 
ontological status apart from the various acts that constitute its reality”’.34 
 
It may appear that ‘security [is] determined by the requirements of a pre-existing 
sovereign state and war conducted in its name as a response to an objective danger’.35 
However, Campbell suggests that identities are always in the process of being ‘secured’ 
through the articulation of dangers and risks. For example, invoking ‘the people’ in a 
certain context creates ‘the people’ as a unified group with an identity which may be 
perceived in contradistinction to that of the dangerous ‘other’. In defending ‘the people’, 
one brings into being ‘the people’ who demand defence. Campbell cites the example of 
G.H.W. Bush’s speech on sending troops to Saudi Arabia in 1990: ‘“In the life of a 
nation, we’re called upon to define who we are and what we believe”’.36 The perception 
of certain dangers and not others, and the use of military force to meet them is a way of 
performing and bringing into being these apparently immutable characteristics. The 
point is that the process is a reflexive one which does not involve pre-given identities 
but conceives of security (or securitisation) as the process through which identities 
come into being. The same may be said to apply to the identity of individuals within a 
state, which is formed through ‘discipline and domination through multiple forms of 
subjugation’: 37  identities are arranged hierarchically in relation to each other, and 
deviation is penalised through a variety of micro-deterrents from social opprobrium to 
state non-recognition or penalty.  
 
An alternative way of thinking the relationship between war and politics is through the 
Foucauldian concept of ‘biopolitics’38 which refers to the regulation of populations 
rather than individuals. A population is a circulating, fluid mass of people that does not 
have any particular identity, but which has certain calculable properties.39 The concept 
                                                 
33 Ibid. p. 3 
34 Ibid. p. 9 
35 Ibid. p. 11 
36 Ibid. p. 3 
37 Ibid. p. 10 
38 Michel Foucault (ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell) The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at 
the Collège de France 1978-1979 London: Macmillan 2008 p. 317 
39 Michael Dillon ‘Security, Race and War’ pp. 166-196 in Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal (eds) 
Foucault on Politics, Security and War London: Macmillan 2008 p. 182 
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of biopolitics has been seized upon as a mode of explaining the organisation of politics 
and war in late capitalist society, in which exchange and flow seem to be essential to 
the dynamics of life. Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller suggest that after Nazism, there 
was no other way for biopolitics to proceed except in accordance with, rather than in 
opposition to, the idea of freedom. 40  Rather than trying to secure identities, 
contemporary biopolitics must make its peace with change, movement and 
unpredictability. Because a population is not ‘a people’, ‘[t]he political regulation to 
which population may...be subject cannot...proceed through the pursuit and resolution 
of inter-subjective rivalries’.41 Rather, it is regulated according to various technologies 
and sciences. ‘Biopolitics was inextricably bound up with the rise of the life sciences, 
the human sciences, clinical medicine’.42 This is understood to mark a change from the 
‘epistemologies of political subjectivity’,43 which are concerned to know (and inform) 
the preferences and behaviours of a group of subjects of given identity. Biopolitics is 
not ‘immediately or directly to do with the politics of identity... [it is] not a politics of 
identity’.44 
 
A shift in ideas about and technologies of security occurs at the same time as a 
refiguration of what the object of security is. ‘Identity’ or ‘political subjectivity’ are no 
longer the essential concerns of practices of war/politics/security, as ‘biopolitics’ is 
concerned with the regulation of life itself. Dillon suggests that ‘life’ is defined by its 
ability to change and adapt: ‘contingency is constitutive of what it is to be a living thing, 
the referent object of biopolitics—life—cannot be secured against contingency’.45 This 
suggests that our ideas about what constitutes ‘life’ are subject to change.46 Although in 
the first instance it may be human life which is the object of regulation, new sciences 
may give rise to new forms of life which are ‘post- and extra-human’ as with, for 
example ‘artificial and cybernetic, as well as animal and viral, beings’.47 The second 
implication is that change, fluidity and inconsistency become internal to, and essential 
                                                 
40 Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller Biopolitics Aldershot: Avebury 1994 pp. 21-22 
41 Michael Dillon ‘Security, Race and War’  p. 182 
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to, the system itself. Rather than being regarded as threatening, contingency comes to 
be seen as being a necessary condition for life, and a potential occasion for profit. 
Therefore the point is not to limit or hinder change, but to develop sciences of profit 
and risk which enable contingency to be exploited. Dillon says that ‘biopolitical 
security practices must somehow deliberately allow for the transformation and 
change—indeed cultivate the very capacity for adaptive emergence—that living 
contingently is said to require of all living things’.48  
 
The idea of a security whose object is life itself seems to place war in a paradoxical 
position in contemporary society, in the sense that a war in defence of life appears to be 
an absurdity. One is faced with the task of explaining how and why liberal biopolitical 
governments continue to wage war, a particular quandary in the light of the generalised 
and amorphous state of war associated with the ‘war on terror’. More broadly, however, 
liberal states continue to invest heavily in ever more sophisticated methods of killing 
despite their stated interest in human rights and freedoms. As Reid says, ‘the increasing 
precision with which human life is targeted for killing in war, severely undermines the 
foundations of liberal modernity understood in terms of the pursuit of sustainable 
peace’.49 However, war is legitimised and decided for on the grounds that some life 
may be inimical to life, which is to say that: ‘not all life is helpful to the promotion of 
species existence’.50 Biopolitics involves ongoing decisions about what forms of ‘life’ 
are compatible with the biopolitical imaginary itself. Dillon and Neal say that ‘[i]n 
many respects [biopolitics’] political rationalities and governing technologies are 
nothing but a vast ensemble of life-sorting and life adjudicating devices’.51 In this sense, 
‘the modern way of war...[is waged] in the name of life itself’52 against those forms of 
life hostile to life, as part of an ongoing process of organising ‘life’ into these categories.  
 
The implication of this ‘war in the name of life’ is that war has a far closer relation to 
the organisation of politics and society than appears to be the case from the (neo-) 
Clausewitzian account, and greater even than that presented by Campbell. Not only is it 
the case that models of military organisation act as inspiration for the organisation of 
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society, in modern society and war, the relationship may be presented as being more 
intimate than this. War immanently organises the social field through “the multiplicity 
of force relations immanent to the sphere in which they operate and which constitute 
their own organisation”.53 This image challenges the utilitarian pretentions of modern 
war through emphasising the extent to which war is not a decision, but more a condition 
of everyday life. One consequence of this is that it becomes difficult or impossible to 
demarcate cleanly between ‘war’ and ‘peace’. Indeed, rather than a continuation of 
politics with other means, the emphasis is on the reverse, that ‘modern 
politics...emerges as the extension of war by other means’.54 In this sense the end of 
military force is not so much in an externally designated goal but in ‘the forms of order 
that are mapped out in the theorisation and implementation of military organisation 
itself’.55 ‘Security’ emerges as the figure through which this organising function takes 
place: Dillon says that ‘logos of peace is systematically inscribed with the logos of war 
through discourses of security’.56 
 
Biopolitics, Contingency and the Excluded Body 
 
The biopolitical account of war contains a number of insights which are important for 
this thesis, including the critique of the utilitarian, state-centric account of war, and the 
insistence on an intimate relationship between the organisation of war, the organisation 
of politics, and the organisation of life. However, the thesis deviates from the 
biopolitical account in its approach, and it does so in order to furnish an independent 
perspective on war and politics which aims to flesh out some of the areas which are 
arguably left underdeveloped by the dominant biopolitical approaches to contemporary 
politics. One such focus for further exploration is the body. Foucault’s thematic of 
power involved two modes of governance or control; the biopolitics of population, 
discussed above, and the ‘anamato-politics of the human body’.57 The latter entails, for 
example, the disciplinary process by which one has ‘‘got rid of the peasant’ and given 
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him ‘the air of the soldier’’.58 As Reid suggests, this indicates a situation where there is 
‘a war that is being fought for political order...on the terrain of the human body’.59 
However, I would suggest that the biopolitical account has tended to dominate the 
anamato-political one, resulting in a degree of marginalisation of the body. Dillon 
quotes Foucault to the effect that biopower ‘is centred not upon the body but upon 
life’.60 This corresponds to the rise of technologies which do not take the body as their 
referent, but rather focus on data such as genetics, in accordance with ‘new 
molecularized and digitized accounts of what it is to be a living thing’.61  
 
I wish also to depart from the way in which contingency is accommodated within the 
biopolitical account of war and politics. As I suggested above, the biopolitical vision 
holds that contingency becomes internal to the system, and constitutive of life itself. 
The sciences of biopolitics dedicate themselves to the calculation of contingency, which 
is understood as a domain of risk, but one which cannot be expunged and can only be 
surveyed and managed. 62  One might also say life is contingency, which is not 
understood as pure chance, but is to some extent calculable within certain parameters.63 
This arguably represents a change from a conception of politics in which the primary 
aspiration was to ‘tame nature’ 64  and attain certainty about it, to one in which 
contingency can be managed and calculated, but not ultimately eradicated. 
Understandings of contingency have been enhanced by the emergence of probability 
science and complexity theory which seek to adumbrate the parameters of the 
calculable, and to provide a way of navigating uncertainty. In terms of war, this 
conduces towards pre-emptive and preventative action which strives to ‘colonise the 
future’,65 as elucidated in the National Security Strategy 2002, what James Der Derian 
calls a ‘global ‘Minority Report’... for preventative interventions against evils yet to be 
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born’.66 But this is not a purely negative activity, concerned with the prevention of the 
emergence of certain forms of life. It is also positive, engaged in the promotion of 
alternative forms of life. As Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero argue, ‘security becomes a 
set of mechanisms self-governing the very contingent properties of the freedom which 
biological entities are said to display’.67 In other words, security and contingency are 
seen as being part of the same moment of emergence.  
 
I argued above that ‘knowing’ the body is problematic in terms of ‘drawing the line’ 
between what is given by the body and what is given by knowledge. That is to say 
positing ‘a body’ independent of what we say and think about it becomes problematic 
when we look closely at the way in which this ‘body’ is constructed and addressed. This 
indicates that knowledge should be thought of not as the acquisition of data on a 
discreet object, but as a process of emergence through which this object comes to be 
apprehended. In the case of biopolitical life, for example, it is argued that new 
technologies of knowing and understanding ‘life’ are productive of new forms of life.68 
In this sense, there is a kind of agnosticism about the form that life can take and 
therefore a tacit acknowledgement that one cannot once and for all ‘know’ life. In this 
sense, it may be problematic to argue, as I have, that the body is excluded or bypassed 
in biopolitical accounts of life. This is not the case, not least because theoreticians of 
biopolitics themselves deliberately choose life rather than the body as the referent 
object of security. If we accept that ‘the body’ is itself the outcome of political 
organisation, as I have argued, then this seems to be missing a step in terms of 
analysing the relationship between war and politics. More simply, and perhaps more 
importantly, one gets the sense that the biopolitical world is a curiously depopulated 
one, devoid of imagination, emotion or bodily sensation. In this sense it becomes 
possible to suggest that the biopolitical critique is startlingly immanent to the 
technologies of security, war and governance that it diagnoses.  
 
One could legitimately ask why the absence of the body matters. If science has moved 
beyond the body, then what is there to lament in this development, which after all is 
merely another form of control? I want to use this thesis to argue that there are 
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important reasons why the body should be taken account of in thinking about war and 
politics. Here, I confine myself to some comments on the role of contingency in 
biopolitics, and suggest some reasons why this constitutes a limitation on its scope and 
critical power. I want to suggest that the consideration of the body in a particular way 
may have the capacity to broaden our thinking beyond the utilitarian. Contingency 
refers to the impossibility of certainty. Identity, as discussed above, is contingent in the 
sense that it does not necessarily take the form that it does, and it may not take this form 
for all time: we cannot tell. I am organised into a person who identifies with a certain 
name and articulates my body in a certain way, and therefore I may not often 
experience the contingency of my identity, as I am thoroughly habituated to it. But this 
does not mean it is not there. And occasionally, I do experience there being something 
more than (or less than) this organised subjectivity in moments of blankness or euphoria: 
what could be called in Lacanian or Žižekian terms an encounter with the Real.69   
 
It is possible to consider this an encounter with contingency. But it is an encounter of a 
very particular kind. For example, it is awkward to say that I have such an encounter, 
when the whole point of this moment of slippage is that I am not really present. 
Contingency is not really a property of the coherent identity which can say ‘I’, indeed, 
this form of organisation is an attempt to ward off contingency. But the body is more 
problematic, or more promising. As I suggested above, attempts to demarcate a natural 
body from a constructed one are imperilled by the recognition that they will always be 
political and therefore in some sense contingent. We cannot know the body beyond 
these interventions, or beyond the range of our own experience and sensation. Although 
it might seem legitimate to say that we know our own bodies, this is not entirely the 
case. We do not know what they look like from all angles, or in motion,70 and we do not 
know how our bodies will react to various encounters (with certain foods, or stimuli, for 
example). The point of this is that this impossibility of knowing is not a provisional 
problem associated with insufficiently advanced science, but an inherent one arising 
from the position from which we know, and think, that of a fictitious coherent 
identifiable subject.  
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In contrast, biopolitical governance seeks to technologise, or utilise contingency. This 
does not mean that it seeks to eradicate it, but that contingency becomes a part of the 
system itself, a calculable factor (to a degree) in its own right. For example, in terms of 
the state, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero argue that state borders ‘do not prophylactically 
secure the state by throwing up a barrier around it. Nor do they constitute an identity for 
it. Their task is to regulate the very productive powers of the intercourse transacted by, 
between and through populations’. 71  For example, air travel brings commerce and 
business as well as potentially terrorism and disease.72 The appropriate response is not 
to restrict air travel, but to calculate the degree of danger. In this way, contingency 
becomes politically neutralised because its power to unsettle established forms of social 
organisation is limited. We are already given the tools to think about it (in the language 
of risk, for example) and therefore it cannot challenge the way in which we think to a 
significant degree. This is an important reason for retaining and exploring the 
implications of the body in thinking about war. I argue that there is something unknown 
about the body which endures bombardment with an arsenal of insights from biological 
science. This is because systems of knowledge are context specific. We can say that 
global politics is characterised by late capitalism, flows of finance, goods and people; 
malleable identity and the porosity of state borders. In this case we can devise modes of 
knowledge for thinking about this system. But these ways of thinking are always 
predicated on the endurance of the image of the global system. If we are denied an 
image of systemic organisation, then it becomes very difficult to anchor knowledge.  
 
I want to suggest that the body is a figure which can incite a different way of thinking, 
which is itself contingent and does not claim any universal validity. The idea of 
organisation is at the heart of this, because on the one hand the idea of the body reflects 
a certain mode of social organisation. There are culture- and time-specific expectations 
about the way in which the body should be presented and articulated. However, I aim to 
show that the body is not exhausted by these modes of organisation and always retains 
an element of the unknown. In relation to the literature on biopolitics, this thesis aims to 
revivify the idea of the unknown (in contrast to the calculable contingent) as a 
politically important one which can provoke potentially new ways of thinking in the 
face of war. Rather than knowing the unknown analytically, as a problem to be 
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overcome, I intend to present it as something which has a positive transformative 
potential which may change the conditions of thinking itself. The implications of the 
bodily approach may be that one can no longer make generalisations about war and 
politics: one must not only think systematically but also singularly.  
 
Structure of the Thesis  
 
This thesis begins in chapter one by exploring the ways in which various discourses on 
war approach the body. I begin by considering writing about war which I describe as 
being ‘technological’; by which I mean writing which highlights the utility of war and 
strives to emphasise its instrumental properties. I suggest that this mode of writing 
about war tends either to exclude the body or to present it as being a cipher for political 
will which is not considered in itself. This exploration proceeds according to the 
aspiration to create the space within this technological way of writing for ‘the body’ to 
emerge, while at the same time being committed to the idea that various ways of writing 
about war and the body are not merely descriptive but are active in the creation of a 
body as a certain kind of entity. That is to say: they create the object that they propose 
to know, and they imply knowledge of the object they purport to exclude. My intention 
is to expose these logics of exclusion and instrumentalisation in such a way as to create 
the space for the spectral image of an alternative body to appear.  
 
The work of making space for the body within instrumental discourses of war begs the 
question of what is at stake in this work: why does it matter whether or not the body is 
taken into account? Perry Anderson refers to a ‘sudden zest, a new appetite, for the 
concrete’.73 But what is the impetus behind this zest, and what does it mean? David 
Harvey argues that ‘the extraordinary efflorescence of interest in ‘the body’ as a 
grounding for all sorts of theoretical enquiries over the last two decades or so’74 may be 
explained by ‘a contemporary loss of confidence in previously established categories 
[which has] provoked a return to the body as the irreducible basis for understanding’.75 
In terms of discourses about war, the erasure of the body may be held to have a de-
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realising impact on our ideas about war76 as well as having the morally unfortunate 
effect of concealing the extent to which war wreaks destruction on bodies. In this sense 
it is tempting to conclude that the body somehow provides the truth or the reality of war, 
and that, if reintroduced, the body has the capability to interrupt these. That is to say, 
one might begin from ‘the simplest fact about the body, whether it is present or absent, 
and the verbal form in which this is most habitually registered, the act of counting’.77 
 
In the second chapter of the thesis I turn to body counts in war as a way of exploring 
this problem. It swiftly becomes apparent that counting the body is a problematic 
activity. For example, Margot Norris suggests that counting is unable to convey the 
material weight of the dead bodies which lie behind the numbers.78 This concern is 
founded on a supposed juxtaposition between language and the material body, or one 
might say, between the body and discourse. The problem is then one of representation: 
how are we to bring the body to bear on discourses of war? If counting won’t do, maybe 
photography will. As Susan Sontag says ‘[i]n modern society, images made by cameras 
are the principal access to realities of which we have no direct experience’,79 so that ‘[a] 
photograph passes for incontrovertible proof that a given thing has happened’. 80  
However, I argue that this contrast between the solid, foundational body and slippery, 
unreliable discourse is untenable, for the reasons I have already indicated. That is to say, 
posing a body outside politics is itself political. Moreover, I argue that the 
determination of what ‘counts’ as a body is thoroughly political and is not given by the 
materiality of the body but by processes of political decision and fabrication.  
 
I have so far focused on the ways in which the body has been organised and outlined 
through political practices and representations, emphasising the extent to which these 
do not only convey the body in a certain way, they also construct it (which is to say, 
organise it) in certain ways. This work is necessary to unsettle what might seem like 
self evident or common-sensical knowledge about what the body is, and therefore what 
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it is not. It is aimed to open out a space within which it might be possible to flesh out a 
fuller understanding of the body. However, the body I aim to sketch is not merely the 
passive consequence of the play of political forces. If this were the case, the provenance 
of these political influences would be left uncertain. Nor is it my intention to take a 
position on the structure/agency debate and to give everything away to structures of 
language and society in determining the organisation of the body. Brian Massumi asks 
‘[i]s the body as linked to a particular subject position anything more than a local 
embodiment of ideology? Where has the potential for change gone?’81 I want to argue 
that the body is more than a residue of political organisation, and I do so in the third 
chapter through the relationship between the body and technologies of war. 
 
Virilio suggests that the increasing sophistication of military technology bodes ill for 
the future of politics and the body, which stand at risk of being condemned to 
obsolescence. An alternative prognosis is that the increasing influence of technology on 
war may render war amenable to being made ever more rational, and easier to 
subordinate to political aims than before. I argue that both these visions of technological 
war are underpinned by the assumption that technology and the body are functionally 
independent, operate according to different logics, and may replace or supersede each 
other. Contrary to this, I argue that there is a greater degree of interdependence between 
the body and technology. I explore this intimate relationship through the work of the 
Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which is committed to 
engineering a closer relationship between body and technology so that the functioning 
of both are improved. This ‘symbiotic’ vision of the relationship between body and 
technology may seem to be a progressive one, in the sense that it does not incorporate 
an essentialist view of what the body is and what its capabilities are: it sees the body as 
a work in progress. However, I suggest that this reading is still limited as it takes the 
body as being an object upon which the scientific will, and technology, works. In 
response, I seek to advance a reading of the body which presents it as being active in 
determining the conditions of its own emergence, development and expression.  
 
I use the work of Klaus Theweleit and others to indicate that technology may be 
thought of as existing in a certain relation to the body, as being ‘technological’ by virtue 
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of this relation rather than by some a priori design or purpose. Technology is invested 
by the body and this is what enables it to operate in certain ways. But more than this, 
one must consider the body itself as being potentially operable as a technology, not by 
virtue of some exterior force, but as a consequence of the body’s own investments of its 
own boundary. For example, Theweleit’s Freudian approach suggests that Freikorps 
soldiers imagined themselves as hard, metallic and unyielding bodies who rejected any 
association with inconstant flow-like substances, the ides of ‘flow’ being associated 
with both women and Communism. Only in battle was the member of the Freikorps 
permitted to have his own encounter with flow, becoming one with weaponry and the 
pyrotechnics of conflict.82 The question is: how could anyone firmly demarcate the 
parameters of the Freikorps soldier’s body? Or say what his relationship to technology 
was? It is the desire, or libidinal investment of the soldier which animates technology, 
and which is constitutive of the boundary of the body itself.83 Therefore, ‘technology’ 
cannot be considered to arrive as a divine (‘hylomorphic’) intervention into the body, 
but must be considered an active component of the becoming-technological of the body 
itself.  
 
Up to this point in the thesis my aim has been to engage critically with existing 
literatures on the body and war in order to allude to potential alternative understandings 
of the body which are excluded or crowded out by the image at play at any given time. 
Rather than accept the parameters of the body and politics as they are given by any 
particular approach, it is my intention throughout to be vigilantly aware of the hidden 
political decisions which compose discourses of war and the body, before concealing 
themselves within them. However, I do not do this in order to create the space for my 
own reading of the body and war which can answer to these others by being more 
truthful, authentic or powerful. Rather, my project involves the continual questioning of 
social realities which purport to self-evidence or ‘naturalness’. To this end, I turn in 
chapter four to the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. It is worth reiterating that 
I do not do so out of the conviction that their work can offer the ‘solution’ to the 
problems and uncertainties that I have hitherto highlighted. Instead, I hope to use 
Deleuze and Guattari to advance an understanding of these quandaries in such a way as 
                                                 
82 Klaus Theweleit (trans. Chris Turner et al.) Male Fantasies Vol. 2: Male Bodies: Psychoanalyzing the 
White Terror Cambridge: Polity Press 1989 p. 192; 206  
83 See Ibid. p. 179 
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to present them not as problems or hindrances to thought, but as positive catalysts for a 
different way of thinking.  
 
There is insufficient space here to summarise the ways in which I mobilise Deleuze and 
Guattari to enable a particular reading of the body. However, it is perhaps useful to plot 
out a few aspects of their work which I believe have the potential to prove productive in 
thinking about the body and war. For Deleuze and Guattari, the body is the consequence 
of a certain regime of social and political organisation. The realities of bodily life to 
which we have become sufficiently habituated to regard as ‘natural’ are for Deleuze and 
Guattari the works of purest artifice. For example, the fact that our organs exist in 
relation to each other and to the world in a certain way is the consequence of discipline, 
not of nature. 84  Any attempt to express the body differently is likely to attract 
‘censorship and repression’,85 but the insistence that the organised body is not ‘natural’ 
but immediately a political product alters the way in which we think about deviations 
from this mode of organisation. Deleuze and Guattari ask ‘[i]s it really so sad and 
dangerous to be fed up with seeing with your eyes, talking with your tongue, thinking 
with your brain... Why not walk on your head, sing with your sinuses, see through your 
skin...?’86 
 
This insistence on the constructed and provisional nature of the organised body makes it 
difficult to have confidence in any definition of what the body is. All such definitions 
become transitory and superficial, able only to express what this body seems to be at 
this time, for different forms of social organisation will produce different bodies. For 
Deleuze and Guattari, this is precisely what is interesting about the body. Following 
Spinoza, they argue that our inability to know what a body can do is precisely what 
gives it its ethical and philosophical significance.87 Deleuze and Guattari say that ‘in the 
same way that we avoided defining a body by its organs and functions, we will avoid 
defining it by its Species or Genus characteristics’.88 In other words, we will be unable 
to say what a body is, once and for all. Rather than this being a failing or an inadequacy 
                                                 
84 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (trans. and foreword Brian Massumi) A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia London: Continuum 2004 pp. 176-178  
85 Ibid. p. 166 
86 Ibid. p. 167 
87 Ibid. p. 284; Gilles Deleuze (trans Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta) Cinema 2: The Time Image 
London: The Athlone Press 1989 p. 189 
88 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p. 283 
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of thought, this should prompt us into reconsidering our expectations of what ‘thinking’ 
can provide. Taking the body seriously as a perspective on the world, rather than as an 
object for thought, should allow us to be sensitive to those feelings, sensations and 
impressions which elude classification and which do not seem to conform to any given 
identity. Remaining agnostic about what the body ought to look like, be, and do should 
make us more alive to the political influences which lie behind every bodily expression. 
The insistence that the body remains unknown in the face of all attempts at organisation 
introduces, for Deleuze and Guattari, an inherently ethical facet of the body which I aim 
to mobilise for thinking about war.89 
 
In the final chapter I use these insights to talk about the body of the shell shocked 
soldier in the First World War. My aim is to trace the way in which the body of the 
shell shocked soldier deviated from the ‘normal’ mode of organisation through 
paralysis, psychosis and neurosis. I approach the clinical and social responses to these 
deviations as active interventions into body politics which prescribe and reinforce a 
certain mode of bodily organisation. In this way, I aim to trace the vectors of 
disorganisation and reorganisation (in Deleuze and Guattari’s language, 
‘deterritorialisation’ and ‘reterritorialisation’) which the body follows in relation to war 
and society. Attempts to understand and treat the shell shocked body grounded and 
conceived of this body in various ways and according to various paradigms of 
knowledge, according to whether the approach in question was psychoanalytic, 
disciplinary or ‘physicalist’. In other words, they were events in the politics of 
organisation. As well as taking seriously these attempts at organisation and regulation, I 
aim to draw out some of the productive ways in which we can understand the ‘deviant’ 
and ‘disordered’ body as a productive political force rather than a subjective problem. If 
we dispense with the image of the body as objective, foundational, or non-political, then 
it becomes easier to apprehend the social and political significance of ‘bodily disorders’.  
 
I suggest that thinking positively about the shell shocked body produces a change in the 
way that war, politics and the body are conceived in relation to each other. Rather than 
                                                 
89 Michel Foucault writes that ‘Anti-Oedipus ... is a book of ethics, the first book of ethics to be written in 
France for quite a long time’ in Michel Foucault ‘Preface’ pp. xiii-xxvii in Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari (trans Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane) Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia London: Continuum 2004 p. xv. I want to try to locate this ethics with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s thinking about the body.  
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being discreet analytic categories, I argue that war and the body are better considered to 
be in a relationship of dynamic co-becoming. By this, I mean that neither of them have 
fixed properties or character, and the relationship between them may be productive of a 
multiplicity of different ways of being. These are coded in certain ways by the 
dominant social framework for interpretation, so that bodies which are not organised 
according to its prescriptions are branded ‘deviant’. However, from a perspective 
critical of this view it becomes possible to approach the ‘abnormal’ body as enacting a 
powerful social and political critique. For if the ‘normal’ body is organised and 
constructed by social and political forces, then its evasion of these is an immediately 
revolutionary act. This in consequence indicates that it is not possible to clearly 
distinguish between what is of political significance and what is not. The actions of the 
soldier on the battlefield might reasonably seem to be of interest to the Historian or the 
International Relations scholar (though they may not, in the light of the tendency 
towards distain for the body), but his dreams and nightmares should be equally so.  
 
I suggest that it becomes difficult to think war and politics apart from their rehearsals 
through the body. Every image or model of war, no matter how arid and utilitarian, is 
animated by the desire of those who imagined and sustained it. But this also means that 
it is difficult or impossible to arrive at a general theory of war and the body. Seeing war 
as expressed through the changing body, and denied any categorical understanding of 
what ‘the body’ is, the coherence of these forms is degraded. The elusive nature of the 
categories that we are left with may seem to call the utility of this mode of thought into 
question. However, my aspiration is not to develop a new theory of the body and war 
which is able to stand alone and to better those that have gone before. Rather, my 
perspective is intended to exist alongside multiple others as an ongoing critique of the 
way in which ‘self evident truths’ and ‘natural facts’ are constructed and sustained. 
Rather than to advance any particular political end in this way, my aim instead is to 
create the space for the political moment itself. In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, this is 
an ethical project because it is designed to allow the emergence of previously unknown 
bodies, which, rather than being apprehended as problems or deviations to be subject to 
reorganisation and restraint, are approached positively as having the potential to change 
the landscape of politics itself.  
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Chapter 1  
The Dream of War without Bodies 
 
Thinking about war suffers from a ‘body problem’. That is to say, certain prisms 
through which the object of ‘war’ is considered sideline the body in order to be able to 
think more clearly and coherently about war. As a way of writing about war, strategy 
rests on certain presuppositions about what the body and war are; suppositions which 
may either be explicitly elucidated or tacitly implied. It is these underlying conceptions 
of what it means to write the body and war with which I am concerned in this chapter, 
rather than any particular iteration of the strategic vision. I do not intend to make any 
extravagant claims about the field of ‘war studies’, broadly defined, as this would 
involve an undesirable and un-illuminating degree of generalisation.  Nor do I advance 
overall claims about the preoccupations and structure of strategic thinking per se. 
However, in mapping the terrain as I do, I make a more circumscribed claim about 
certain aspects of strategic thought. The tendency I am concerned with tends to tacitly 
endorse the notion that war and the body are analytically distinct and functionally 
separable entities. Therefore, I am concerned with strategy as a discourse containing 
certain enabling features and silences which form part of its condition of possibility. 
Technology has a number of points of resonance with strategy as a prism through which 
to analyse war. In many cases, I will suggest that it converges with strategy insofar as it 
is motivated by the possibility of making war a more effective instrument of politics 
which is brought ever more closely under the control of reason. To clarify slightly, this 
appears to be the case with the mode of thinking about war and technology which is 
influential in contemporary (especially Anglo-American) defence departments, and 
which intersects and interacts most frequently and directly with the ‘strategic studies’ 
thinking. There is a vociferous debate within the disciplines of ‘strategic studies’ or 
‘military science’ as to the extent of transformation that technological innovations are 
able to effect in the way in which war is waged. Broadly speaking, the debate is formed 
between those who emphasise the revolutionary possibilities of new technologies in 
fundamentally changing the way in which war is prosecuted, and those who draw upon 
the elements of continuity in military history to refute the possibility of any such 
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change.1 My intention here is not to try to determine which of these arguments is the 
most convincing, but rather to attend to the terms which the participants deploy and the 
assumptions and implications that underpin them. It is worth pointing out that there are 
ways of writing about war and technology which are guided by different motivations 
and suppositions, and which are not ultimately concerned with deploying technologies 
more effectively to make war more useful.2 There are non-technological ways of 
writing about technology. These are not addressed in this chapter because my concern is 
with the kind of technological writing about war which is common to both ‘strategic 
thinking’ and ‘technology’. 
In order to clarify what is intended by the term ‘technological writing’, I refer to 
Heidegger’s discussion of what ‘everyone knows’ about what technology is.3 He says 
that ‘to posit ends and procure and utilize the means to them is a human activity. The 
manufacture and utilization of equipment, tools, and machines, the manufactured and 
used things themselves, and the means and ends that they serve, all belong to what 
technology is. The whole complex of these contrivances is technology. Technology 
itself is a contrivance—in Latin, an instrumentum’.4 Technology is the positing of 
means and ends, their manufacture and pursuit. By ‘technological writing’ I mean a 
way of writing about these activities which in some senses accepts the existence of the 
means and ends which have been put in place. In other words, it is instrumental writing, 
or writing which is at least uncritical of the goal and activity of instrumentalisation. The 
writing about strategy and technology with which I am concerned, although it may 
contain significant disputes, has in common an unquestioned fidelity to the possibility 
of means-ends activity. Within this framework, not only do considerations such as 
‘efficiency’5 become possible, but they start to appear as self-evident ‘goals’, as the 
idea of having goals, or ends, itself becomes naturalised within the system. Just as the 
                                                          
1 For example, see David J. Lonsdale The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future 
London: Frank Cass. 2004; Colin S. Gray Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson 2005 for continuity and Alvin and Heidi Toffler War and Anti-War: Making Sense of 
Today’s Global Chaos London: Warner Books 1993 for change.  
2 For example, Daniel Pick War Machine: The Rationalisation of Slaughter in the Modern Age London: 
Yale University Press 1993 
3 This is then distinguished from Heidegger’s conception of what the essence of technology actually is.  
4 Martin Heidegger ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ pp. 311-341 in Martin Heidegger (ed. David 
Farrell Krell) Basic Writings London: Routledge 2004 p. 312 
5 Henryk Smolimowski argues that efficiency is in some sense the key characteristic of technological 
thinking. See Henryk Smolimowski ‘The Structure of Thinking in Technology’ pp. 42-49 in Carl 
Mitcham and Robert Mackay (eds) Philosophy and Technology: Readings in the Philosophical Problems 
of Technology New York: The Free Press 1983 
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essence of technology is not technological in Heideggerian terms,6 technological 
writing does not have to be ‘about’ technology, in the sense of addressing itself to 
machines, engineering projects, and so on. And writing about technology does not have 
to be technological. But it is the technological mode of writing and thinking about war 
with which I am primarily concerned here.  
Technological writing about war has been subject to criticism on the grounds of its 
relation to ethics. Edward N. Luttwak alleges that ethical concerns have intruded 
excessively into thinking about war and have interfered with the ability of strategists to 
think technologically. His imputation is that rather than being free to consider means 
and ends from a purely utilitarian perspective, military planning has become thoroughly 
saturated with ethical considerations which demand that the protection of human lives 
(especially those of Western soldiers) is prioritised above all. He argues that this has 
been detrimental to effective military action, as evidenced in Serbia and Somalia, where 
‘aggressive small powers... [and] even mere armed bands... [are permitted to] rampage 
or impose their victories at will’7 due to American ‘squeamishness’. In other words, his 
suggestion is that there is a clash between utility and ethics, and ethics is prevailing.8 A 
contrasting criticism comes from Martin Shaw. His concern is that ‘strategy’, or 
technological writing about war blinds us to the ruinous effect that it necessarily has on 
participants and bystanders, and that we have no evidence that this can be ‘engineered 
out’. That war causes death should be sufficient to invalidate it as a tool of policy. 
Shaw’s argument seeks to interpose itself into the ‘technological writing’ of the 
strategic thinkers9 by indicating (without elaboration) that the body is an end in itself 
and therefore cannot legitimately be employed as a means to an external end. This is 
also the position that Elaine Scarry adopts when she deconstructs the logic of war 
legitimisation which says that ‘‘war (injury) is the cost of freedom’’.10 She contends 
that it is not that the death of soldiers or civilians is a necessary step on the road to 
whatever political goal has been decreed, but that death/injury is the central goal of 
war-making and is itself the end of all military endeavour. She says that ‘while the 
                                                          
6 Martin Heidegger ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ p. 328 
7 Edward N. Luttwak ‘Toward a Post-Heroic Warfare’ pp. 109-122 in Foreign Affairs May 1995 Vol. 74, 
No. 3 p. 116 
8 See also Edward N. Luttwak ‘Give War a Chance’ pp. 36-44 in Foreign Affairs 1999 Vol. 78, No. 4 
9 Martin Shaw ‘Strategy and Slaughter’ pp. 269-277 in Review of International Studies 2003 Vol. 29 No. 
2  
10 Elaine Scarry The Body in Pain Oxford: Oxford University Press 1985 p.76 
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central activity of war is injuring... the fact of injuring tends to be absent from strategic 
and political descriptions of war’.11  
I will argue that technical modes of knowledge such as strategy strive towards a degree 
of scientific certainty. Strategy is concerned with generalisation, and this is the case 
both synchronically and diachronically. That is to say, strategy seeks to attain an 
overview of a specific war without getting caught up in the complexity and confusion 
which might limit its utility as a tool of policy. By maintaining a vision of the war as a 
whole, strategy seeks to link it effectively to the political end for which it is waged. In 
this sense, technological writing about war seeks to move from the complexity of the 
battlefield up to the general progress and direction of the war and the way in which it 
intersects with politics. But strategy also seeks to attain knowledge about war in 
general, and to propose rules, maxims and codes for understanding that transcend 
specific instances of war and apply to war rather than wars. I will try to show that the 
aspiration to this form of knowledge is not compatible with a full consideration of the 
body, which is associated with a different mode of knowledge: more fragmentary, 
singular, and non-generalisable; one which has the potential to present a challenge to 
the systematic view of war to which strategic and technological thinking strive. In this 
chapter, therefore, it is my goal to present strategic and other forms of technological 
writing about war as making certain kinds of claims concerning the knowledge that they 
can have of war, claims which demand a certain kind of body with a certain kind of [in-
]visibility.  
In the first two sections I take strategy and technology in turn and seek to indicate that 
the body is sidelined in these ways of writing due, at least in part, to their commitment 
to the instrumental possibilities of war. In the third section I address Martin Shaw’s 
attempt to overturn this by highlighting the centrality of the body in war, and pointing 
to the impossibility of excluding it through technological innovation: ‘surgical strikes’ 
and precision bombs still kill people. In other words, he attempts to deploy the body to 
overturn the instrumental logic which informs the writing on strategy and technology. 
Concluding, I offer some preliminary thoughts as to why Shaw’s intervention might be 
inadequate as a reconsideration of the body at war. It is not my concern to argue that the 
exclusion of the body is a ‘bad [unethical] thing’ as such, but to start to give expression 
                                                          
11 Ibid. p. 12 
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to the way in which the excluded body is being (negatively) constructed as being the 
sort of entity that one can easily exclude. Contrary to this, I introduce some of the ways 
in which systematic claims to knowledge of the sort made by technological writing 
about war may be reconfigured through a consideration of the body as a perspective 
from which to view war.  
Strategic Thinking: Generalisation and Instrumentalisation  
By ‘strategic thought’, I understand a mode of technological thinking and writing about 
war which is underpinned by Clausewitz’s maxim that war is a continuation of policy 
with other means. Strategy tends to purport to be purely pragmatic: Seabury and 
Codevilla say that ‘[s]trategy is a fancy word for a road map for getting from here to 
there, from the situation at hand to the situation one wishes to attain. Strategy is the 
very opposite of abstract thinking’.12 Put simply, ‘[s]trategy is about how to win 
wars’.13 However, I will try to show in this section that strategy must (re-) produce the 
concepts with which it is concerned (war, politics, strategy) in order to sustain the 
coherence of this commitment to ‘pragmatics’. There are strategists who argue that ‘war 
cannot be studied as an accurate or scientific discipline… it is an art and not a 
science’.14 However, I will suggest below that, in order to be able to analyse ‘war’ as 
such, rather than historical wars in particular, strategic thought must engage in a degree 
of generalisation. Quincy Wright suggests that ‘[s]cience strives for generalizations 
which accord not only with the observations upon which they were based but also with 
all future and past observations at the time the generalization was made’.15 Strategic 
thinking addresses itself not only to individual wars, but to War, and therefore is 
concerned with a strong degree of generalisation, making it quasi-scientific according to 
Wright’s definition. In so doing, however, it must construct war as an abstract form for 
knowledge, and I will try to show that this entails the exclusion or instrumentalisation 
of the body. In other words, the discussion below represents a disagreement with the 
claim that strategy is ‘purely pragmatic’, not concerned with abstract thinking, and 
interested predominantly in ‘reality’.16 Instead, I try to show that in the process of 
                                                          
12 Paul Seabury and Angelo Codevilla War: Ends and Means New York: Basic Books 1990 p. 97 
13 Thomas G. Mahnken ‘Strategic Theory’ pp. 66-81 in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Colin S. Gray and 
Eliot Cohen (eds) Strategy in the Contemporary World Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007 p. 68 
14 Michael I Handel War, Strategy and Intelligence London: Frank Cass. 1989 p. 3 
15 Quincy Wright A Study of War Vol. II Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1959 p. 681 
16 Peter Paret ‘Introduction’ pp. 3-8 in Peter Paret (ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to 
the Nuclear Age Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994 p. 7  
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sustaining a ‘technological writing’ about war, strategy creates a particular image of 
‘reality’. At the same time, the commitment to pragmatics may be used by strategists to 
jettison unwanted ‘ethical’ or ideational baggage which threatens to inhibit strategy’s 
instrumental purpose.17  
This section addresses the way in which strategy’s commitment to the instrumentality 
of war has implications for the body with respect to politics, science, and ethics. It 
represents an exploration of the suspicion that, just as one must delineate an abstract 
concept of ‘war’ in order to understand it, one must first conceive of the body in order 
to exclude it. That is to say that strategy must construct the body as something which 
may be excluded or ignored, although this construction is rarely explicit. Contrary to 
the suggestion that it is self-evident what ‘a body’ is I will be operating throughout 
from the position that the ‘self-evident’ body is the consequence of a certain way of 
writing or thinking, rather than something which exists independently of it. Just as 
strategy is not strictly ‘pragmatic’ with respect to war, but must also define and 
constrain what is meant by war, I will try to suggest that strategic writing, together with 
writing about technology and human rights, enacts certain assumptions about what ‘the 
body’ is. This is done in order to situate it with respect to the other terms with which it 
is concerned, or to disregard it altogether. Colin Gray cautions his readers that ‘[w]hen, 
as in this book, an author is sweeping over the strategic history of a whole century and 
employs collective concepts such as landpower, seapower, airpower, spacepower, and 
cyberpower, it is not difficult to forget that real people must and do execute strategy’.18 
He chastens ‘scholars of a theoretical bent’ for allowing ‘the human dimension’ to 
elude them.19 But if the ‘human dimension’ entails only the extent to which humans 
‘execute’ strategy, then it becomes hard to see why scholars, theoretical or otherwise, 
should include them as they may just as well be replaced with automata.   
Politics  
Colin Gray deploys the image of strategy as a bridge between war and politics: 
‘[s]trategy is the bridge that relates military power to political purpose; it is neither 
military power per se nor political purpose’.20 And elsewhere he reaffirms that 
                                                          
17 Colin S. Gray Another Bloody Century p. 334( italics added) 
18 Colin S. Gray Modern Strategy Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999 p. 26 
19 Ibid. p. 26 
20 Ibid. p. 17  
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‘[s]trategy is the bridge between military power and political purpose... Moreover, 
although it is a bridge that must allow two-way traffic between tasking from policy and 
military feasibility, it is the former that must dominate’.21 He laments that ‘[p]eople 
have no difficulty in comprehending either policy or fighting, regarded separately, but 
to connect the two in a purposeful way, and to keep them connected, is often a mental 
step too far... I would go so far as to claim that on the evidence of performance, strategy 
tends to be a bridge too far for many policymakers and military professionals’.22 The 
idea of strategy as a ‘bridge’ is significant in as much as it constructs the impression of 
war and politics as independently existing entities between which communication must 
be maintained through strategy. It is misleading, however, insofar as it implies that war 
and policy are phenomena which exist on equal levels in different domains, requiring 
only a line of communication between them. Instead, as Gray emphasises, there is a 
hierarchy of relations between war and politics which must be maintained if war is to be 
the effective servant of policy, rather than competing with it for influence. ‘When 
policy fails to command it finds itself the servant of warfare, the reverse of the only 
legitimate terms of the relationship’.23 In the discussion below, I analyse the 
relationship between war and politics as written and mediated by strategic thinking and 
draw out the implications that this has for thinking about war. I will suggest below that 
the emphasis that strategic thinking places on the instrumental function of war means 
that it is presented as being populated almost exclusively by mere ciphers of political 
will.  
The image of strategy as a bridge creates the impression that war and policy pre-exist, 
and must merely be placed into communication with each other. However, strategic 
thought holds that politics is a necessary condition for war to be defined as such. Gray 
states that ‘[i]f....force is not applied for political purposes, then it is not war. It may be 
sport, or crime, or banditry of a kind integral to local culture, but it is not war. War, its 
threat and its actuality, is an instrument of policy’.24 So it is possible for fighting to take 
place for reasons which are not political, but one could not classify this fighting as 
‘war’ without the added dimension of political interest. In the absence of political 
                                                          
21 Colin S. Gray ‘Introduction: Holding the Strategy Bridge’ 1-14 in Colin S. Gray (ed.) Strategy and 
History: Essays on Theory and Practice London: Routledge 2006 p. 1 
22 Ibid. p. 4 
23 Ibid. p. 1 
24 Colin S. Gray ‘What is War? A View from Strategic Studies’ pp. 185- 189 in Colin S. Gray (ed.) 
Strategy and History p. 185 
34 
 
purposes, ‘war’ degenerates into atavistic bloodshed, because the significant thing about 
war is that it ‘is not only an eruption of primordial violence’.25 War has some exterior 
purpose which turns it from primordial violence into war, and this exterior purpose is 
political and is provided by strategy. Of course, on one level, the primordial violence is 
still there, but in war it is not all there is, for the additional political element gives 
violence a purpose. The role of strategy in this is ‘translating military effects into 
political results... It is the essential link between political objectives and military force, 
between ends and means’.26 The implication is that without strategy or policy, war 
would reside in the domain of pure means and would therefore be ‘irrational’. Gray 
affirms ‘the importance of political purpose for defence preparation and the use of force 
in war. Armed forces and their use cannot produce their own justification’.27 War is 
being presented here as being a purely purposive instrument of policy. In the absence of 
this policy, it can no longer be defined as war, so essential is this instrumental element 
to defining the nature of war. Moreover, one can infer that war does not itself have any 
internal ‘political’ significance because war and politics are somehow different orders 
of discourse or activity, and must be ‘translated’ for the comprehension of the other by 
strategy.  
Colin Gray affirms that ‘[m]odern strategy ultimately derives its significance from the 
realm of politics. If this is not true, what else was the strategic history of the twentieth 
century about? Although war and its strategic conduct is an economic activity, engages 
our moral judgement, and consists at its brutal core of combat of various kinds, war is 
not ‘about’ economics, morality, or fighting. Instead, it is about politics.’28 What this 
indicates is that, although war may be a multidimensional phenomenon, the only really 
distinctive thing about it as opposed to other forms of violence is the fact that it is 
‘about’ politics, and it can only be made to be ‘about’ politics through strategy, because 
war and politics are such separate domains of expertise. This conception seems to be 
predicated on a very specific understanding of what ‘politics’ is, in order to facilitate its 
straightforward disaggregation from war and strategy. I will expand on this suggestion 
in the section below. 
                                                          
25 Colin S. Gray Another Bloody Century p. 362 ( italics added) 
26 Thomas G. Mahnken ‘Strategic Theory’ p. 68  
27 Colin S. Gray Modern Strategy p. 30 
28 Ibid. p. 55 
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Clausewitz’s expression of the war/politics relation famously held that ‘’war is simply a 
continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means’’.29 Potentially 
problematic for strategists is the impression that ‘the concept of politics lends itself to 
sundry interpretations’,30 but this receives a two-fold dismissal by Gray. The first is on 
the grounds of ‘common sense’, which means that although intellectual game-playing 
might induce us to call ‘politics’ into question, ‘really’, we know what it is.31 The 
second is founded on certain assumptions about the international system which depend 
upon a strict division between foreign and domestic policy and the rigor of the 
boundary between them. Milan Vego argues that ‘policy’ and ‘politics’ are often used 
(in the strategic literature) as though they are interchangeable, but they are not, quite. 
Whereas ‘policy’ is the use of power to achieve a certain goal, ‘politics’ is the 
distribution of power.32 So, ‘[p]olicy... decides whether to enter a war... it is the task of 
policy to determine and articulate a... desired end state... Policy also determines and 
defines the... limitations on the combat employment of one’s military forces’.33 Politics 
determines the distribution of power within a system, and thereby judges who is 
empowered to make decisions. The decisions that the relevant bodies/individuals make 
(with respect to war/foreign policy) are policy decisions. ‘Politics produces policy, 
which may require the services of strategy’.34 In any case, Gray suggests that there is no 
need to be pedantic on this point, and ‘it is wise to be relaxed about, and empathetic to, 
the exact meaning of ‘political’ over the centuries’.35 
I would suggest, however, that strategic thought tends to be anything but relaxed as to 
what policy/politics entails and encompasses. For in order to sustain the ‘trinity’ 
between war, strategy and politics discussed above, it is necessary to keep them 
separate and hierarchically organised, and this seems both to empower and to curtail 
‘politics’. Gray says that ‘[a]lthough some individuals enjoy fighting, some institutions 
anticipate benefit from hostilities, and the community at whole finds the condition of 
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war to be pleasurably thrilling, the decision to fight will be political’.36 The fact that 
‘some individuals, groups, or institutions anticipate benefit of a non-political kind from 
a condition of belligerency’ is not relevant to the claim that what is essential about war 
is its political dimension. Politics is empowered insofar as that it is given a central 
position in determining the ends of war, but it is limited because of all the things that it 
is not. As indicated above, politics is not economics or profit or pleasure or fear. We are 
not provided with a clear indication of what politics is, in this context, other than the 
decision to go to war, and could therefore legitimately conclude that, from the 
perspective of strategic thought, politics is the act of decision.  
It might be legitimate to enquire at this point exactly what is at stake in this discussion 
of the parameters of ‘the political’. After all, strategic thought it not concerned with a 
discussion of politics as such. Bernard Brodie says that ‘[s]trategic thinking, or 
“theory”, if one prefers, is nothing if not pragmatic. Strategy is a “how to do it” study, a 
guide to the accomplishment of something and doing it efficiently’.37 So in this sense 
we might conclude that it is not for strategy to speculate on what politics might be, or 
what other iterations it might have, because its job is simply to interact with politics at 
the point of policymaking—to ask for a deeper engagement would be to misunderstand 
what strategy is ‘for’. But this would be disingenuous. It is clear from the above 
discussion on how we define ‘war’ that strategy avows its own capacity to change the 
conceptual parameters of that with which it comes into contact. The tendency within 
strategic thinking to insist upon a narrow definition of politics as an act of decision 
which is in hierarchical relation to strategy and war is necessary in order that ‘war’ be 
apprehended as instrumental. The commitment of strategic thinking to the notion that 
war can be of use to politics depends upon the radical separation of the two, otherwise 
the means-ends logic upon which the entire edifice is constructed will collapse along 
the lines elucidated by Elaine Scarry. Scarry exposes the fallacies underlying 
justifications for military action which take the form of ‘x is the cost of y’. These are 
fallacious because they suppose that ‘war’ and the political end state which war helps to 
achieve are two distinct spaces populated by distinct groups of people, neither of these 
spaces is fully embodied, since death and injury are not ‘the end’. This commitment to 
technological writing about war effaces the fact that the body cannot be thus 
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technologised and its death is not a step on the road toward ‘freedom’, but the end of 
the road. Instead of war for liberation or glory or freedom, Scarry suggests that war 
should be coupled only with the death and suffering that are its inevitable 
companions.38  
Aspects of war which do not fall under this strict definition of ‘politics’ are discussed 
only on the condition that they are acknowledged as being parenthetic to the serious 
business of making strategy. Gray acknowledges that ‘[m]uch of the potential cannon-
fodder in conflicts from Afghanistan to Liberia fights for motives no more strategic 
than food, self-respect, greed, lust, ambition, and boredom’.39 In terms of his own 
position, he says that ‘this text can hide from the face of battle, the tactical doing of 
strategy, behind its high level of analysis…Nonetheless, I admit to some discomfort 
with an analysis which blanks out people and is obliged to treat them as cipher-like 
combatants in the engagements that strategy must use for the political object of war’.40 I 
would suggest that strategy is predicated upon the possibility of thinking of people as 
conduits for political will, which is why Gray ‘is obliged’ to do it, although it causes 
him some discomfort. Not only is ‘war’ positioned outside the political community of 
ends, it is further removed from policy by strategy, which purports not to be political. I 
would suggest that this expresses strategy’s commitment to appear as a technological 
writing which is determined to prove its pragmatic utility. ‘Bodies’ only appear as 
channels through which strategy can fulfil the political will, and as such they are more 
akin to units of capability or force than to anything we would recognise as human. One 
might argue that it is forgivable and even necessary for strategy to exclude the 
inessential, and indeed the point is not so much to condemn strategic thought, but to 
suggest that in order to exclude the ‘non-political’ thus, it must first organise the world 
to make this possible.  
I have sought to suggest in this section that strategy is instrumental in placing politics in 
a certain relation to war, one which relies on a putative separation between the two. It is 
this hierarchical separation which makes it possible for war to appear as an instrument 
of policy. Insisting on this instrumental character of war with respect to politics 
suggests that war has no dynamic potential of its own. Gray acknowledges that ‘war has 
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a grammar of its own, aside from the political logic of policy... Nonetheless, war is an 
instrument of policy and by and large is controlled by it’.41 Caveats about the dynamic 
of war do not disrupt the core claim that war is instrumental, and in any case this 
dynamic is not political. Therefore, insofar as that the body is considered by strategy, it 
is as a pure instrument of political will. Characteristics extraneous to this expression of 
will are disregarded as ‘non-strategic’ and ‘non-political’. This analytic framework is 
founded upon a strict distinction between the rational and the irrational, and hence both 
war and politics are understood in restricted and highly instrumentalised forms. One 
might counter that ‘bodies’ are clearly assumed to exist by strategy, but I would suggest 
that what is assumed is the existence of entities capable of expressing political will, and 
there is no particular reason why these should be human bodies, although historically 
they generally have been.  
Science  
As discussed above, strategy is involved with defining war and politics in order to 
interpose itself between them as a branch of knowledge and a way of thinking capable 
of providing guidance as to the ‘proper’ ways of war. It seeks to develop and convey 
principles for the ‘better’ and more effective conduct of war, and so therefore aims to 
encompass both theories about historical wars and prescriptions for the conduct of 
future ones. If military planners are not to commit the cardinal error and “prepare for 
the last war”,42 then strategic thought must furnish some general rules for the conduct 
of war which are independent from specific moments of conflict. One may define 
science in this context as that which ‘strives for generalizations which accord not only 
with the observations upon which they were based but also with all future and past 
observations unknown at the time the generalization was made’.43 Bernard Brodie 
lamented after the Second World War that ‘strategy is not receiving the scientific 
treatment it deserves... [and that] our failure to train our military leaders in the scientific 
study of strategy has been costly in war’.44 Although it would be false to claim that all 
strategic writing assumes the status of a ‘science’, nonetheless strategic thought tends to 
emphasise abstraction and generality, and to highlight the generic features of war over 
the specific details of particular wars. In this section I will discuss various iterations of 
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the tendency of strategic thinking to concern itself with the regular, general and 
predictable over the specific, contingent, and mutable, before suggesting some possible 
implications for the capacity of strategy to take account of the body. I focus first on 
what I take to be a ‘scientific’ ambition in strategic thinking, associated with the work 
of Baron de Jomini.   
Jomini belonged to a tradition which ‘saw war as the application of the principles of a 
military science: to follow these principles was virtually to ensure victory: to neglect 
them was to make defeat a certainty’.45 While Clausewitz emphasised the importance of 
factors outside the regulatory scope of ‘scientific’ strategy, such as friction, fog, genius, 
chance, and so on, Baron de Jomini and his theoretical descendents tend to imply that 
these factors are the inconvenient consequence of ineffective strategic reasoning: In 
other words, that they are extraneous and inessential elements of war, rather than being 
integral to it.46 All strategists must claim for themselves some general expertise which 
transcends particular wars and is not bogged down in historical detail and ‘must clearly 
distinguish between the unique and the representative’.47 However, some go further and 
make strong claims about the capacity of strategic thought to offer certainty, as with the 
Soviet conviction that ‘[m]ilitary strategy is a system of scientific knowledge dealing 
with the laws of war as an armed conflict’.48 Jomini may be thought of as the ‘climactic 
figure of the rationalist strategic tradition’.49 It has been suggested that Jomini, not 
Clausewitz, was the dominant inspiration for strategists in the American Civil War,50 
and that his thought continues to resonate with American military institutions.51 
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Commentators have remarked that ‘the continuing adherence of the US Army to 
[Jomini’s] ideas is at once interesting and troubling’.52  
The extent to which Jomini’s ideas continue to influence American military instruction 
and thinking is reflected in Lieutenant Colonel Saulnier’s view that ‘after nine months 
of instruction [at the US Army Command and General Staff College], the author found 
it difficult to escape the conclusion that Jomini walks the college halls and is, in fact, 
regularly attending class’.53 Jomini insisted that ‘there is one great principle underlying 
all the operations of war,—a principle which must be followed in all good 
combinations’.54 He saw his role in systematising the laws of war in a scientific 
manner, excluding ‘unnecessary’ details and personal accounts. Jomini insisted that ‘the 
art of war has existed in all time, and strategy especially was the same under Caesar as 
under Napoleon’.55 He sought a ‘small number of timeless principles’56 which ‘reduced 
war to a geometric calculus’,57 thus producing a science or mathematics of warfare. 
Therefore, it may be suggested that Jomini’s ‘art’ was more akin to a science. 
Striving to become ‘scientific’, strategy must deal delicately with the question of the 
significance of context. In one sense, one cannot understand war in a vacuum, and 
context is an important accompaniment to the ‘scientific’ tendency in strategic thought. 
One must keep an eye on context if ‘strategy’ is to remain securely moored between 
‘military force’ and ‘policy’, otherwise it risks abstracting itself into obsolescence. It is 
therefore recognised as being ‘necessary to think of warfare as having political, socio-
cultural-technological, historical, and strategic contexts which give it meaning and 
character’.58 ‘War’, taken as a coherent unit of analysis, must be situated within a wider 
framework of analysis. As well as being political, warfare is an ‘expression of 
culture’,59 and although strategic thought posits some essential characteristics of ‘war’, 
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no one would seriously suggest that this view is not enriched by putting some 
contextual meat on the conceptual bones. This said, affording too much constructive 
power to context degrades the possibility of referring to some ‘essential’ aspect of war 
which exists alongside the contingent. This is incompatible with the idea of strategic 
thought as being something which has general form and content which exists through 
time. I would suggest that strategic thought, whether of a ‘scientific’ bent or not, must 
somehow construct ‘war’ as a general object for analysis which has common features 
throughout all specific manifestations of war. Discussing the relationship between 
strategy and history, Gray says that ‘strategic theorists tend to be unduly interested in 
the general at the potential expense of the particular... [but] historians are overly prone 
to retreat into the rich singularity of detail at the possible expense of a general 
wisdom’.60 It is implied in strategic thought that statements about war may to some 
extent be valid across the ages. Therefore, in part the duty of the strategist is to ‘look for 
the hidden jokers in a situation, the vagaries of circumstance which profoundly affected 
the outcome... he must engage in a refined analytical operation... [which] requires a 
mind trained for analysis and the rigorous scrutiny of evidence’.61 I want to suggest that 
the fact that strategic thinking emphasises the generalisable makes it necessary for it to 
exclude the body.  
For example, it is possible to argue, from a constructivist perspective, that weapons do 
not have ‘real’ effects that are separable from their social effects. They are thoroughly 
social, which is to say, thoroughly determined by context. From this point of view, 
‘[t]he technological object—the bullet—only exists as part of prior social constructions 
and contemporary social actions’.62 It seems relatively uncontentious—even 
conservative—to insist upon the importance of social context in situating technologies; 
on the intrinsic sociality of the technical.63 However, attributing constructive power to 
context seriously imperils strategic thought. As far as strategic thought is concerned, the 
‘constructivist approach’ ‘suffers the limitations of microinterpretivist approaches in 
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understanding large-scale social patterns’.64 This is because the constructivist approach 
here outlined suggests that one cannot understand ‘social phenomena’ on the macro-
scale, so one must take account of the body. This would mean that war is inappropriate 
as a unit for analysis, because it already assumes too much about the bodies that occupy 
it. It would also mean that strategic thought is somehow defective as an epistemology. 
Stone points out that ‘[t]he strategist’s tendency... to reify technology—to abstract out 
from the unique and contingent properties of sociotechnical systems... is a necessary 
consequence of efforts to derive generalized insights for strategic theory’.65  
I have tried to show that whether or not it claims a scientific status for itself, at the very 
least strategy must construct ‘war’ as a general phenomenon in order to make enduring 
claims about its nature. It must therefore be highly selective about those aspects of 
actually existing wars that it takes account of, and those which are designated as non-
repeatable. I would contend, then, that this makes strategy ill-equipped to take account 
of the body as anything other than a generalisable unit for the application of strategic 
design. It is possible to suggest that this is in part because the particular capabilities of 
certain bodies defy inclusion into a more widely applicable schema.66 In addition, the 
constructive specificity of a particular conflation of forces on bodies in any specific 
circumstance can also not be accommodated because, as discussed above, this hinders 
the development of enduring principles. Committed to furnishing prescriptions for the 
prosecution of future wars, strategic thought cannot be concerned with the dense 
phenomenological experience which might inhere in any particular war, as this is 
unlikely to be precisely repeated in future. The strategist must travel ‘beyond history—
i.e. beyond experience—to explore the feebly lit realm of “what might have been”’.67 
Not only is experience a problem for strategic thought, it is also potentially an 
irrelevance, unless it conduces directly to an understanding of how certain outcomes 
eventuate. Because of its self-affirmed status as a quasi-scientific discourse, strategic 
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thinking does not accommodate the unrepeatable aspects of the body at war, which 
would in any case be irrelevant to the goal of ‘winning the war’.68 
Ethics 
Finally, I would suggest that strategic thought is in some senses ethically blind, and that 
this blindness derives at least in part from its stance with respect to the body. Of course, 
it would be misleading to suggest that ethics and war are wholly unrelated, as Just War 
theory is concerned precisely with the rules of ethical conduct in war. Historically, 
appeal to ‘military necessity’ has legitimised deviation from the norms of Just War, and 
even the Nuremburg Principles insert a caveat into the definition of war crimes, which 
are understood as being acts ‘not justified by military necessity’.69 Indeed, Martin Shaw 
is critical of the Just War tradition on the grounds that it gives too much away to 
‘military necessity’, and therefore makes ethics insufficiently binding even in 
principle.70 Moreover, it is subject to conjecture among strategists that the intrusion of 
ethical qualms into strategic planning may diminish the utility of war and ultimately do 
harm.71 Edward Luttwak argues that the United Nations should be censured for its 
consistent reluctance to allow wars to follow their natural course. In imposing a 
premature conclusion to hostilities, he suggests, the UN obstructs the achievement of a 
lasting peace. For example, in Bosnia, ‘[u]ninterrupted war would certainly have caused 
further suffering and led to an unjust outcome from one perspective or another, but it 
would have also led to a more stable situation that would have let the postwar era truly 
begin’.72 This implies that it is only after war has done its work that ethics can flourish: 
war and ethics are temporally and analytically in different worlds. Gray says that ‘ethics 
follow culture, which follows strategic context’.73 
To construct a framework in which war appears as a policy option potentially 
equivalent to any other, strategic thought must efface the degree to which war causes 
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suffering and death. Luttwak laments that the rush to peace is driven in part by 
‘frivolous motives, such as television audiences’ revulsion at harrowing scenes of 
war’.74 He argues that US foreign policy is being emasculated by ‘political constraints 
[that] greatly restrict [ground forces’] availability’.75 To preserve the idea of war as 
pragmatic, strategic thought must resist the temptation to become derailed by 
considerations of death and suffering since these are the necessary cost of the projection 
of power in the world. In this sense, the body tends to be marginalised because it tends 
to confuse the overall goal of the use of military force, and to introduce ethical 
objections which are inimical to the pursuit of long term strategic objectives. Luttwak 
argues that it may be possible to see war now for stable peace in the future as the better 
choice than an unstable peace now. Such a war has a rational basis. It also has an ethical 
basis, if it signifies the path towards the creation of the conditions of flourishing for 
ethics. Seeing the ‘big picture’, it becomes feasible for strategists to align war with 
rationality and to elide any conflict it has with ‘ethics’. Gray argues that a ‘strategist 
worthy of the name is a person who sees... all dimensions of the ‘big picture’ of the 
evolving conditions of war’.76 For Shaw, ‘[w]ar is both the rational, purposive activity 
that strategic thought guides and the necessarily unpredictable, uncontrollable, 
irrationally destructive clash of opposing wills that combatants and victims 
experience’.77 However, strategy tends only to be concerned with the former and must 
suppress the latter for fear that it proves obstructive to the achievement of ultimate 
goals. For strategic thought, ‘[i]t might be said that ethics is akin to the dog that did not 
bark in the night’.78 This is partially because politics is taken to be the domain in which 
all the ethical ‘working out’ takes place, and strategy has positioned itself outside 
politics: ‘the ethical dimension to statecraft and strategy is already integral to the human 
and bureaucratic instruments that decide upon strategic issues’.79 Moreover, if there is a 
danger that ‘revulsion at harrowing scenes of war’ undermines long-term policy 
planning including the use of war, then it seems likely that it follows that strategy 
should not give undue attention to the aspects of war which are common to all wars, 
i.e., death and killing.  
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Brodie points out that ‘[w]riters on strategy, and certainly its practitioners, have almost 
always rejected from their conscious concern those characteristics of war that to 
ordinary folk are its most conspicuous ones. In the treatises on strategy, battlefields 
rarely have the smell of death’.80 This is not only because strategists are focused on a 
milieu above that of the battlefield, but also because their commitment to the 
instrumental utility of both war and of writing strategy militates against the inclusion of 
those factors which are not useful, but are merely ‘in themselves’ tragic or painful. 
Moreover, as with Luttwak’s comments, there is the imputation that the inclusion of 
these factors may turn us away from war when it is in fact the necessary and correct 
course: as Brodie says; ‘the decision to go to war has not always in retrospect appeared 
wrong, the alternative in some instances being submission to unmitigated lawlessness, 
tyranny, and other evils. Those to whom Hitler is a live memory cannot be in doubt 
about that’.81 More than this, strategic thought does not really give us the tools with 
which to decide whether war is ‘wrong’ or not, except from a means-ends point of 
view.82 ‘Ethics’ is generally placed with ‘politics’ as something with which strategic 
thought is not directly concerned. In addition, because strategy must be committed to 
the possibility that war is potentially an appropriate instrument of policy, it is of no 
benefit to give too much attention to the inevitable death and suffering that it causes. 
From an instrumental perspective, it seems, the generative effects of the experience of 
war are not of concern, especially because the conception of war here considered tends 
to be abstract rather than visceral.  
Strategic thought, through the desire to produce generalised conclusions and maxims 
about warfare, demonstrates a tendency toward abstraction by excluding ‘unique and 
contingent properties of sociotechnical systems’. Therefore, any embodied approach 
which insists upon the contingent and the ‘irrational’ tends to appear inimical to 
strategic thought, and is tolerated only as an excluded component of warfare which is of 
anecdotal and personal interest only. John Keegan suggests that where bodies do 
appear, they are shorn of the features that would make them conceivable as multi-
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dimensional political entities. He says that ‘[t]he warrior in Clausewitz was a sort of 
cipher—a being subject to fear and fatigue and capable of bravery—but faceless, 
unindividualistic and asocial, for all that Clausewitz had to say about the enthusiasm of 
popular armies… He was a being without family or friends, without a future or past, 
without values, good or bad, except for the incidental flash of courage or self-
sacrifice’.83 Since one of the key functions of strategy is to link violent conflict to 
political ends, all aspects of combat that cannot be thus instrumentalised must be 
excluded. In his famous elucidation of friction, Clausewitz takes the reader into battle 
with an inexperienced soldier. He writes ‘[l]et us accompany the novice to the battle-
field. As we approach, the thunder of the cannon becoming plainer and plainer is soon 
followed by the howling of shot, which attracts the attention of the inexperienced. Balls 
begin to strike the ground close to us, before and behind... we begin to feel that we are 
no longer perfectly at ease and collected; even the bravest is at least to some degree 
confused... The young soldier cannot reach any of these different strata of danger 
without feeling that the light of reason does not move here in the same medium’.84 But 
the thrust of strategic thought has tended to travel in the opposite direction: away from 
the heat of battle, and towards the light of reason.  
Technology and the Utility of War 
In the last section I tried to suggest that strategic thought is committed to a kind of 
technological writing which invests both the writing and its object, war, with the 
appearance of instrumental purpose. The overall effect with respect to the body tends to 
be a combination of concealment, simplification and inattention. In this section I will 
try to show that this aspect of strategic thinking resonates with a certain way of thinking 
about war and technology. In the first instance, this is because they share a core 
commitment to the ideas of utility and efficiency as lying at the heart of the project of 
thinking about war. In addition, there is the underlying assumption that it may be 
possible to wage better war, whatever criteria are used to define ‘better’. Lastly, there is 
a sense in which they share certain generally unstated assumptions about the body. For 
as discussed above, for strategists the body is largely considered only as a cipher, or a 
device through which the strategic design may be implemented. Factors extraneous 
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from this function are largely excluded from strategic consideration. For strategic 
thought, then, the body fulfils a purely technical function. However, there are many 
things that the human body is poorly adapted to do. In the context of the lethality of 
modern weapons systems, survivability on the battlefield may be extremely low. In 
addition, human bodies are prone to fatigue, disobedience, over-exuberance, and 
multiple other kinds of deviation from perfect functionality.  
So in strategic thought, the body tends to be regarded as something which is the agent 
of strategic design and political will, but in a potentially problematic and limited way. 
Within this frame of thought, the task for technological writers focused on technology is 
to engineer in a substitute to the human body which is not subject to the same 
limitations. Technology is sometimes regarded as holding out the possibility of making 
war an ever more perfect tool of politics. Michael Ignatieff suggests that ‘[t]he 
technologies put to use in Kosovo are the result of a revolution in military affairs... 
whose purpose was to return war in the West to its position as the continuation of 
politics by other means’.85 The story goes that the total wars of the twentieth century 
threatened the coherence of the idea of the ‘utility of war’ by unleashing a maelstrom of 
mass destruction which seriously imperilled the polities that war had been intended to 
protect. The distinction between war, politics, culture and ethics became increasingly 
muddied. Christopher Coker suggests that ‘[s]omething was lost in the mayhem [of the 
Second World War]—that inner belief in war... modern warfare reached a dead-end: not 
so much an endgame as a point beyond which it was impossible to play the game by the 
old rules any longer’.86 It is conducive to the security of the politics/war hierarchy if 
technology replaces the human body at war, as this enhances the appearance of war as 
purely instrumental. Through the use of so-called surgical strikes and precision 
weaponry, technology seems to provide redemption to war and to bring it closer to 
realising the strategic dream in which reason dominates the conduct of war.  
Of course, here too, care is needed as to the extent of convergence and complicity 
between the technological writing about war of strategy, and the technological writing 
about the potentially redemptive or transformational impact of technology on war. 
Indeed, there is a tension between them insofar as that strategic thought emphasises the 
enduring features of war and is hostile to the notion that it can be transformed. In 
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addition, strategic thinkers tend to place strategy at or close to the top of the hierarchy 
of importance when thinking about war. So, ‘the engines of war can perform no better 
than the people who must direct them’,87 in other words, the strategists. But the 
disagreements between technophiles and technophobes88 do not really need to concern 
us here, because as with the discussion about strategic thinking, the arguments made 
matter less than the way that the arguments are made. Technology may be a panacea, or 
its effective use may require that the ‘strategic bridge’ be maintained. But the important 
thing is the way in which war and technology are written about technologically, which 
is sustained by embedded assumptions about the rationality of war, and the status of the 
body. If both strategists and technologists adhere to the notion that war is instrumental, 
then the instruments engaged in waging war may be human bodies, or they may be 
robotic technologies. Moreover, many of those writing about technology and war are 
driven implicitly or explicitly by the desire to remove the body from the battlefield. 
Strategists and technologists may disagree about each others’ relative importance, but I 
would suggest that they are to some extent speaking the same language.  
The impact of new technologies on the way that war is apprehended, experienced and 
waged is dramatised by the evolution of air power as a strategic tool. Air power was 
embraced as offering the potential for war fighters to stand above the confusion of the 
battlefield and to survey the scene untroubled by the melee of battle. It promised to 
offer the capacity for pilots to view the battle as strategists viewed the war: with an 
appraising, rational eye standing apart from the confusion of combat. The air power 
theorist and enthusiast Giulio Douhet stated that ‘[a]s long as man remained tied to the 
surface of the earth, his activities had to be adapted to the conditions imposed by that 
surface… The uneven configuration of the land surface presents all kinds of obstacles 
which hinder movement of solid bodies over it…Thus the surface of the earth gradually 
became covered with lines of easy transit intersecting at various points, at others 
separated by zones less easy of access, sometimes impassable’.89 Douhet and the air 
power optimists hoped that it was possible to take to the sky and enjoy perfect 
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manoeuvrability.90 Air power seemed to promise a ‘third dimension’91 overcoming the 
‘natural’ limitations of the embodied perspective. In terms of sight, then, air power was 
taken as being a technology able to overcome the limitations of the partial, situated 
view and to provide something approaching omniscience. Advantageous too was the 
fact that air power removed the pilot from the scene of battle and therefore from its 
potentially upsetting or confusing features.  
The rise of air power signified the rise of killing at a distance, and killing at a distance 
is widely regarded as being psychologically easier than killing in hand-to-hand combat: 
‘The combatants in modern warfare pitch bombs from 20,000 feet in the morning, 
causing untold suffering to civilian populations, and then eat hamburgers for dinner 
thousands of miles away from the drop zone’.92 Air power was increasingly exploited 
for the fact that it could shield killers from the fact of killing: those who kill and those 
who die to occupy different moral and geopolitical universes. For the former, the 
implication is that the act of killing barely need intrude on the quotidian pattern of their 
lives. Dave Grossman speculates that if the bomber crew members on Operation 
Gomorrah ‘had had to turn a flamethrower on each one of those seventy thousand 
women and children... the awfulness and trauma inherent in the act would have been of 
such a magnitude that it simply would not have happened’.93 This might seem 
melodramatic, but it merely serves to illustrate the point that, thanks to air power, 
killing becomes easier because confrontation with death is deferred. Grossman suggests 
that the majority of soldiers have an aversion to killing: ‘the average soldier will not kill 
unless coerced and conditioned and provided with mechanical and mental leverage’.94 
His thesis is that ‘the history of warfare can be seen as a history of increasingly more 
effective mechanisms for enabling and conditioning men to overcome their innate 
resistance to killing their fellow human beings’.95 So as air power enabled pilots to 
think and see more clearly, raised above the confusion of battle, at the same time it 
ensured that they saw less clearly in terms of the death and destruction that their 
technologies wrought.  
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The rise of air power seemed to signal a growing gulf between aerial combatants and 
civilians. Randall Jarrell’s WWII poem about bomber crewmen contains the lines:  
our bodies lay among 
The people we had killed and never seen96 
And the Canadian bomber pilot J. Douglas Harvey visiting Berlin in the 1960s 
recounted that “I could not visualize the horrible deaths my bombs... had caused here. I 
had no feeling of guilt. I had no feeling of accomplishment’.97 Although air power 
might seem to present the possibility for the realisation of a Cartesian dream of rational 
warfare, it is important to note the disjuncture between the optimistic claims of the air 
power enthusiasts and the different view that a shift in perspective proffers. While the 
technological view of war addresses the use of air power from the perspective of the 
utility of war, ‘on the ground’ matters appear very different, irrational and hellish.98 
Jörg Friedrich details a catalogue of visceral horrors which were evident in Wuppertal, 
the bombing of which in May 1943 ‘was regarded in England as the most successful 
mission’.99 Statisticians and chemists attempted to bring scientific rigour to bear on area 
bombing between 1943-1945, in the hope of compensating for the fact that ‘pilots could 
not be programmed as perfectly as the chemical mixtures of the bombs’.100 Friedrich 
suggests that the ‘fire raids’ on Germany were unique because ‘never... [before] had the 
history of a weapon been guided totally by scientists’.101 However, the ‘scientific’ 
origins of the bombing war did not result in the exercise of pure reason in practice, and 
the extent to which bomber crewmen were insulated from the stress of their job by 
virtue of their aerial position was limited, suggests Friedrich. ‘The boyish candidates 
who went on their thirty sorties ... soon had incredible horror stamped into their 
features’.102 This was more the consequence of their helplessness in the face of air 
defence than the mass deaths they caused.103 However, it is enough to suggest that the 
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apparent strategic rationality of any particular action is likely to degrade in practice, and 
that the fact that there is a gulf between the horror of those on the ground caught up in 
bombing and the experience of those in the air, this does not necessarily connote 
detachment and disinterest on the side of the latter.  
This notwithstanding, faith in the redemptive potential of air power appears to remain 
potent in western militaries. Arguably, the United States, in its continued search for 
Jominian precision, has been particularly optimistic about the possibilities of air power. 
Daryl G. Press said that ‘[f]or US foreign policy, the Gulf War seems to show—and the 
1999 Kosovo conflict appears to confirm—that air power is now so lethal, and 
American air power so dominant, that the United States can win nearly cost-free 
military victories against its foes’.104 This has produced ‘what seemed a callous 
assumption among airmen that the kind of future war of which they spoke could 
somehow provide quick, clean, mechanical, and impersonal solutions to problems with 
which others had struggled for centuries’.105 ‘Clean’ and ‘impersonal’, presumably, 
because with air power, killing need no longer be visceral and therefore potentially 
morally compromising. For example, trying to make sense of My Lai, Tim O’Brien 
says that ‘[a]fter fire fights, after friends died, there was... a great deal of anger—black, 
fierce, hurting anger—the kind you want to take out on whatever presents itself... I 
know the boil that precedes butchery’.106 Despite the best efforts of the US government, 
My Lai endured as a silent critique of the idea of a good war nobly fought by 
incorruptible heroes.107 Visceral engagement with war is unpredictable and morally 
unstable, potentially producing outcomes which undermine the idea of the war as a 
purposive and rational venture. Air power appears to allow pilots to apprehend battle as 
the strategist apprehends war: with oversight, guided by reason. Faith in the utility of air 
power seems to survive despite historical failures or inadequacies,108 partially because it 
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is underpinned by the technological view of war that sees it as an improvable project. 
This, together with the comparative safety enjoyed by the pilot in modern warfare, 
produces what Ignatieff calls ‘virtual war’.109 He says that ‘[t]echnological mastery 
removed death from our experience of war. But war without death—to our side—is war 
that ceases to be fully real to us: virtual war’.110  
In the discussion of strategic thought I suggested that death in war had the potential 
power to interrupt the technical means-ends logic which informs strategic thought. 
Unless concealed or converted into some system of explanatory power, the dead body 
threatens to undermine the utility of war because the permanence of death seems 
incompatible with the notion that war can be for something. Technology offers a 
potential way around this by providing substitutes to the human body in war in the form 
of remotely operated or robotic systems.111 But it is not only in its potential to die that 
the human body is potentially subversive of the utility of war, but also in its potential to 
feel rage, compassion, confusion, and a plethora of other unpredictable emotional 
responses. Technology also promises to help here. Distancing the soldier from the heat 
of battle may enhance the extent to which it is viewed rationally, rather than 
emotionally, and as killing becomes less visceral it becomes correspondingly easier to 
bear. J.F.C. Fuller suggests that in the technological epoch of war, heralded with the 
first use of gunpowder, ‘the hidden impulse... is the elimination of the human element 
both physically and morally, intellect alone remaining’.112 Replacing the body with 
technology at war seems to offer the potential to fulfil the strategic dream of agents of 
war functioning as ciphers of political will. Although strategic thinking strives to 
construct soldiers as conduits for political decision, there is always the potential that 
this unstable situation will be disrupted by the unpredictable actions of men at war, or 
by the responses of domestic publics to the spectacle of death. Technology seems to be 
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motivated by the desire to distance ‘our’ soldiers from the battlefield, and this has a 
variety of advantages. With air power and remote technologies, the death and 
destruction which results from their use is in many ways invisible to the operator. 
Therefore, any resistance to killing is weakened because it barely seems as though 
killing is taking place. In this sense, perspectives on war are radically divergent, not 
least because air power has historically been seen to involve high levels of civilian 
casualties,113 but also because killing and dying seem to take place in different registers. 
In addition, the hope is that the use of air power and remote technologies reduces the 
risk that ‘our’ soldiers will be put in harm’s way, so therefore the potentially inhibiting 
effect of ‘body bag syndrome’ is overcome, and war is revived as a thinkable policy 
option.   
‘Human rights’: Interventions in the Instrumental Logic of War 
I have suggested that strategy and technology have tended to exclude the body. This is 
in both cases motivated by the need to think war as something which one can have a 
general and close-to complete knowledge of, with an instrumental function. This leads 
to a kind of technological writing which sees all components of war only in terms of 
their contribution to its overall utility. There are nuances in the way in which this 
agenda is expressed in different iterations of these modes of thought, and indeed, in 
many cases the body is not so much excluded but presented as being the transparent 
servant of political will. Where in strategic thought the body appears, it is as a cipher 
for politics, and is therefore less ‘a body’ as we would recognise in the human sense, 
and more a unit of force application, or a conduit for an strategic design. Technological 
thought seems to proceed from the tacit recognition that this body is imperfectly 
realisable in practice, and then proceeds to attempt to engineer in the more obedient, 
more resilient, more deadly body. This may be an augmented human body, or it may be 
an autonomous robotic system. Machines can come to take over from people as the 
heroes of war: For example, in the Second World War; ‘in the popular imagination the 
planes were anthropomorphized. Indeed, the Spitfire so captured the British 
imagination... that it became the icon of the battle, the equivalent of Achilles’s armour 
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and Arthur’s sword’.114 The theorisation of war has often involved the production of the 
chimerical war without bodies, as in the ways outlined above.  
Of course, it is problematic to speak of ‘the body’ and war, without specifying whose 
body we are concerned with. I have suggested that the ‘thick’ political conception of 
personhood is absent from war because strategic thought insists upon the distinction 
between war and politics.115 However, there is a difference between the body of the 
allied soldier, which may be present as a cipher or agent, and the body of the enemy 
soldier or civilian non-combatant, which is rarely present at all, especially in the case of 
the latter. In this sense, the body of the enemy or civilian is subject to a kind of double 
concealment, whereby the already ephemeral body is further effaced and the fact that 
war is about killing is decentred. This is underlined by the ‘morally problematic human 
habit of saying, “I am going off to die for my country” rather than acknowledging that 
“I am going off to kill for my country”’,116 which tends to conceal the body of the 
enemy. Emphasising the technical importance of war tends to gloss the fact that the 
purpose of this techno-strategic mastery is to learn to kill people more effectively. The 
invisibility of enemy dead therefore facilitates the translation of the military victory to 
political victory without it becoming contaminated or ossified in the bodies of enemy 
dead. The noble purpose of military activity can all too often crumble in the face of the 
death it causes. Scarry opines that war is concerned with ‘the reciprocal infliction of 
massive injury and the essential disowning of the injury so that its attributes can be 
transferred elsewhere, as they cannot if they are permitted to cling to the original site of 
the wound, the human body’.117 
As is suggested throughout, however, the extent to which war is an apolitical realm of 
pure technology is limited in practice. The normative lens through which war is viewed 
is a product of the ethico-political climate of the times. Philip Bobbitt has suggested 
that, taking a long view, we can see that the way in which states view success and 
failure in war changes as a consequence of the evolutionary relationship between the 
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state and its citizens, and the obligations that are acknowledged to pertain on both sides.  
For example, he argues that twenty first century western states may be classified as 
‘states of consent’. These are juxtaposed to what he calls ‘states of terror’ which use 
coercion rather than consent as the organising principle of society. The chief war aims 
of a state of consent are ‘the protection of civilian lives and the preservation of the rule 
of law’.118 Therefore, the idea of ‘victory’ in a war between a state of consent and a 
state of terror is asymmetrical: ‘States of consent don’t need to win; they simply need 
not to lose. Indeed, for such states, not losing amounts to winning’.119 In distinction 
from the twenty-first century ‘states of consent’, the industrial nation states of the 
twentieth century were founded on the ‘improvement of the material well-being of... 
[their] people to confirm... [their] legitimacy’120 and were more concerned with 
common interests and identities, and a strong relationship of dependence and influence 
between people and state. Types of war and expectations of what was acceptable in war 
were correspondingly different.  
It has been subject to conjecture that the late twentieth/early twenty-first century has 
seen a decline in the willingness of Western states to see their soldiers die in battle. 
Michael Mandelbaum suggests that, in the late twentieth century Western states, 
‘[m]ost people are more interested in becoming wealthy than in risking their lives in 
war’:121 ‘Americans... [do] not want to die’.122 Michael Walzer suggests that the basis 
of the rules of war has been that, ‘“Soldiers are made to be killed... that is why war is 
hell”... [but] no one else is made to be killed’.123 But it has been subject to conjecture 
that, in the contemporary West, there is intense resistance to the idea that anyone is 
made to be killed, and that one of the key drivers behind the adoption of unmanned and 
autonomous technologies is the need to reduce the risk of Western soldiers dying. For 
example, Herfried Münkler states that ‘[t]he western democracies are simply unable to 
wage Mao Tse-tung’s “long war of endurance”. As they are programmed for 
interchange rather than sacrifice... they will do their utmost to avoid or minimize their 
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own losses in combat’.124 This ‘post-heroic’125 warfare is concerned with the projection 
of power together with the protection of western life, where the success of the former is 
inextricably linked with that of the latter.  
What follows is a brief introduction to Martin Shaw and his place in this chapter. 
Martin Shaw is concerned to expose the concealment which is being enacted under the 
guise of what he diagnoses as a ‘new western way’ of warfare. This way of war 
purports to be an improvement in humane terms on what went before, but Shaw 
suggests that this is only (and even then imperfectly) the case with respect to Western 
soldiers: war is as hellish as ever for enemy soldiers and non-combatants. In other 
words, he is concerned to trace asymmetries of importance with respect to Western 
soldiers and civilian non-combatants who are caught up in war. The de-prioritisation of 
the latter represents a violation of Just War principles and an object lesson in why 
‘humanitarian war’ can never be. Shaw speaks of ‘massacres’ and ‘blood baths’,126 and, 
discussing the wars of the Former Yugoslavia, the ‘perception that all the individual 
lives mattered’.127 However, the body is only a shadowy outline in his analysis: more 
important is the norm of the value of human rights. His concern is ultimately to 
condemn the West on the grounds of hypocrisy, in the sense that if we say that we think 
that all individual human lives are valuable, then we must act in such a way so as to 
support this claim, rather than behaving hypocritically. Below I outline Shaw’s 
arguments in more detail, before outlining why I think that his approach does not go far 
enough in [re-]situating the body as a prism through which to view war.128  
Shaw’s starts from the position that was outlined above with respect to strategic and 
technological views of war: that ‘modern strategic thought is based on the belief that 
armed force can be an effective instrument of political policy’.129 In his account, this 
position has been challenged in recent history in two ways. The first relates to nuclear 
weapons: the prospect of almost instant total devastation that mutually assured 
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destruction seemed to threaten strained the credibility of the idea of war as useful. For 
the consequences of nuclear war would so surpass any possible political ends, resulting 
(most likely) in the destruction of the decision-making polity/institution itself, that it is 
difficult to see what possible ‘use’ could be maintained. In his view, therefore, with 
nuclear war, ‘war...negates itself. If there are no longer any internal constraints, and war 
becomes absolute destruction, it becomes invalid as a means of policy’.130 The second 
challenge originated with Vietnam and concerned the political unacceptability of 
American losses of life. ‘Vietnam was a watershed in the history of Western warfare, a 
moment when publics stood back from the kind of war that they had tolerated, and 
elites realized that war could not go on in the same way’.131 Vietnam signified that 
‘limited war’ was as untenable as ‘total war’. The apparent futility of American deaths 
incurred the wrath of the American public, and the wrath of the American public 
indicated to political leaders that military activities should be carefully managed so as 
not to threaten the stability or popularity of western governments. After Vietnam, Shaw 
suggests that the west has aspired to organise itself so that it can ‘fight wars at little 
human cost to itself. And since the risk of human lives, pictured on television, has been 
since Vietnam the major political risk of war, this also means that the West is able to 
fight wars with a great reduction to the political costs’.132 In other words, Vietnam 
taught the west that, if war is to be conceivable as a political asset, it has to be seen to 
minimise losses to western lives. Otherwise, it is a political liability.  
The imperfect solution to these crises in the legitimacy of war comes in the form of 
what Shaw terms the ‘new western way’ of war: a way of war being a ‘general pattern 
in the actual practice of warfighting’.133 In short, the western way of war is constituted 
by the protection of the lives of western soldiers as a primary interest, the protection of 
civilian non-combatants as a secondary interest, and the management of the global 
media such that events are not permitted to become politically damaging to those in the 
west who decided on war.134 In practice, what this means is that western soldiers are 
protected at the expense of civilian non-combatants, in direct contravention of the 
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demands of ‘Just War’.135 This is because western soldiers are protected by high-
technology and the reliance on air power which transfers some of the risk of death to 
enemy soldiers and civilian non-combatants: Shaw calls this ‘risk transfer war’. When 
civilians are killed in air strikes it is presented as being a regrettable accident. But this is 
not sufficient, says Shaw. The fact that these deaths were not intended does not relieve 
western militaries of the obligation to take active steps to reduce the likelihood of 
civilian deaths, and these steps must be taken even if at the expense of soldiers’ lives.136 
Ultimately, this demand is unrealistic. Western soldiers must be protected because the 
west itself is informed by ‘tight norms against killing [which] are being extended into 
the realm of legitimate organized killing itself’.137 But in order to adhere to the norm 
against killing in a non-hypocritical way, it is necessary to follow it to its conclusion, 
‘to accept the full logic of the value that Western society places on human life, and to 
seek alternatives to war’.138 For Shaw, war does not work as an instrument of policy, 
and to try to make it viable as such is to miss the point; we actually need to reject war 
altogether.  
Shaw’s opposition to the techno-strategic vision of war is clear. What sustains it is the 
West’s self-affirmed commitment to human life, which means that it struggles to come 
up with a positive justification for war and can only sustain it on the grounds that deaths 
do not occur: an obvious impossibility. But for a variety of reasons, I suggest that Shaw 
misses the mark when it comes to thinking differently about the body and war. These 
objections are alluded to here, but are developed more thoroughly throughout the thesis. 
As I suggested above, Shaw is less interested in the body than in ideas about the value 
of human life. What he is concerned with is catching Western governments on a lie, 
failing to practice what they preach in terms of human rights and civilian protection, 
and ultimately in demonstrating the necessary bankruptcy of all wars when held against 
these criteria. Because human rights are universal, Shaw rejects the prioritisation of 
some lives over others, and to this end uses body counts as an equalising tool, which 
makes all deaths appear to have the same value: ‘[b]ody-counting is an intervention in 
the risk-economy of war, to make the risk-experience of civilians... as ‘valuable’ as the 
exposure of Western soldiers, and to make it significant for politicians, so that they 
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won’t risk more wars of this kind’.139 It might seem that the body is centrally present as 
a mobilising factor in this critique of war, but actually it is possible to suggest that the 
body is not contributing anything to the way in which ‘war’ is understood or imagined. 
The ‘war’ with which Shaw is concerned is largely identical to the war outlined by the 
techno-strategists he so reviles,140 insofar as that it is an instrument of policy which can 
be apprehended as a coherent entity. Holding war up against the values the West 
purports to hold dear, he reveals that it cannot be an instrument of policy because 
polities do not accept death, and that in any case we are conspicuously failing to win in 
Iraq.141 What have changed are the parameters of the acceptable with respect to war, but 
Shaw does not go much beyond a strictly rationalist account of what war might be ‘for’. 
Nor does he use the ‘rediscovered’ body to look at war from a different perspective: it 
remains the instrument of policy, albeit under changed circumstances.  
The points under discussion here do not really constitute a criticism of Shaw, because 
what he aspires to is a critique of the idea of war as an instrument of policy. His 
arguments are therefore made with techno-strategists in mind, and he is not interested in 
producing a rereading of war, but only in hastening its obsolescence. The point of this 
discussion, however, is to indicate that the appropriate response to the claim that bodies 
have been excluded from consideration in talking about war is not merely to reintroduce 
them. On its own, this does not change our perspective on war, and leaves untouched 
the notion that ‘the body’ stands for an object of political will, or strategy’s plaything. 
The terms which have been current in this chapter: war, politics, strategy, body; may be 
shuffled and brought into contact with each other without necessarily changing the way 
that each term is understood. From this point of view, arguing as Shaw does for the 
obsolescence of war from the point of view of human rights may be said to reproduce 
the Archimedean arrogance which characterises the strategic and technical visions. 
Standing outside the mêlée of war, Shaw concurs with the strategic assumption that one 
decides for war, or not, on the basis of certain ostensibly ‘rational’ criteria. Of course, 
Iraqi civilians presumably did not decide for the war, so this idea of ‘war as decision’ is 
a profoundly asymmetric one. The decisions are all on the side of the West, creating the 
impression that Iraqi civilians engage with war on a bodily level (or it engages with 
them) but ‘we’ in the West make ‘rational’ decisions about their bodies, and the bodies 
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of our soldiers. The point is that bodies are still being presented as being the passive 
objects for political decision. Shaw is unconvinced by numbers as a way of expressing 
dead or injured bodies,142 but actually I would suggest that counting bodies is in perfect 
conformity with the strategic notion, which he does nothing to dispel, that the body is 
the passive object of political calculation.  
Conclusion: Writing/Rewriting War, Bodies, Politics.  
I have tried to show that strategy entails a ‘technological writing’ about war which is 
committed to defending and enhancing the utility of war. This way of writing is shared 
by many forms of writing about war and technology, whether or not they share the same 
presuppositions about the unchanging nature of war. In other words, what are 
significant for my purposes are not so much the arguments being made, but the terms in 
which they are made. I have suggested that the way of writing which characterises 
much strategic and technological thinking tends to exclude the body. In the case of 
strategy, the body is either absent altogether, or it is present in a simplified form, such 
that it is only a device through which the strategic design is executed. In some cases, it 
may be present as a negative term, as a source of confusion or error. This vision of the 
body is tacitly shared by the pragmatics and poetics of technologists who describe an 
ever greater role for technology in warfare as it increasingly takes over functions from 
the human body and thereby seems to facilitate a realisation of the strategic desire to 
make war ever more effective as an instrument of policy. In some cases, techno-
optimists go much further than strategists would be comfortable with in projecting a 
utopian future of perfect utility for war. Nonetheless, the core contention is that 
‘technology has steadily increased our ability to generate force from passion by 
overcoming the performance limits associated with the human body’.143 
Focusing on Martin Shaw, I tried to suggest that those who are opposed to the idea that 
war is an acceptable instrument of policy may reproduce some of the same exclusionary 
or marginalising moves with respect to the body. Emphasising that death in war is 
incompatible with the West’s commitment to human rights, Shaw says that ‘[w]e have a 
choice: we can continue with war as a means, progressively abandoning the pretence 
that we are using armed force in new ways… Or we can follow the logic of our 
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commitments to global institutions, democracy and human rights, and renew our 
determination to avoid war’.144 But in focusing on the decision for war, Shaw is 
uninterested in significantly altering the way that war is understood. Indeed, I have tried 
to suggest that he reproduces many strategic assumptions about war in order to 
demonstrate that they are not appropriate to the ethico-political climate of the twenty-
first century West. I have tried to show that technological writing about war makes 
implicit claims to a particular kind of knowledge within which certain decisions and 
judgements are possible. What is elided to a greater or lesser extent in this way of 
writing is the work necessary to construct the terrain upon which these judgements are 
made. That is to say, a number of decisions are involved in constructing ‘war’ as the 
type of event about which systematic and general knowledge can be held, but these 
decisions are frequently concealed in the application of the knowledge.  
Although Shaw is concerned to refute the instrumental logic of strategic thinking, and 
to expose the extent to which it is inimical to the principle of human rights, I have 
suggested that he shares in common with strategic thinking the tendency to present war 
as something about which one can have general knowledge, in which the body is 
subordinated to thought and is presented as being its object. I want to suggest that this 
subordination or evacuation of the body is a condition of possibility for the possession 
of a general knowledge about war which can assume a constant viewpoint unchanged 
by interacting with it. In my concluding remarks I would like to suggest some 
possibilities for writing about war which do not present the body as being a hindrance 
to understanding. Indeed, it is possible to suggest from certain perspectives that the 
body is the only route through which it might be possible to make sense of war. Via a 
brief discussion of ways of thinking and writing war which take the body seriously, it 
should be possible to indicate how the body can be replaced at the centre of the analysis 
as a productive way of making sense of war, and therefore to prepare the ground for 
thinking about the body as a dynamic and creative agent in war.  
In the context of the challenge to writing presented by his experience in Vietnam, Tim 
O’Brien suggests that ‘[a] true war story is never moral. It does not instruct, nor 
encourage virtue, nor suggest models of proper human behaviour, nor restrain men from 
doing the things they have always done... As a first rule of thumb... you can tell a true 
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war story by its absolute and uncompromising allegiance to obscenity and evil’.145 He is 
sceptical of ‘war stories’ which have coherent morals, or which seem to ‘make sense’ in 
the context of the expectations of the reader. According to O’Brien, one cannot extract 
‘lessons’ from a true war story, at least not as conventionally understood: ‘In a true war 
story, if there’s a moral at all, it’s like the thread that makes the cloth. You can’t tease it 
out. You can’t extract the meaning without unravelling the deeper meaning... True war 
stories do not generalize.  They do not indulge in abstraction or analysis... It comes 
down to gut instinct. A true war story, if truly told, makes the stomach believe’.146 The 
hallmark of ‘truth’ for a war story is not so much the question of whether the details of 
the story line up against some external ‘facts’. The test of veracity lies in the stomach of 
the listener/reader. If a war story tells us anything about war ‘in general’, it tells of the 
impossibility of apprehending ‘war’ as such, because the distinction between observer 
and surroundings degrades so that there is no stable point from which the war can be 
surveyed. War is always altering the subject who surveys it. ‘In any war story, but 
especially a true one, it’s difficult to separate what happened from what seemed to 
happen. What seems to happen becomes its own happening and has to be told that way. 
The angles of vision are skewed’.147  
It is possible to suggest that writing about war in a way which focuses upon its 
instrumental use—‘technological writing’—has a disciplinary function on what we 
envisage by ‘the body’, and what powers and potentialities we ascribe to it. It assumes a 
great deal of knowledge about the body which legitimises the move by which the body 
is used and/or excluded. From an instrumental point of view, the body is only the agent 
of external will. In this sense it is of limited potential and interest because it is not the 
originator of its own activity. Instrumental writing often displays a reluctant awareness 
of the possibility that this image is not stable; that bodies of soldiers always have the 
potential to behave unpredictably through fear or exhilaration. Nonetheless, I have tried 
to show that technological writing is characterised by a tacit unwillingness to grant to 
the body any dynamic creative potential of its own: any potential assigned is on the side 
of negative ‘friction’. However, what O’Brien calls for is a different way of writing 
about war, in which stomachs can believe and bodies can drift and hallucinate and 
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deceive, and things are un-tethered from the illusory powers of identity and reason. In 
other words, the regulatory vision of what a body is and what it is capable of is 
unsettled by writing about war which seeks to emphasise not conformity to the norm 
but deviation from it. Ultimately in O’Brien’s writing, stable categories of identity, 
place and time are degraded by the hallucinatory effects of the war environment. 
Visiting Vietnam years after the wars end, O’Brien finds himself ‘back in history, 
snagged in brothers and bones’.148 Back in the States, he reflects that ‘[y]ou don't have 
to be in Nam to be in Nam’.149 There is no stable position from which to view the war, 
because there are no clear boundaries between past present and future, here and there, 
even between the body and the world. Making sense of the war can then only take place 
through an endless bodily process, expedited by sleeping pills and cigarettes.150  
De-centring ideas of what the body should be opens up a conceptual space for 
unpredictable responses to be recorded. War has the capacity to unsettle established 
ideas about how one should behave, and what one is capable of doing and enduring. 
This creates the possibility for thinking about the body in a way which is attentive to the 
possibilities of its responses and capabilities, and does not have a predetermined idea of 
what a body is and what its attributes are. In discussing the lived experience of the fire-
bombing of Germany, Jörg Friedrich indicates that reactions could appear perverse in 
the context of mass death and suffering: ‘[a]fter the raid [in Aachen] everyone talked 
about it... “The whole thing was like being inebriated”’,151 just as during the plague in 
1374 they had ‘danced unceasingly, with passion and rapture’.152 Joy in the context of 
horror, and also composure in the face of terror. Friedrich adumbrates the way in which 
survivors were somehow ‘outside themselves’: ‘I do what needed to be done, outside 
my self. The sensory skin, however, was numbed’.153 He asks ‘[w]ho did experience the 
air war?’154 He suggested that, as a coping mechanism in the face of horror and 
relentless stress, survivors ‘shut down’ with the ‘senses blacked out’155: ‘emotional 
paralysis warded off the air war’.156 Enduring such unimaginable trauma, it might be 
thought that mental collapse would be inevitable, but Friedrich suggests that this was 
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not the case.157 Responses to war may illuminate the potentialities of the human body 
and the multiplicity of ways in which it can be experienced, if not constrained by a 
predetermined orthodoxy concerning the possible parameters of the body.  
Strategy may be understood as a framework for making sense of war. In this case, 
sense-making takes the form of ‘use-making’, as strategy aspires to embody general 
truths about war, so that the ‘war’ understood by it tends to be instrumental and general. 
I have suggested that the way in which strategy makes sense of war takes place at the 
expense of the body, which is sidelined or simplified as an undesirable complicating 
factor which is in any case inessential to a functional understanding. However, it is 
possible to suggest that the body may in fact be central to the work of making sense of 
war. John Limon argues that ‘[w]e should not imagine war to be the frustration or the 
demise of communication, or the consequence of failed communication: it 
communicates’.158 But it does not communicate in a vacuum: it is not ‘war’ as such 
which communicates. Rather, that which is communicated by war is embodied and 
enacted by those present; performed. ‘We make war in much the same way that we 
make policy, make cities, make works of art, make love, and make believe’.159 When 
thinking about making sense of war, it is necessary to attend to the meanings of both 
making and sense.  
Tim O’Brien asks: 
‘How do you generalize? 
War is hell, but that’s not the half of it, because war is also mystery and terror 
and adventure and courage and discovery and holiness and pity and despair and 
longing and love. War is nasty; war is fun. War is thrilling; war is drudgery. 
War makes you a man; war makes you dead’.160  
In his account, war has multiple meanings for participants at different moments, and is 
also somehow constituted by contradiction: for example, it is when you are closest to 
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death that you feel most alive.161 If war, in all its contradictory confusion, is constituted 
by the fabric of the experience of those living through it, then this suggests that only 
those who ‘were there’ are authorised to speak about war. Milton J. Bates imagines an 
‘authority pyramid’ which determines who is entitled to speak about the Vietnam War. 
Asserting their managerial knowledge, ‘those who managed the war, and who were as a 
rule physically remote from it proceeded on the assumption that their knowledge was 
the most complete’.162 Or, there were those who make the converse claim: that only 
those ‘on the ground’ could really speak with authority on the texture of life in 
Vietnam: that ‘[t]he man who has not understood with his flesh cannot talk to you about 
it’.163 Ultimately, one could argue that ‘only the dead can tell complete war stories from 
firsthand experience’.164  
This is problematic, because of the multiple perspectives on war which cannot be 
trumped by any single one. There is no single truth on what the sense of a war was: all 
wars are ‘not one war but many’.165 But more significantly, the multiple perspectives on 
war are themselves multiple, in the sense that every position on war is fluid, 
evolutionary and unstable. For example, O’Brien says that ‘[w]hen a booby trap 
explodes, you close your eyes and duck and float outside yourself… The pictures get 
jumbled; you tend to miss a lot… there is always that surreal seemingness’.166 Presence 
does not guarantee anything, due to the seemingly infinite number of ways in which 
bodies can respond to and make sense of the numberless events which go to make up 
the experience called ‘war’. So what then is ‘the truth’? Even the dead cannot embody 
the sense of war, since a dead body no more has stable meaning than a living one. It is 
possible to suggest, then, that the process of making sense of war is the sense of war. In 
The Things They Carried, O’Brien’s soldiers carry stories linking ‘the past to the 
future’167 stories that can ‘make the dead talk’,168 stories that ‘never seem… to end’.169 
And this never-ending quality is arguably characteristic of the work of making sense of 
war. Limon says that ‘I have denied that war is beautiful, which is primarily to deny… 
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that it is beautifully resolved’.170 Writing the sense of war as stable and finalised is 
misleading, I suggest, because the sense of war is always embodied and contested. The 
body is not a stable referent to which the meaning or sense of war can be tethered. 
Rather, the body is the site of a painful political [re-]enactment of war which is itself 
the sense of war.  
Philip Beidler suggests that the best writing about Vietnam has ‘a commitment on one 
hand to an unstinting concreteness—a feel for the way that experience actually seizes 
upon us... and on the other [hand] a distinct awareness of engagement as a primary 
process in sense-making’.171 The caesura between sensation and sense can never be 
resolved but must always be somehow embodied, even if that which is being embodied 
makes only partial sense, or no sense at all. The point is that making sense of sensation 
is the only way in which sense can be made of war, and the fact that this process must 
always wrestle with contradiction and the impossibility of completion does not mean 
that one can bypass the body, because the body is the route through which sense is 
made. Technological writing about war seeks somehow to establish the sense of war in 
order to safeguard its utility. Strategy presupposes that ‘lessons’ can be extracted from 
history, and operationalisable morals can he drawn from experience. Writing from a 
pacifist position, Martin Shaw also contends that the meaning/sense of war is clear and 
unambiguously comprehensible within a moral framework which demands its 
obsolescence. I have suggested that this way of writing about war excludes the body, 
possibly of necessity, because the body brings with it an unwelcome ambiguity and 
unpredictability. Taking the body seriously, however, I suggest that the sense of war 
may be envisaged as being embodied in this ambiguity and enacted through the visceral 
responses to war, and the unending process of coming to terms. Rather than being a 
hindrance to apprehending the sense of war, the body is possibly better understood as 
the medium through which sense is made.  
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Chapter 2 
The Political Economy of Death: Counting Bodies at War 
‘if it isn’t human, it doesn’t matter much if it’s dead’1 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the ways in which the body is implicated in 
understandings of war through the device of body counts. This investigation begins 
from the premise that body counts, as a way of thinking the body at war, posit ‘the 
body’ as being a stable object which can then be counted. Even where the body counts 
themselves are contested on the grounds of accuracy or appropriateness, I suggest that it 
tends to be the case that the body itself is understood to be a self-evident referent. The 
way of counting may be problematic, but what is counted is not. Contrary to this 
interpretation of the body in war, I aim to demonstrate that the body is always the 
consequence of a work of creativity. To this end, I examine the broader relationships 
between the body and the politics of the state in order to try to show the mutability and 
contestability of what we call ‘the body’. My purpose is to address the politics of the 
body in order to try to show that the body cannot be satisfactorily thought of purely as 
an object for knowledge, but rather that it is important to take account of the politics of 
the emergence of the body as a body, a process which is dynamic and contested even 
where the body in question is dead. Rather than accept the notion that taking account of 
the body at war is a pragmatic or scientific exercise such as could be encapsulated by 
counting, or other ways of accumulating knowledge about the body at war, I want to 
resituate the politics at the heart of understandings of the body.  
The body at war is subject to continuous change, both in life and in death, as a 
consequence of the extreme hostility of the environment to which it is exposed. In the 
case of the efforts to recover bodies from Vietnam, Thomas Hawley points out that 
‘[a]fter the crash of a fighter jet at five hundred miles per hour followed by thirty years 
during which the remains are lying in tropical acidic soil, there is simply not much of 
the body to bring back, for identification purposes or for anything else. Quite often, all 
that remains of the body fits in an envelope or perhaps a shoe box’.2 Even where less 
time has elapsed, the violence to which the body is subject may make it unrecognisable 
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and unfamiliar as something which was formerly a living human being. More than this, 
however, I try to suggest that, whatever condition it is in, the body is always subject to a 
complicated matrix of determination whether it can count as a valuable human body, 
and that, in this sense, the body cannot be anything other than political and imaginary.  
The chapter begins with a brief history of body counts from Vietnam to the Iraq War. I 
suggest that body counts were central to military strategy in Vietnam, but that the 
failures of that conflict, and the complexities of body counting as a component of it, 
resulted in reluctance on the part of the US military to count the bodies of enemy dead. 
In this sense, ‘[s]hedding the Vietnam syndrome has always meant achieving a double 
power: the ability to win an absolute and “clean” military victory by full use of 
American technological superiority, and the ability to win an absolute and “clean” 
moral victory by full use of the Pentagon’s virtually absolute control over martial 
necrology’.3 Therefore, in the ‘virtual’ Gulf War and in Afghanistan and Iraq, body 
counts of enemy soldiers have not been systematically used by the US military 
(although they have been reintroduced on the operational level4). However, body counts 
have been a part of the discourse concerning the legitimacy of the war itself. Therefore, 
body counts may provide strategists with an insight into the progress of the war, but 
they may simultaneously undermine the legitimacy of the war when used as evidence of 
the moral bankruptcy of the prosecuting nation, as with Iraq. 
However, the problems with body counts are not merely about agreeing numbers, which 
is in any case by no means unproblematic. I suggest that those critical of particular 
wars, or of wars in general, find body counts defective as a way of taking account of the 
war dead, because they are too heartlessly mathematical, too abstract and too 
‘immaterial’ to really give a sense of the impact of the loss behind the numbers. Margot 
Norris situates this problem in the context of a general crisis of representation produced 
by the barbarism of the twentieth century and the awesome destructive power that 
modern weapons systems now have. The dead of the many wars of the twentieth 
century ‘resist meaningful figuration or representation’,5 she says. Norris acknowledges 
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an important debt to Elaine Scarry,6 and through Scarry I outline the ways in which the 
body may be presented as being ‘the truth’ of war. My motivation is to show that what 
is being elided in this discussion concerning the difficulty of representing the body at 
war is the question of what ‘the body’ is,  and what is perceived to be at stake in this 
struggle to expose it as operating at the centre of war. For Scarry, the body is in some 
sense the origin of certainty and reality, and these properties are exploited by political 
agents who desire those properties for themselves.  
Contrary to this position, I try to show that it is not coherent to talk about the dead body 
‘outside politics’, because it is always being politically constructed and contested, and it 
is this which determines what is thought of as a dead (human) body. In other words, I 
try to suggest that the dead body is not the foundation for the significance of war, but is 
itself the outcome or expression of a political process which determines what is 
considered ‘a dead body’ and what is not. Through a discussion of the taking of bodily 
souvenirs from Japanese soldiers in the Pacific War, I seek to demonstrate that material 
artefacts of dead bodies are not sufficient to determine their inclusion in the world of 
persons, now deceased. Ernst Jünger reports from the Western Front of the First World 
War that ‘we were so accustomed to the horrible that if we came on a dead body 
anywhere on a fire step or in a ditch we gave it no more than a passing thought and 
recognized it as we would a stone or tree’.7 The material dead body does not determine 
our reaction to it in the absence of the political context which permits it to be seen as a 
dead human body rather than as an object analogous to a stone or tree. 
It is in the context of this claim that I discuss the state’s relationship to the war dead, 
which may be iterated through memorialisation; or, in the case of the US in Vietnam, a 
decades-long search for all remains, irrespective of the likelihood of finding them.8 The 
contestations inherent in this relationship relate to the authority to speak for, and 
account for the dead, but also to the willingness (or otherwise) to be transformed by 
death. In a sense, the dead body is always a fabrication, but the event of death is 
something that one can be transformed by, or not. This is developed through a 
discussion of Judith Butler’s work on mourning, a discussion which allows me to argue 
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that body counts are problematic not because they fail to adequately represent the 
materiality of the dead body, but rather because they cannot interrogate the conditions 
of their own possibility. In other words, I suggest that the possibility of counting is 
predicated on a set of prior judgements about what counts as a body, and what kinds of 
bodies are worth counting in different categories. Insisting that the body is not an 
unproblematic entity and that bodies are always brought into being as bodies of certain 
kinds as they are being counted potentially creates the opportunity for thinking the body 
at war in a non-technological way.  
Body counts in Vietnam, the Gulf, and Iraq. 
Tim O’Brien wrote of Vietnam that ‘[i]f land is not won and if hearts are at best left 
indifferent... the only obvious criterion of military success is body count’.9 Scott 
Sigmund Gartner and Marissa Edson Myers argue that the US emphasis on number of 
enemy dead as a signifier of military success originated in Korea in the winter of 1951, 
when there was ‘a shift in performance indicator from terrain to number of enemy 
dead’,10 and that this was carried over to Vietnam, as both were ‘non-linear’ and non-
territorial wars.11 That is: ‘[i]n both Korea and Vietnam... there was no territorial 
objective [for the United States] other than to defend the status quo ante; thus it was not 
possible to demonstrate or assess progress in terms of territory gained and held’.12 
Enemy bodies were considered to be the most valuable materiel of war and were 
therefore the main element of success on the part of the US, particularly when ‘success’ 
seemed to be stubbornly elusive. The Vietcong have subsequently been regarded as 
highly atypical with respect to the extent to which they were prepared to tolerate 
extremely high losses without capitulating.13  
Making body counts a decisive measure of success in the war in Vietnam proved 
problematic, however, not least because of confusion and obfuscation about which 
bodies counted. Bruce Palmer suggests that one element of the problem lay in the 
differing values ascribed to life, so that ‘one must be careful not to judge... [casualties’] 
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psychological effect on the enemy on the basis of occidental values... [it is important to 
be mindful of] differing oriental values with respect to human life’.14 Moreover, he 
points out that, in an unorthodox field of battle such as Vietnam, it was unclear ‘[w]hich 
categories [of dead] had sufficient military capability to be counted as enemy 
soldiers?’15 Philip Caputo said that ‘[i]f its dead and Vietnamese, its VC, was the rule 
of thumb in the bush’.16 And the decision to place preeminent importance on body 
counts inevitably conduced to exaggeration and incautious risk-taking in the field in an 
effort to promote the ‘successfulness’ of operations. Douglas Herring says that 
‘[t]hroughout the chain of command there was heavy pressure to produce favorable 
figures, and padding occurred at each level until by the time the numbers reached 
Washington they bore little resemblance to reality’.17 It is possible to suggest that, at the 
very least, the use of body counts to measure success was seriously undermined by the 
experience of Vietnam. For not only did it become apparent that numbers of dead do 
not, in themselves, mean anything in terms of the fighting capability or resolve of the 
enemy, but body counts of US dead fatally imperilled the war effort when deployed by 
anti-war movements.  
In the Gulf War, the US military did not count the enemy dead, and it took measures to 
prevent anyone else doing so. Margot Norris argues that the Pentagon imposed ‘pre-
censorship’ on journalists in the Gulf, so that not only were they not permitted to 
disclose information to the public, they were not allowed to obtain it in the first place.18 
She suggests that this policy created an ‘originary silence’19 which made it impossible 
to ‘know the dead’,20 and this in her account applies both to Iraqi soldiers and civilians, 
and to US soldiers, whose injury and death was kept out of the news as far as 
possible.21 Combined with the spectacular technological imagery which was the focus 
of media coverage of the war, the consequence of the refusal to count the dead in the 
Gulf was the ‘confounding [of] the nature of what is “real” in war’22 resulting in ‘a 
philosophical aporia that obliges the discourse of war to live in a kind of untruth, and to 
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conceal or concede the simultaneous necessity of killing and the irrelevancy of the 
dead’.23 Baudrillard suggests that the failure to count the dead in the Gulf War, together 
with the minimal coalition losses, made the war appear as ‘the prefiguration of an 
experimental, blank war, or a war even more inhuman because it is without human 
losses... [Iraqi dead were] held in utter contempt by their chief without even the 
collective glory of number (we do not know how many there are)’.24 
Norris seems to suggest that the refusal to count the dead, or allow them to be counted, 
brings about an important shift in the ontology of war. Moreover, it is taken to signify a 
degree of moral irresponsibility on the part of the US, which appears to refuse to take 
account of the war dead and has lost ‘the willingness to reckon the meaning and 
significance of such vast numbers of the killed in an accounting of the purpose, 
necessity, effect, and human cost of their violent destruction’.25 In Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the US has expressed a reluctance to take responsibility for counting the enemy 
dead.26 Carl Conetta suggests that this may be at least in part because the US legitimises 
its ‘high-tech’ military on the grounds that it allows the military to avoid ‘excess 
deaths’ through the use of precision weapons. He says that ‘[a]lthough Operation Iraqi 
Freedom was supposed to exemplify the new warfare, it provides no unambiguous 
support for the hypothesis regarding civilian casualties’.27 Contestation over numbers 
and the ‘irresponsibility’ of refusing to count also characterised the 2003 Iraq war. Ira 
Chernus claims that ‘[i]n Iraq, it is as if the killing never happened. When a human 
being’s death is erased from history, so is their life. Life and death together vanish 
without a trace’.28 However, body counts were undertaken in Iraq by a variety of 
agencies and with controversial results. One such agency was the US military itself, 
which quickly reintroduced body counts in Iraq on an operational level in the absence 
of any other clear way of making sense of the conflict.29 Even so, an expert 
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commentator reported that ‘[t]here still are problems in identifying who is who, just as 
there were in Vietnam’.30   
Body counts and the mathematics of death were important to the process of establishing 
and contesting the legitimacy of the war in Iraq from the start. In the face of opposition 
to the war, Tony Blair said of Stop the War Coalition’s 2003 London protest that ‘[i]f 
there are 500,000 on that march, that is still less than the number of people whose 
deaths Saddam has been responsible for. If there are one million that is still less than the 
number who died in the wars he started’.31 The Iraq Body Count (IBC) was set up in 
January 2003 to collate media reports of civilian deaths in Iraq. It does not distinguish 
between deaths caused by US/occupying forces or by insurgent groups, and because of 
its dependence on ‘confirmed’ media reports, insists that the figures it gives are not 
estimates.32 At the time of writing, the number of killed is placed between 92,898 and 
101,388.33 In 2005, it was closer to 30,000,34 and this was the figure quoted by George 
W. Bush,35 leading some to criticise the IBC for being too conservative and becoming 
‘the tool of choice for the Bush Administration and the US corporate media’.36 In 
contrast, the Lancet Report measured ‘excess mortality’ in 2006 and estimated it at 654, 
965.37 Rather than using existing media reports, the Lancet researchers interviewed 
households in Iraq. They made no attempt to distinguish between ‘combatants’ and 
non-combatants’,38 and took ‘excess mortality’ to mean deaths above the pre-invasion 
median.  
The reluctance to count enemy dead in Iraq was expressed differently in the context of 
the evolution of the phases of the war. Initially, the campaign was focused on the use of 
‘shock and awe’, entailing ‘precise, surgical amounts of tightly focused force to achieve 
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maximum leverage’ to cause the adversary to panic, surrender, or both.39 The focus of 
the military and of media reporting was on high tech weapons systems, and this tended 
to efface the resultant combatant and civilian deaths in ways analogous to the first Gulf 
War. Pointing to the ‘spectacular’ character of the first phase of the war,40 William 
Merrin notes, it ‘was designed to mobilize the home front. If its explosive power was 
aimed at the Iraqis, its implosive power was aimed at us to produce identification with 
the bomb rather than its anonymous victims.’41 Since the declaration of victory in April 
2003, during the counter-insurgency phase, the numbers of civilian deaths have 
continued to rise.42 The US expressed regret ‘“that civilians are hurt or killed while 
coalition forces search to rid Iraq of terrorism”’,43 and occasionally offered (arguably 
meagre) financial compensation for these deaths.44 This notwithstanding, although body 
counts have occasionally been used on an operational level, numbers of enemy or 
civilian dead have not been systematically counted in either Iraq or Afghanistan. The 
deaths of coalition soldiers45 and civilians killed by insurgents46 are recorded.      
Body counts are of variable utility in ascertaining the success of war. After the 
‘credibility problems of body counts in the Vietnam War’,47 the US military showed 
reluctance to release body counts from Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, with 
General Tommy Franks insisting that ‘I don’t believe you have heard me or anyone else 
in our leadership talk about the presence of 1,000 bodies out there, or in fact how many 
have been recovered. You know we don’t do body counts’.48 It has been suggested that 
the fact that ‘numbers are squishy, and few bodies have been found’49 impaired the 
efficacy of Operation Anaconda, and the US should have accepted that ‘the only way to 
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measure its effectiveness is by tallying the dead, wounded, and captured’.50 In other 
words, one reason for counting enemy dead is that it can demonstrate the impact of 
military operations and provide a way of gauging their efficacy. The problem revealed 
in Vietnam is that it is not always possible to ascertain whether the dead are combatants 
or civilians, and therefore counting may not give an accurate indication of the progress 
of the war, and may provide ammunition to those opposed to the war. However, the 
military interest in counting bodies relates to the possibility of revealing the changing 
fortunes of the parties at war. As Martin Shaw says, ‘war is fundamentally about killing 
in order to achieve political goals, and therefore it is very reasonable to want to gauge 
the extent to which it actually produces death’.51  
Related to this is the idea of contesting the legitimacy of a particular war, or of war in 
general. In this sense, body counts may be used as part of the process of challenging the 
legitimacy of war, and may be concealed by the belligerents due to an awareness of 
their potentially incendiary function, as in the Gulf War. As mentioned above, body 
counts were invoked as justification of the Iraq War by Tony Blair, who referred to the 
possible cost in life of not acting, while many have criticised the apparently excessive 
numbers of civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq in consequence of certain 
military decisions taken by the coalition. For example, Marc Herold asked: ‘[w]hat 
causes the documented high level of civilian casualties...3,400 [from October 2001 to 
March 2002] in the war upon Afghanistan? The explanation is the apparent willingness 
of military strategists to fire missiles into and drop bombs upon, populated areas of 
Afghanistan’.52 The United States, however, tended to argue that when civilian deaths 
in Afghanistan can be proven, responsibility for them rests with the aggressors who 
colluded with the attacks of September 11th 2001, for the dead have suffered as a 
consequence of America’s just response.53 Counting the dead is therefore closely 
associated with accounting for death; that is, taking (or claiming) responsibility for 
deaths. This produces the impression that to refuse to count the dead is to display an 
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unethical indifference towards the event of their dying, and a blindness to one’s own 
responsibility for it.54  
Capturing Materiality: Problems with Counting  
Counting is problematic in part because it seems to resist accuracy: numbers tend 
always to be ‘approximate’, ‘conservatively estimated’, ‘close to’,55 they are never 
precise. But more serious is the suspicion that counting cannot carry the weight of the 
multiple tragedies that it connotes; that this mathematics of death leads us to the ‘dreary 
business of quantifying and comparing oppressions’56 and not to an understanding of 
the magnitude of loss that even a single value—decreasing in significance as the 
numbers rise—expresses. Günter Grass’s Crabwalk is a novel about the multifaceted, 
unending process of ‘coming to terms with’ aspects of the Second World War. His 
narrator says of his tally of dead that ‘[t]he numbers I am about to mention are not 
accurate. Everything will always be approximate. Besides, numbers don’t say much... 
The ones with lots of zeros can’t be grasped. It’s in their nature to contradict each 
other... [there is] the question, to which no answer can be hoped for: What does one life 
more or less count?’57 This raises the question of whether numbers are ever adequate to 
capture the magnitude of loss that multiple deaths signify, or to stand up to the material 
weight of their destruction. In this section I discuss the putative problems with body 
counting, and the distinction between the material body and the abstract number that 
body counts are arguably predicated on. I suggest that the problem with counting may 
be understood in some sense as a problem of representation, but that this is problematic 
insofar as that it leaves unexamined the question of what a body is.  
Elaine Scarry says that: ‘numbers and numerical operations are, presumably with good 
reason, habitually thought of as abstract, as occupying a space wholly cut off from the 
world. Even forms of counting that claim to have a worldly content sometimes seem 
instead characterized by the complete lack of it: the ‘body count’ in war is a notoriously 
insubstantial form of speech’.58 This suggests that numbers are not capable of ever 
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corresponding to the reality of death in war, because they are insubstantial; in other 
words, they cannot carry or transmit the fact that the body has a real material 
significance; that it has the force of a fact. With respect to the Iraq Body Count’s tally 
of dead in Iraq, Joseph Pugliese suggests that ‘[a]t this electronic morgue, flesh and 
blood bodies are decorporealised into so many algorithmic digits. As electronic morgue, 
this necrological tabulating machine has an infinite capacity to absorb its digitised 
corpses’.59 It is possible to suggest in the light of these comments that there seems to be 
an impulse underlying body counts which is always frustrated, and this is relates to the 
desire to make numbers correspond to material bodies on the ground, and for the 
numbers to somehow carry the full weight of these bodies so that rather than converting 
them into ‘insubstantial’ numbers, they may be invoked as material things. I suggest 
that this need to represent the dead relates to the capacity of ‘insubstantial’ or ‘non-
material’ forms of communication to express the corporeal materiality of the (dead) 
body, but that focusing on this dilemma obscures the question of what counts as a dead 
body, and what a dead body ‘is’.  
The first issue can be framed as a problem of representation, insofar as it relates to the 
perceived difficulty of capturing and expressing the material weight of the body. 
Margot Norris has suggested that, in the aftermath of the bloody twentieth century, one 
might conclude that art is ‘incommensurable’ to war.60 This is because ‘the scale and 
intensity of the violence threatened to sever art’s expressive connection to war 
altogether’,61 following Theodor Adorno’s suggestion that poetry is impossible after 
Auschwitz.62 In other words, Norris questions whether representation is capable of 
taking account of the destruction wrought by the twentieth century, both in terms of its 
scale and severity. She suggests that the twentieth century produced a crisis of 
modernism, whereby modern art was unable to take account of modern war. For her, 
the words we use or the numbers we cite are insufficient for conveying the reality of the 
wars of the twentieth century, and ‘thinking of modern wars in terms of numbers is a 
desperate and arguably futile gesture, because their status as dead or injured bodies is 
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conceptually unrecoverable or unimaginable in their materiality’.63 Here, she echoes 
Scarry’s concern that body counts are somehow ‘non-material’ and inadequate to 
‘account for’ the war dead.  
In some senses, Norris suggests that the pursuance of war is predicated upon this 
disjuncture between representation and the material. For example, she argues that the 
conduct and perceived legitimacy of war depends upon the invocation of ‘nonmaterial 
issues’ such as ‘security, sovereignty [and] national identity’.64 Numbers cannot 
intervene entirely effectively in this ‘de-materialising’ road to war, because they 
themselves are inadequate bearers of materiality. However, to refuse to count is in some 
senses even more insidious, as with the war in the Persian Gulf in which ‘by coupling 
an instrumental military discourse to the indeterminability and invisibility of the enemy 
body, the Pentagon had created a sophisticated strategy for derealizing the war’.65 By 
allowing itself to be dazzled by this ‘derealization’, postmodernism’s response to this 
postmodern war has been impoverished and ‘uncritical’, according to Christopher 
Norris, who lambasts Baudrillard’s conclusion that ‘we just cannot know’, and that the 
attempt to distinguish between ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ is predicated upon ‘hopelessly 
outmoded epistemic or ontological distinctions’.66 The suggestion is that if modernism 
tried and failed to represent the material aspects of war; or at least to posit their 
unrepresentable existence; postmodernism has abandoned such efforts at discernment 
and has sided ‘uncritically’ with the spectacular images of war.  
It is possible to suggest that these discussions imply that the intervention of the body 
into discourses about war is a potentially effective strategy for disrupting them, if only 
we could construct an artistic or aesthetic practice which was capable of this. Body 
counts are used to intervene on either side of the war, to demonstrate its efficacy, or 
bankruptcy. But on a more fundamental level, Margot Norris suggests that we should be 
troubled by the shortcomings of body counts themselves in terms of their capacity to 
effectively signify or ‘recover’ the dead body. What is at stake here, I contend, is the 
supposition that this capacity to efface the reality of the dead body is a condition of 
possibility for non-combatant populations to countenance war. For example, Paul 
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Fussell discusses the fury of troops in the Second World War at the ‘public innocence 
about the bizarre damage suffered by the human body in modern war’,67 and Scarry 
argues that in talking about war, the damaged human body is ‘absent from view in the 
case of omission...actively escorted out in the case of redescription... [or] assign[ed] to 
an accidental, incidental, or subordinate position’.68 The implication is that this 
concealment of the centrality of death in the experience of war is a condition of 
possibility for war. In other words, war must conceal its own purpose if it is to sustain 
itself which produces the impression that the dead body is the reality, or the truth, of 
war, but that the continuation of war is predicated on the concealment of this truth.  
The way in which the body can function as the location of truth and certainty may be 
illuminated through a discussion of Elaine Scarry’s work The Body in Pain, which may 
be said to operate from the point of view of a kind of ‘materialist bias’.69 Scarry argues 
that pain is somehow the foundation for certainty for the person who suffers it. She says 
that, ‘for the person in pain, so incontestably and unnegotiably present is it that “having 
pain” may come to be thought of as the most vibrant example of what it is to “have 
certainty”, while for the other person it is so elusive that “hearing about pain” may exist 
as the primary model of what it is “to have a doubt”’.70 So while pain creates all sorts of 
problems for representation and inter-subjectivity, it acts as ultimate confirmation of 
subjectivity: my pain is confirmation of me, and the fact that it is so thoroughly confined 
within the boundaries of my body is what makes it possible for other people to hurt me 
without themselves suffering. Scarry is concerned to interrogate the conditions of 
possibility for the deliberate infliction of hurt on others, together with the political 
purpose of causing pain. Addressing the former, her contention is that it is the 
incommunicability of pain, results in it being radically confined within the body of the 
sufferer, which makes it possible for others to inflict it, and impossible for them to truly 
comprehend it.  
Because of this, the capacity of pain to confer certainty can be deployed politically by 
detaching it from the suffering human body and attaching it to some other referent. 
Scarry says that ‘the felt characteristics of pain—one of which is its compelling 
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vibrancy or its incontestable reality or simply its “certainty”—can be appropriated 
away from the body and presented as the attributes of something else’.71 Because I 
cannot express my pain, it is vulnerable to being detached from me and attached to 
some other political purpose which serves to efface the extent to which the pain is being 
suffered by me. So in war, the ‘reality conferring’ properties of the body are in play 
such that ‘extreme attributes of the body... [are] translated into another language and 
forced to disappear... The force of the material world is separated from the fifty-seven 
thousand or fifty million hurt bodies and conferred not only on issues and ideologies 
that have... been designated the winner, but also on the idea of winning itself’.72 The 
‘reality conferring’ properties of the body would seem to become more complicated in 
terms of the dead body, which does not exist for itself in the way that the body in pain 
does. This distinction is elided by Scarry, for whom it seems that ‘the dead body’ and 
‘the injured body’ are in some senses interchangeable: after her discussion of body 
counts she refers to the ‘injuries of both sides’.73 In her analysis, one of war’s two 
primary functions is ‘injuring’, so one might suppose that in her schema ‘death’ is a 
subcategory of ‘injury’, which might tend to suggest that the materiality of the body is 
as significant as its capacity to be a container for pain.74 
For Scarry, the body provides the foundation for certainty in war. War ‘makes sense’ 
thanks to ‘the incontestable reality of the body... the legitimacy of the outcome [of a 
war] outlives the end of the contest because so many of its participants are frozen in a 
permanent act of participation: that is, the winning issue or ideology achieves for a time 
the force and status of a material “fact” by the sheer material weight of the multitudes 
of damaged and opened human bodies’.75 She suggests that the injured/dead body is 
somehow emptied of cultural content so that it becomes any-body, rather than being 
‘North Korean, German, Argentinean, Israeli’.76 The dead body merely ‘is’. However, 
the properties of ‘reality’ are detached from the dead body and used to confer reality 
onto some external political cause: ‘the incontestable reality of the physical body... 
[becomes] an attribute of an issue that at that moment has no independent reality of its 
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own’.77 Because of the original independence of ‘the [dead, injured] body’ and 
‘politics’, there are no constraints on the way in which the body is deployed or the 
cause to which it is subsequently attached. For example, with respect to the American 
Civil War, Scarry says that while during the war one might say ‘94,000 died for the 
cause of the South’ or ‘110,000 died for the ideals of the North’, once the war was over, 
the dead ‘collectively substantiate, or are perceived as the cost of, a single outcome’.78 
Scarry suggests that this illustrates the ‘fluidity of the injured body’s referential 
direction’,79 that is to say, the fact that the dead body does not have any fixed political 
meaning, and the work of meaning-making is parasitic on, and theoretically 
independent of, the dead body itself. 
It is possible to suggest therefore, that the issue for Scarry is not only one of 
representation, in which writing about war sidelines or conceals the damage done to 
bodies, but also one of theft, whereby war steals from the body in order to anchor the 
reality of its own outcome. For her, the (dead) body is an ‘extreme fact’,80 and this 
facticity can be transferred away from the body onto some external political cause. But 
the very possibility of this transference hints that the ‘incontestable reality’ of the dead 
body is not quite as straightforward as it might first appear, since it seems not to be 
‘incontestable’ but rather precisely the subject of heated deliberation and reclamation. 
Rather than focus on the idea of ‘representation’, I suggest that the body itself is 
contested and political; best understood not as a stable object which we must strive to 
give expression to, but rather a highly fluid and political entity which cannot be 
apprehended apart from its expression[s]. While re-inserting the body into the discourse 
of war may be admirable and necessary on one level, on another it evinces a somewhat 
conservative vision of the body itself. Depending upon the body to act as a 
counterweight to the ideological and linguistic fabrications about war may elide the 
extent to which the body is necessarily characterised by ‘ambiguity, multivocality and 
polysemy’81 and cannot do the work of making meaning for us: it cannot bypass 
politics.  
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Reconstructing the Fragmented Body  
It is possible to suggest that the concerns of Margot Norris and Elaine Scarry about the 
fate of the body in modern war and war writing are underpinned by a certain 
constellation of values and interests, which, while they may not be explicitly drawn 
attention to, determine what is understood by a body, and what connotations this has for 
them. It seems legitimate to contend that Scarry, for example, has what we might call a 
‘humanitarian’ interest in calling attention to the violence done to ‘the body’ and the 
ways in which this is effaced. It might therefore be possible, if somewhat simplistic, to 
suggest that Scarry’s body is something which is imbued with the spirit of humanity, 
and attendant principles of consent82 and value for example; and this is the case even 
where these principles are violated. I would suggest that these beliefs and political 
positions construct what is understood by the body—they are part of the fabric of the 
body—rather than being simply brought to bear on it. ‘The body’ may not be a stable, 
determined entity; the ‘materiality’ of the body does not conduce to certainty and in 
some cases ‘the materiality of the body results in still more uncertainty’.83 The eternally 
political character of the dead body, and its inherent mutability, may be productively 
explored through a discussion of the taking of souvenirs from human remains in the 
Pacific War, in which the intrusion of ‘the body’ into the discourses of war revealed a 
different and highly fungible, evolving set of ‘truths’.  
The Pacific War was characterised by a higher degree of de-humanisation of the enemy 
than was seen in the European theatre.84 Paul Fussell quotes a marine on Guadalcanal as 
saying that “I wish we were fighting the Germans. They are human beings, like us.... 
But the Japs are like animals... They take to the jungle as if they had been born there, 
and like some beasts you never see them until they are dead’.85 Although they might 
have been flawed and wicked, the Germans and Italians were distinctively human 
(especially the latter86). However, the Japanese were regarded as being ‘animals of an 
especially dwarfish but vicious species’87, “Beastial apes”, ‘wildcats’88, or 
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rattlesnakes.89 This racism was predicated on suppositions about the distinctness of the 
Occident and the Orient, and the existential danger presented by an aggressive and 
acquisitive Oriental power, producing ‘“the War of Oriental Races against Occidental 
Races for the Domination of the World”’.90 Moreover, racist suppositions on each side 
tended to produce an escalating environment of reciprocal dehumanisation in which 
atrocities were committed by both the Japanese and the Americans, and in which the 
brutality of the war challenged the parameters of ‘humanity’ as such. The degree of 
racial prejudice on the part of both Japan and America coloured evaluations of strength, 
assessments of intelligence information and predictions of behaviour and produced a 
way of war conditioned by ‘patterned rhetoric of exterminating beasts, vermin, or 
demons that unquestionably helped raise the tolerance of slaughter in Asia.91  
The view of the Japanese as animal influenced attitudes towards the act of killing them, 
as well as attitudes towards their dead. James Weingartner points out that very low 
numbers of surrendering Japanese soldiers were taken prisoner of war; most were 
killed,92 used as ‘amusing rifle targets’.93 And the killing borrowed heavily from the 
experience of killing animals, which was arguably itself embedded as a foundational 
cornerstone of the masculine psyche in American culture.94 Weingartner suggests that 
‘combat against Japanese assumed the character of a hunt’, and the ‘hunting’ image was 
used as recruitment device by the Marines, who offered ‘Free Ammunition and 
Equipment!’ with a ‘Japanese Hunting License’.95 Even where hatred and brutality 
were absent, the mutilated dead evoked the pity due a hunted animal rather than to a 
human person. E.B. Sledge remembers his first encounter with a dead Japanese soldier, 
in which he thought ‘[t]his can’t have been a human being... It looked more like the 
guts of one of the many rabbits or squirrels I had cleaned on hunting trips as a boy’.96 
This impression seemed to sanction behaviour which would be regarded as 
inappropriate if it had concerned a dead human body: Sledge’s companion admonishes 
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him not to “stand there with your mouth open when there’s all these good souvenirs 
laying around”,97 the souvenirs including spectacles, fillings and items of clothing.  
It was not only artefacts found on dead enemy soldiers that were taken as souvenirs; 
parts of the bodies themselves were taken, especially skulls, ribs and teeth. Although 
one could argue that ‘the mutilation of the dead has been part of military behaviour 
from the beginning of wars’,98 it is noteworthy that ‘the killers felt no sense of 
ownership of [enemy soldiers’] bodies’99 in the European theatre. Rather, as Harrison 
and Weingartner indicate, attitudes towards the body parts of dead Japanese soldiers 
were conditioned by the evolving political environment in which the construction of the 
Japanese and their relation to America was mutating. This determined the extent to 
which the skulls or ribs which soldiers proudly sent home to their relatives and loved 
ones were seen as tokens of heroism, or were read as being a fragment of a dead human 
body, disrespectfully removed. In other words, the body part in question might be seen 
as belonging to one body (that of the acquisitive American soldier, or the triumphant 
American nation as a whole) or another (that of a fallen soldier who also fought well). 
To whom the skull belongs or what it signifies is not settled once and for all, and the 
political negotiation which accompanies it plays a part in determining whether it counts 
as (standing in for) a human body at all. 
Simon Harrison discusses a 76-year old veteran of Guadalcanal who, with others, 
acquired the head of a Japanese soldier, boiled it, ‘breaking the bones behind the eyes to 
remove the brain’,100 and took it home. As time passed, the skull began to trouble him, 
and he eventually handed it over to a group of Japanese priests for repatriation and 
appropriate burial.101 Hence, what had been a positive or at least neutral object became 
an ‘object...of avoidance’,102 as it became less clear whether trophies ‘belonged in the 
realm of things or persons’103 and they started to appear as ‘a reproachful human 
presence in the family’.104 As well as a diachronic variance in the way in which body 
fragments were regarded, there was synchronic dissonance in terms of whether they 
were held as being emblems of personhood or trophies of war. In May 1944, Life 
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magazine featured as its ‘picture of the week’ a young woman gazing at a skull on her 
desk which was said to be a gift from her Navy boyfriend, inscribed ‘This is a good 
Jap—a dead one picked up on the New Guinea beach’.105 Many readers disapproved, 
however, with one counselling that we ‘imagine that one of the most prominent 
magazines in Tokyo published the picture of a young Japanese girl in such a pose, 
gazing at the skull of one of our sons who died for his country—the storm of protest at 
such savagery would sweep the country’.106 The materiality of the fragment of the body 
is insufficient to invoke the whole body, which is instead conjured through an ethico-
political work of re-constructing and re-imagining the body as a son, a soldier, a human 
being, or alternatively as animal, or as not being a body at all.  
The Pacific War was by no means the only war in which body parts were taken as 
souvenirs by Western powers with pretensions towards civility.107 But rather than to 
sanction or condemn any particular stance with respect to the dead, the purpose of this 
discussion has been to demonstrate the multiple networks of political interpretation 
which are inextricably associated with the meaning of the dead body and which can 
condition what counts as a dead body. During periods of ‘reciprocal dehumanisation’ 
bodies may not be regarded as being ‘human bodies’ at all, but as relics of heroism, 
items of property, or souvenirs from a successful hunting expedition. These 
interpretations can be challenged by appeal to different constellations of understanding 
into which the body count be inserted, as for example with the reader of Life magazine 
who suggested that the souvenir skull be understood as that of a son who died for his 
country. Not only is the body incapable of determining which understanding is 
‘correct’, but it cannot be understood apart from these competing interpretations: to say 
that it is wrong to take souvenirs from battle because it demonstrates a lack of respect 
for the dead body, or a failure to appreciate its human qualities, is not to express a 
‘truth’ about the body (whatever this might mean), but to put forward a different 
construction of the body.108  
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The ‘materiality’ of the dead body cannot found the ‘reality’ of the body, because what 
it expresses is always contested and political. The bone of the Japanese soldier may be 
the souvenir of war, evidence of the former vigour of a war veteran, or it may gesture to 
the loss of life of which it is a relic, but it is nothing outside these understandings. In the 
aftermath of the Vietnam War, the issue of soldiers ‘missing in action’ (MIA),109 
became highly politicised, raising questions about what material evidence was needed 
to prove death, and also ‘over what constitutes a body in the first place’.110 If ‘the 
intelligibility of the accounted-for body is not discovered but produced’,111 then the 
dual questions which arise are: how many fragments does one need to construct a body? 
Under what political conditions can a fragment stand in for the fictive whole of a lost 
body? Hawley suggests that in many cases, the materiality of fragmentary remains ‘has 
long produced still more anxiety and has further complicated the question of what 
constitutes a body in the context of the accounting effort’.112 He says that ‘[a]n example 
comes from the identification in 1993 of the remains of Navy Captain Harley Hall by 
means of three of his front teeth. Hall’s wife found this insufficient proof of death. As 
she remarked at the time, “After 20 years of almost unbearable uncertainty, I now face 
the worst possible scenario: still not knowing”’.113 
In the context of war, the ‘dead body’ is unlikely to be a coherent entity immediately 
recognisable as a human body. Katherine Verdery suggests that dead bodies are likely 
to have political resonance: ‘because all people have bodies, any manipulation of a 
corpse directly enables one’s identification with it through one’s own body, thereby 
tapping into one’s reservoirs of feeling’.114 But the dead body’s resonance as a body is 
highly politically mediated and constructed so that fragmentary remains may stand in 
for the fictive missing whole, or they may conspicuously fail to do so. The ‘material’ 
properties of bodies cannot be considered in isolation from their imbrication in a 
complex terrain of political meaning-making without which they cannot be considered 
to be ‘bodies’ at all. It is possible to suggest, therefore, that ‘body counts’ require a 
prior determination as to which bodies count as bodies, and that it is not possible to 
invoke the ‘materiality’ of the body without engaging the dense ethico-political material 
                                                          
109 In 1980, those soldiers who had previously been classified as ‘killed in action/body not recovered’ 
[KIA/BNR] were reclassified as MIA. See Thomas Hawley The Remains of War p. 80 
110 Ibid. p. 105 
111 Ibid. p. 85 
112 Ibid. p. 106 
113 Ibid. p. 86 
114 Katherine Verdery The Political Lives of Dead Bodies p. 33 
87 
 
which constructs it as such. In this sense, ‘what emerges with unrelenting clarity is 
factuality’s status as contingent and ever fugitive, something which makes a consistent 
and sometimes cruel mockery of the “need to know”’.115 
The Dead Body and the Body Politic  
It is potentially productive to read the process of counting, accounting for, and 
constructing the dead body within the wider context of state politics. Moira Gatens says 
that ‘the body politic is constituted a creative act, by a work of art or artifice, that uses 
the human body as its model or metaphor’.116 In this section I propose to examine the 
ways in which the dead body of war interacts with the idea of state politics. However, I 
would adapt Gatens’ description of the relationship between the body and the state to 
allow for the unfinished and undetermined character of the dead body, which, I will 
suggest, only emerges as such through a political work of creativity. Gatens’ description 
of the body suggests that it has properties of naturalness and coherence which the state 
aspires to emulate, so that the body is the model and the state the copy. However, as I 
have tried to show, what ‘counts’ as a body is itself the consequence of a political work 
of construction which cannot readily be bypassed by appealing to the biological 
grounds of bodily integrity. Therefore I would prefer to envisage the relationship 
between the state and the body as being one of mutual interaction and co-formation. In 
this section I would like to offer some necessarily tentative and suggestive thoughts on 
the dynamics of the co-constitutive emergence and identification of the state and the 
war dead.   
Those who are to become the war dead are sent to war at the state’s behest, and they do 
not return alive. It is possible therefore to suggest that one of the dynamics of the 
interaction between the state and the dead body of the soldier is coming to terms with 
this absent or missing life. In the case of Vietnam, Hawley suggests that ‘[o]ne of the 
most vital links between the individual and the national body in the context of Vietnam 
War memorials is the sense that the American body politic remains wounded as a result 
of the fragmentation caused by the war and the absence of certain bodies’.117 He argues 
that memorials therefore have significant political work to do in replacing the missing 
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body and thereby restoring wholeness to the fractured and wounded nation.118 In a 
sense, memorials may serve to take the place of the body of the soldier and becomes a 
permanent and unchanging monument to it, so that the properties of being a body 
somehow migrate to the monument. Katherine Verdery remarks ‘how thin is the line 
separating bronze from bone’,119 and in a sense a monument may appear more perfect 
than the fragile finite body which went before‘[t]he body shall not be a body but is 
greatness and strength’.120 Secondly, the monument signals to the permanent and 
profound absence of the animate body which went to war, most literally through the 
construction of a Cenotaph, ‘a word that literally designates a tomb containing no body 
and is thus interestingly a symbol whose primary function is to delineate an empty 
space’.121 
Susan-Mary Grant suggests that it is through the dead that the body of the nation comes 
to life. She says that ‘[o]ne of the dominant symbols of the modern nation...is the empty 
tomb, the cenotaph, simultaneously symbolic of loss and acquisition: the loss of human 
life, the attainment of national life’.122 Anthony Smith says that ‘[t]he fraternity of the 
nation is lived in and through the sacrifice of its citizens in defence of the fatherland or 
motherland, seen as the unchanging bedrock of the nation, and the sacred soil that 
nourishes its historic culture’.123 In a sense the apparently ‘unchanging’ character of the 
dead, together with the capacity of their invocation to ‘transcend... time, making the 
past immediately present’124 may function as a powerful device in the emergence of a 
chimerical coherence to the nation. But it is possible to suggest that there are reasons to 
be suspicious of this conservative view that the dead body in war serves to reinforce an 
existing entity, and to argue that the war dead have a more transformative role than this.  
Judith Butler suggests that, in the context of the global war on terrorism, ‘[l]oss has 
made a tenuous “we” of us all’,125 and that the process of mourning is transformative. 
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She wonders whether ‘mourning has to do with agreeing to undergo a transformation 
(perhaps one should say submitting to a transformation)’.126 Because as we are in some 
way constituted by our relation with the other, their loss must make us strangers to 
ourselves as we try to establish who we are without them. ‘We’re undone by each 
other’,127 both in our relations, and in our grief when those relations end. To complicate 
matters further, it is not even clear who or what we have lost, as ‘when we lose 
someone, we do not always know what it is in that person that has been lost. So when 
one loses, one is also faced with something enigmatic: something hiding in the loss’.128 
One of the transformative elements of loss therefore comes from its capacity to reveal 
the tenuousness and chimerical character of that which we thought we unquestionably 
possessed. This indicates an inability to define exactly what was lost, and so what was 
possessed, and so what we are to lose and possess: loss sets off a chain of doubt. In this 
context it is possible to suggest that the lost body is always divided, multifaceted and 
fragmentary.  
Butler suggests that ‘denial of vulnerability through a fantasy of mastery (an 
institutionalized fantasy of mastery) can fuel the instruments of war’.129 In this sense, 
the glorification of the dead through monuments of bronze and stone could be 
apprehended as being complicit in this denial of vulnerability through the construction 
of a meta-body which effaces the destruction and decay of the dead and replaces it with 
a more perfect soldier who is not vulnerable to these indignities. In this sense, it is 
possible to argue that the state aims at the ‘sacralization of memory’130 and aspires 
precisely to arrest the transformative potential of loss by concealing the bodily 
vulnerability which permitted it. The formation of a wider fellowship of “we” who have 
lost may thus be prevented. However, the scale of the loss may overwhelm these 
attempts to construct the dead body as invulnerable. In the First World War, ‘[s]acrifice 
might have been a euphemism for slaughter but, either way, the significance of victory 
was overwhelmed by the human cost of achieving it. As if acknowledging that, in this 
respect, there was little to choose between victory and defeat, between the British and 
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German experience of the war, memorial inscriptions were not to ‘Our’ but to ‘The 
Glorious Dead’’.131  
Following Butler, it is possible to suggest the nature of the loss that a dead body 
represents can never be fully known, and therefore, that the ‘meaning’ of the dead body 
can never be fully exhausted in any one representation or appropriation. Katherine 
Verdery suggests that the body is an attractive emblem for political power because it 
carries ‘the illusion of having only one significance’132 as a consequence of its 
‘concreteness’ and ‘thereness’.133 But it is possible to argue that these are precisely 
illusions. Because it is not clear to us what has been lost, it is not possible to embody 
the loss in one unchanging expression. In this sense, the nationalism which drove the 
war is threatened by its dead, and the idea of glorifying the war dead, and by extension 
the war, may itself be undermined by different expressions of the dead body. For 
example, through the ‘revelation of the body’s capacity to be wounded, to fail and to rot 
as a result of combat [which] constitutes a rejection of loftier discourses that seek to 
sublimate human activity, to elevate it to realms beyond the earthly here and now’.134   
Accounting for the Dead 
What bodies count for, and how they are made to count as bodies, is dependent upon a 
work of political negotiation and contestation, which fabricates the dead body and 
imbues it with a certain significance. In other words, it is possible to lay claim to the 
dead, or to contest the meaning and significance of death. Stefan Goebel suggests that 
this dynamic operates under the influence of ‘the dual force of personal grief and 
political expediency’.135 This ‘appropriation’ of the dead for political ends may be 
contested by the families of the dead who want their death to be expressed differently, 
who want to emphasise the personal aspects of the death rather than their significance in 
terms of sacrifices made to the state. Tombs of Unknown Soldiers may be seen as being 
‘a means of symbolizing and honoring the sacrifice of one for the good of the 
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democratic whole’,136 in the sense that the dead were undifferentiated; categorised only 
by their sacrifice to the indivisible state. However, in the case of the Tomb of the 
Vietnam War unknown soldier, in 1998 the decision was taken to exhume the remains 
interred therein for identification in the context of more advanced forensic technologies, 
and of mounting political pressure for all the unaccounted for to be accounted for.137  
In this sense, the body is subject to an evolving framework of counting and accounting 
for, which changes the idea of the body itself. The anonymising impulse of tombs of 
unknown soldiers subsume the dead within the overarching discourse of 
statehood/nationalism, the body stands as a cipher representing sacrifice and service, 
and could be any-body. What is important here are not the singular details of the body, 
but the fact of having fought and died in the colours of the state. However, from a 
different perspective, the importance lies precisely in these singular details which are 
violently effaced through the political appropriation of the body. As in Hawley’s 
account, it may seem that the body cannot be specific, or personal, enough; 
‘identification’ may not be something which is carried out once and for all, but an 
ongoing process of acceptance that the former life met its end in these remains. 
However, the intention is not to suggest that what is at stake is a struggle between the 
state and the family of the dead for the capacity to account for the dead body and the 
right to speak and act in its name. It is not a question of wresting the memory of the 
dead from the state.  
Jenny Edkins says that ‘[w]e are not just talking about a struggle for memory between 
state authorities and the population at large, but something much more complex’.138 As 
Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan point out, ‘an ongoing process of contestation... is 
likely to remain one of the permanent features of remembrance. It is not the 
geographical location or level of economic development which is decisive here, but the 
nature of that complex and enduring social activity, remembrance’.139 Some of this 
contestation may take the form of a suspicion that the state is paying insufficient heed 
of the personal sacrifices made in the service of state’s designated ends. Campaigning 
for a Royal Mail commemoration of the fallen of Iraq, mother Paulene Ward said that 
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‘[o]ur soldiers never get the recognition they deserve. This is a chance to immortalise 
them and see them celebrated globally’.140 The Sun found that two-thirds of the British 
public think not enough is being done to recognise British soldiers killed in Iraq.141 In 
this context, one could argue that the idea that the expressions of the dead are 
conditioned by a dual force of personal grief and political expediency is misleading 
insofar as that both of these ‘dualities’ are themselves multiple and variable: there is no 
single mode of political appropriation nor of grieving. Nor is it clear that ‘grief’ is 
strictly personal, and state level manifestations of it are mere political artifice.  
More than this, I would contend that the dead body is not exhausted in any one 
memorialisation or accounting, nor can it be contained between the dyadic ‘personal’ 
and ‘political’. Marc Augé challenges the idea that ‘[e]very body occupies its place’ on 
the grounds that ‘this singular and exclusive occupation is more that of a cadaver in its 
grave than of the nascent or living body. In the order of birth and life the proper place, 
like absolute individuality, becomes more difficult to define and think about’.142 
However, it is possible to suggest that the dead body is similarly resistant to 
containment in a final resting place, due to the difficulty in fixing the parameters of the 
dead body (how many parts make up ‘the body’?) and in fashioning a discreet 
relationship between the living and the dead which is characterised by independence. In 
addition, what has been lost is subject to ongoing negotiation which refigures the body 
of the fallen in line with current political needs. Foucault asked ‘what mode of 
investment [in] the body is necessary and adequate for the functioning of a capitalist 
society like ours?’143 One might equally ask what kind of war dead the current society 
needs. I have tried to suggest that the impossibility of fixing and defining the dead body 
once and for all means that the political engagement with the dead must be ongoing.  
M. Brady Bower suggests that the work of memorialisation is in some senses a way of 
overcoming the trauma that death in war represents, by making the dead 
comprehensible and even ‘familiar’, and insisting that by virtue of their sacrifice they 
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remain an essential part—maybe the essential part—of the political community. He 
quotes Maurice Barrès, who said at the 1919 ‘Festival of Victory’ in France that ‘[f]rom 
this triumphal day we take away an idea that is true only if we provide a place for the 
absent, for all those who have fallen in the last five years. To the visible, join with the 
invisible and reveal to them your hearts which could never be ungrateful. We salute 
[our soldiers] without piety, without distinguishing between them, the living and the 
dead’.144 The image is one of a community of living and dead, in which the bonds of 
communion and shared experience are such that death cannot break them, and it is 
possible to suggest that such an impulse is present through all remembering of the dead. 
In one sense death may stand as the most dramatic and final loss. In another, the finality 
of the loss is somehow deferred through the work of memory. One might suggest that 
the severity of the loss is given somehow by the body: that the body was present and 
animate and now is no longer, and that this is the foundational boundary between the 
living and the dead. 
How, then, are we to think body counts and ways of accounting for the body at war? If 
the body is a fungible and political entity through and through, then counting cannot 
merely be a matter of representation, since all representations are also constructions. 
Butler suggests that a ‘hierarchy of grief can...be enumerated’,145 and that, with respect 
to the Iraq War, this hierarchy has tended to exclude ‘Arab peoples’146 in accordance 
with our ‘cultural contours of the human’.147 The prior denigration of these ‘Arab 
peoples’, however subtle, becomes a condition of possibility for killing them, or for 
countenancing their death as a necessary evil.148 And in this sense counting starts to 
appear as a deeply conservative activity which not only fails to question underlying 
assumptions about in/valuable life, but may actively reinforce them by counting in 
terms of certain categories, and by failing to interrogate why some bodies are easier to 
grieve than others.  
Julian Barnes parodies the ‘mathematics of death’ at work in the Iraq War:  
Let's start with the basic unit: one dead Iraqi soldier, score one point. Two for a 
dead Republican Guard, three for Special Republican Guard or fedayeen. And 
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so on up to the top of the regime: 5,000, let's say, for Chemical Ali; 7,500 for 
each of Saddam's sons; 10,000 for the tyrant himself.  
Now for the potentially demoralising downside. One Iraqi civilian killed: if 
male, lose five points, female 10, a child 20. One coalition soldier killed: deduct 
50 points. And then, worst of all (as it underlines the futility and hazard of war), 
one coalition soldier killed by friendly fire: deduct 100 points. On the other 
hand, gain 1,000 for each incident which a couple of years down the line can 
give rise to a feel-good Hollywood movie: witness “Saving Private Lynch”.149  
As part of an economy of war and death, counting cannot account for the prior 
construction of ‘bodies that matter’,150 and those that do not, because these initial, non-
enumerable calculations are the conditions of possibility for the apparently 
straightforward act of counting, which serves to reinforce their apparent ‘self-evidence’. 
The act of counting posits the bodies of the counted as being external to those who 
count, and independent from them. The relationship is a technological one, which 
implies that the body is a discreet object for calculation. Contrary to this view, I have 
tried to suggest that bodies construct political communities and are constructed by 
them, so that there is no de facto meaning embodied by the dead body independent of a 
political work of making meaning. In addition, what counts as a ‘dead body’ is not 
given by some material reality but is the consequence of a praxis of valuation and 
interaction so that a bone can at once be ‘a dead body’ and a souvenir of war. In 
consequence, I have indicated that it is possible to think the dead body in terms of its 
relationship to the living, whereby its meaning may be dramatised by the actions and 
behaviour of the living which in turn is informed by the mythological memory of the 
dead. The dynamic process of embodiment may illuminate the ‘palimpsest-like history 
of the human subject, which may be examined for the clues it offers to the interrelation 
of past and present’.151  
Elaine Scarry, and others, have argued that body counts are too ‘abstract’ to take 
account of the material weight of the body. Contrary to this, I have tried to suggest that, 
rather than being ephemeral and disembodied, body counts have material consequences 
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for the fate of bodies, in terms of which bodies are counted as such. I have sought to 
demonstrate that body counts tend to elide the complexity inherent in counting, in terms 
of constructing bodies. Rather than being a self-evident material entity, I have argued 
that the body is thoroughly dynamic and political, and have sought to outline some of 
the expressions that this is the case. This being the case, it is possible to suggest that 
counting itself constructs bodies, in such a way as to interrupt or forestall any other kind 
of encounter with them, and through positing them as unproblematic objects, limits the 
extent to which they can have a transformative political impact. In this sense, rather 
than referring straightforwardly to objects in the world, counting appears as part of a 
process which constructs these objects as being available to technological manipulation. 
Discussing the complicity of the accounting profession in the Holocaust, Warwick 
Funnell suggests that ‘[a]ccounting as an instrument of the German civil bureaucracy 
provided at “centres of calculation” new quantitative visibilities... that were able to 
supplant the qualitative dimensions of the Jews as individuals by commodifying and 
dehumanising them, and, thereby, for all intents to make them invisible as people’.152 In 
other words, it was not only that various administrative and organisation feats were 
made possible by accountancy (and allied mathematical sciences), but that this way of 
thinking about human beings made certain actions thinkable within ‘ends-means 
relationships...able to escape moral reckonings’.153 
Conclusion: Responding to the War Dead  
Maja Zehfuss argues that the contestation of numbers in the debates about the 
legitimacy of the Iraq War proved ‘strangely ineffectual’154 in disrupting the logic of 
the war. This is, at least in part, because the act of counting the dead does not seriously 
challenge the separation between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and the coherence of the former. 
‘Whatever the precise number, the deaths have been caused by the ‘we’ asserted in 
Bush and Blair’s rhetoric about the war and this is not disputed; but ‘them’ and ‘us’ 
remain logically separate’.155 The question provoked by numbers of Iraqi dead takes the 
form of ‘what should we do?’ if it arises at all. This question is consistent with the 
technological approach to bodies discussed in the previous chapter, in which (other) 
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bodies are the passive objects of political decision. Of course, counting is better than 
nothing, and it may be the first step towards (re-)presenting the dead as being grievable 
lives and thereby breaching the distance between ‘us’ and ‘them’: ‘[i]t is not merely 
about showing that Iraqis are people just like us, people who will be grieved by those 
who loved them; they are part of who we are: ‘we’ do not exist without our relation to 
others or before ‘we’ act’.156  
Michael Dillon states that ‘modern military power…seeks to command the very power 
of differentiation of inside and outside, of secure and insecure, less of a mere geo-
strategic terrain of power than the capacity through the power of signification to create 
and command multiple terrains of power relations as such’.157 Counting, in and of itself, 
is entirely compatible with the military logic which seeks to differentiate between zones 
of security/insecurity, even if it is intended to contest the legitimacy of the war. As 
Zehfuss argues, it need not disturb the coherence of the ‘we’ who counts, and this is the 
case in part because the notion of the dead body as something pre-existent, coherent and 
non-political reinforces the putative independence of ‘us’ from it. But there are other 
possible modes of interaction of the dead, entailing different imaginaries of the dead 
body, and taking account of the political nature of dead bodies (what is a dead body? 
How did it come to be dead?) unsettles the relationship between communities of the 
living and dead: ‘reorganizing relations with the dead can be a way of reordering live 
human communities’.158 
I have tried to show that body counts are a problematic way of accounting for the dead 
body at war. This is the case because they somehow assume that the body provides the 
truth or reality of war. Even those critiques of counting which insist on its inadequacy 
and ethically deficient nature tend to do so on the grounds that it fails to convey or 
express the material fact of the dead body, and appears as an abstract digital discourse 
which is all too easily dismissed along with the other ‘disembodied’ rhetoric of war. 
Scarry suggests that it is this move from the material suffering of the body to the 
immaterial ideologies of the state which confer power on the latter, which exploits the 
body’s ‘real’ status to reinforce its own significance and to shore up its own claims to 
veracity and reality. In this context we might say that the body has been subject to a 
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two-fold betrayal: it is difficult or impossible to properly represent, and political power 
depends on taking advantage of this difficulty or impossibility. James Der Derian 
suggests that ‘the material facticity of the dead soldier can be censored, hidden in a 
body bag, air-brushed away, but it provides, even in its erasure, the corporeal gravitas 
of war’.159 It has been my suggestion, however, that body counts are problematic 
because they conceal the political work that is necessary to construct a body as a body, 
and as a body worth counting within a certain category. The work of determining 
‘whose lives can be marked as lives, and whose deaths will count as deaths’160 is so 
multilayered, complex, and itself embodied, that counting runs the risk of simply 
reinforcing its prior conclusions.  
Body counting arguably entails an effort to secure a stable position from which to 
‘know’ the body. According to this mode of surveying the body, the counter is not 
altered in any significant way by what is counted, which is conceived as a process of 
attaining knowledge about a stable entity. I have tried to suggest that this mode of 
knowing the body at war is dependent on a number of prior judgements as to what ‘a 
body’ is, and what importance it has. Rather than simply enumerating the numbers of 
bodies killed or damaged, I suggest that may be more productive to see the body itself 
as a contested and political entity which is dynamic and incomplete even in death. This 
may enable it to become more possible to expose the way in which the body is 
constructed as being either an object for technological manipulation or a cipher of 
personhood. Butler says that ‘[w]hen a bleeding child or dead body on Afghan soil 
emerges in the press coverage, it is not relayed as part of the horror of war, but only in 
the service of a criticism of the military’s capacity to aim its bombs right’.161 That is to 
say, the body may remain enmeshed in the military logic of strategic necessity, and 
therefore does not emerge as occupying the world of persons, whose loss should be 
mourned. Just as Simon Harrison suggested that bodily souvenirs from the Pacific War 
were mobile between the domains of persons and things,162 so bodies themselves must 
be situated in one domain or another, and this situation is never once and for all, but an 
ongoing political work. Therefore, I have tried to suggest that the dead body is better 
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understood not as a material ‘fact’ but through the event of death as something which 
demands a political response.  
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Chapter 3 
Military Technology and the Future of the Body 
 
I have suggested that strategic thought and technological writing about the body tend to 
present the body as being a cipher or agent of political will. In other words, the body 
tends only to be taken into account in terms of its ability to carry out the strategic 
designs of an external political force. However, there are problems with the body in this 
regard, due to the intrusion of extra-instrumental characteristics which tend to 
undermine war’s claims to rationality. Firstly, the body may behave in unpredictable 
ways not conducive to the pursuance of war aims. For example, studies have suggested 
that only 15-25 per cent of US riflemen in certain theatres of the Second World War 
actually shot at the enemy.1 In this case, reluctance to kill may imperil the strategic 
vision. Alternatively, the body may introduce an element of ‘irrationality’ into war by 
being involved in atrocities and the killing of civilians as a consequence of the stresses 
and provocations of war.2 In this sense the clarity of the war aims, together with the 
political justifiability of the methods used, are imperilled, degrading the notion that war 
is a defensible instrument of policy. Secondly, the body is vulnerable to death in war, 
and this too challenges faith in the utility of war. Although technological writing may 
seek to reduce the body to the status of an instrument, it retains some extra-utilitarian 
qualities which may lead polities to reject war as a policy option due to the intolerable 
nature of the losses in which it results. This may be particularly the case in the light of 
claims that contemporary public tolerance of loss of life in war is at its nadir.3  
So, the notion that we can replace the body at war with technology seems a promising 
one. As I discussed in chapter 1, technology has long been used to distance those who 
kill from those who die.4 In the twenty-first century, advanced technologies promise to 
go further, and to remove the body from the battlefield altogether through the 
development of unmanned vehicles which would carry out tasks from surveillance to 
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strikes without the need for human bodies to enter danger zones. The idea that 
technology can replace the body on the battlefield seems to offer the potential to redeem 
war from the horrors of the twentieth century and return it to the status of a thinkable 
option in the policymaker’s arsenal. The US Department of Defense’s document 
outlining their vision of conflict in 2020 cautions that ‘the fundamental sources of 
friction cannot be eliminated. We will win—but we should not expect war in the future 
to be easy or bloodless’.5 However, through the use of technology it is anticipated that 
it should be possible to avoid mass US casualties of the type last seen in Vietnam. And 
in this sense, it may be possible for war to become more rational, ‘rational’ referring to 
‘a way of looking at the world in which the meaning of an act derived entirely from its 
utility’.6  
Christopher Coker points out that ‘[w]ithin the framework of practical rationality all 
means of procuring desired ends are viewed as ‘techniques’ or ‘strategies’ rather than as 
systems of values adhered to on the basis of ethical standards’.7 That is to say, the 
political underpinnings of the framework are not interrogated when concerns of 
technology and utility dominate. In the light of this, I want to suggest that the idea that 
technology can replace the body on the battlefield and thus redeem war as an instrument 
of policy fails to call into question the relationship between the body and technology, 
and reinforces a number of assumptions about the body which merit further scrutiny. 
The first such assumption is that the body and technology are formally independent, and 
that the one can replace the other. I explore this assumption first in the context of the 
work of Paul Virilio, for whom the increasing influence of military technology 
represents a threat to the body and to politics. For me, this evinces a conservative 
understanding of what the body is, and the degree of adaptation of which it is capable, 
as well as an assumption that the body and technology are radically independent, since 
technology can come to change the conditions of bodily life to the extent that the 
continued survival of the body itself is in peril.  
I want to suggest that Virilio’s is a problematic reading, which essentialises the body in 
order to protect it as a privileged site for politics and ethics. In this way, paradoxically, 
it seems to evacuate all meaningful politics from the body, because it cannot take 
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account of adaptation, invention, or change. Rather than this, I would suggest that 
‘[technology’s] essence lies not in the tool or later the machine, but in the man who 
uses it. It resides in the way we think or imagine our external world and our relationship 
with it’.8 I explore this contention through the work of the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA), much of which is orientated towards engineering a closer 
relationship between body and technology. While retaining a faith in the power of 
technology to positively transform the experience of warfare, DARPA does not share 
Virilio’s conviction that the body is a stable object with given properties. Rather, their 
ambitions hinge on the capacity of the body to be positively transformed in conjunction 
with certain technological measures, and express the belief that body and technology 
may enhance each other in a symbiotic manner. This may superficially appear to be a 
more positive reading of the body which is sensitive to its political malleability. 
However, I argue that the work of military research continues to take the body as an 
object for an external knowledge and will, and moreover to see it entirely in terms of its 
utilitarian warfighting capacities, eliding the extent to which political decisions are at 
play in determining the parameters of ‘utility’.  
However, this point needs to be made with some care. For I suggest that the vision of 
the body held by military scientists has something in common with that ascribed to by 
critical thinkers such as Donna Haraway, who seeks to explore the capacity of ever 
closer body/technology mergers to destabilise the politics of identity and to create 
spaces for the emergence of new forms of unregulated bodily being which are not 
disciplined by hitherto dominant ideas about their identity, stability, and conformity 
with a given ideal. In this sense, it may not matter that military research pays no heed to 
the political assumptions behind their utilitarian engineering of the body, as Haraway 
suggests that important political consequences will emerge in any case.9 I argue that 
what is missing from these accounts is a serious consideration of the extent to which the 
body is itself active in determining the conditions of its own existence, and its relation 
to technology. I try to show that the body does not have an exterior relationship to 
politics, but that it is itself thoroughly and immanently political. Through a discussion 
of the psychoanalytic work of Klaus Theweleit, among others, I suggest that presenting 
the body as an object for knowledge or technology is an incomplete rendering of the 
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dynamic potentialities of the body. Rather, I suggest that the body itself is implicated in 
the libidinal investment of technology, and in the constitution of the body as such, and 
discuss the implications of this for thinking about war, the body and technology without 
depending on identity-based categories such as ‘humanity’. 
Writing in the aftermath of the devastating First World War in Germany, Ernst Jünger 
argued against the idea that science and technology were associated primarily with 
reason, and were engaged in the production of the increasingly perfect rational man. He 
suggested that ‘the genius of war was penetrated by the spirit of progress’,10 and 
therefore that scientific development would not necessarily conduce to peace, and was 
in fact entirely symbiotic with war. But more significantly, he argued that the increasing 
use of technology for the waging of war did not reduce the extent to which war was 
animated by an ‘irrational vitalism’.11 For Jünger, war was ‘an intoxication beyond all 
intoxication, an unleashing that breaks all bonds. It is a frenzy without caution and 
limits, comparable only to the forces of nature. There the individual is like a raging 
storm, the tossing sea, and the roaring thunder. He has melted into everything’.12 
Jünger’s argument was that the intoxication of war was in no way eradicated by the 
mechanisation of conflict, and rather than making war more rational, technology merely 
altered the ways in which war takes up the passions and inspires and seduces men. 
While forbearing from some of Jünger’s spiritualist conclusions, I too want to argue 
that the prism of ‘rationality’ is too restricted to apprehend the impact of technologies 
of war, which cannot bypass politics, imagination and desire.  
Virilio and the Body under Siege 
Virilio expresses the clear conviction that war has changed as a consequence of the 
evolving techno-social context in which it exists.13 The focus for his critique of the 
modern military is the phenomenological body, which provides the standard against 
which the ‘inhuman’ speeds of modern life are measured. This has led Douglas Kellner 
to argue that Virilio’s project ‘is essentially conservative, wishing to preserve the 
human body and natural life against the assaults of what he sees as demonic technology 
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which he regards as having a highly destructive impact on nature, human beings and 
socio-political life’.14 Virilio preserves the body as a privileged category in the context 
of ever more sophisticated military technologies; technologies which, for him, also 
condition political life itself. For Virilio, the body has an ethical significance as a 
reservoir of humanity, but this is seen in terms of the possession of certain fixed 
properties and attributes which may be juxtaposed to ‘technology’. His human body is 
not only privileged, however, but endangered, because of the extent to which its 
specificity as a perspective on the world makes it incompatible with other machine-
mediated viewpoints.   
Virilio argues that political life and war are thoroughly implicated in each other’s 
emergence. He says that ‘[t]he city, the polis, is constitutive of the form of the conflict 
called WAR, just as war is itself constitutive of the political form called the CITY’.15 
War itself is thoroughly determined by speed: ‘Speed is violence’16 and the primacy of 
speed in modern society is synonymous with the primacy of the military.17 He goes so 
far as to suggest that war/speed is the driving force behind the history of civilisations: 
‘war and the need for speed rather than commerce and the urge for wealth were the 
foundation stones of the city, culture and society’.18 One implication of this is that it is 
the command of speed which lends itself to political and military power, rather than the 
possession of wealth: ‘whoever commands the means of instant information, 
communication, and destruction becomes a dominant sociopolitical force’.19 So in this 
sense, one makes war by commanding speed, and speed becomes the currency of both 
political and military systems of power in what Virilio terms ‘chrono-politics’.20 In both 
war and politics, it is an advantage to think, decide, and act more quickly than others, in 
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order to outmanoeuvre them. However, Virilio argues that the situation changes at a 
certain stage of modernity, at which the speeds concerned accelerate to the point at 
which any kind of politics becomes effectively impossible, as there is no longer any 
time to deliberate or discuss. This produces what Virilio calls ‘pure war’, which is 
where, under the aegis of this hyper-fast hyper-modernity, war diffuses into politics 
itself.  
The hyper-speed of modernity is threatening to the future of the body because it 
displaces it as the measure of the world. For Virilio, there is a natural speed of the body, 
and there is the ‘unnatural’ speed of high technology. He posits a distinction between 
‘metabolic speed, the role of the cavalry in history, the speed of the human body, the 
athletic body’ and ‘technological speed’.21 Indeed, history is the progress from 
‘metabolic, then mechanical, relative speed, and absolute speed today with the boom in 
electromagnetic systems’22. So the speed of the body has been superseded and is no 
longer the regulatory clock for politics and war. Through technology, the body has been 
surpassed and left behind. Virilio borrows this idea of the body as a container for a 
certain standard of time from Henri Bergson, for whom consciousness depends on 
duration: ‘“the mind is the thing that lasts”’.23 So our very capacity to think is founded 
upon a certain speed, a metabolic clock which regulates human time: ‘the first product 
of consciousness would be its own speed in its distance of time, speed would be the 
causal idea, the idea before the idea’.24 The body is the container for a certain measure 
of time, metabolic time, the time for politics and thought and humanity, so subjectivity 
is the consequence of a certain social speed: “You have no speed, you are speed!”’25 So 
it is possible to see why, for Virilio, the passage of the regulation of speed from the 
metabolism to the ‘absolute speed’ of contemporary technologies has such radical 
consequences for bodies.  
Because the body no longer regulates the speed of the world, it is thoroughly 
dispensable and may be already obsolete: ‘Today, even if God may still need men, war 
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does not, or barely... as victims’.26 In this analysis, the Gulf War was evidence enough 
that modes of waging and perceiving war have moved beyond the realm of the human: 
James Der Derian suggests that it was ‘the first total electronic war...the matter of the 
body disappearing in the process’.27 Rather than being a war of materiel, Virilio 
contends that the Gulf War was a ‘light war’,28 and argues that ‘a war of zero casualties 
is an inhuman war, or transhuman war, and that immaterial war, pure war, is only ever 
an ‘ecological accident’, the fruit of the extreme development of our techno-sciences’.29 
In other words, it was not a war that was willed and planned by man, but one which 
manifested itself as a consequence of the ‘natural environment’, which is now 
thoroughly constituted by technology.30 For Virilio technology is not something that we 
control, but something which thoroughly conditions our environment to the extent that 
it appears to us as being a ‘fact of nature’, an inescapable truth about our existence.  
So man is no longer the measure of time, politics, or war, because technology has 
wrested regulatory power from the body and given it to systems which move faster than 
the body ever could. Virilio says that ‘man is no longer the centre of the world of 
anthropocentrism or geocentrism; he has become, in the course of the twentieth century, 
the end of the world of a technoscientific nihilism’.31 So in the one sense technology 
alienates the body from its own capacities for perception, on the other, though, it 
consumes the body from within by approaching it as the site for technological 
enhancement and control. There is an ‘endocolonisation’ by technology of the body32 
producing an ‘almost total collapse of the distinction between technology and the 
human body’,33 and risking a ‘slide into a future without humanity’.34 The pace of the 
world is such that it is leaving man behind: he is literally becoming a ‘thing of the past’. 
The escalating tyranny of speed is bringing about the ‘[d]isappearance of place and 
individual at the same time…[so] disappearance is our future’.35 Technologies take over 
the functions of the body and in some senses leave the body behind. Kellner says that 
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Virilio is concerned with ‘the tendency of technology to displace modes of human 
perception and representation in military planning and execution... human power is 
replaced by machines, reducing the soldier to a cog in the servomechanism’.36  
Virilio’s work is an analysis of the political consequences of the increasing impact and 
sophistication of military technologies. He departs from the technological reading 
according to which technology is merely an instrument in the service of an externally 
given end. Rather than being a servant of humanity, Virilio’s technology has begun to 
dictate the conditions under which bodies exist, and has come to determine politics. So 
Virilio’s understanding of the consequences of military technology represents a 
departure from the purely functionalist account, and insists that military science has an 
impact beyond the theatre of war. This reading deviates from the ‘technological’ view 
of technology that I outlined in chapter 1, in which technology was credited with having 
the capacity to redeem war by protecting the body from its harmful psychic effects and 
lethal physical ones. For Virilio, war is not seen in a utilitarian sense, as being a 
function of politics, but is seen as co-emergent with politics, as having the capacity to 
dictate the possibilities for politics. In this sense, the rationalist reading of technology 
and war breaks down, and Virilio does seek to interrogate the relationship between war 
and politics. However, a key feature of what we might call the rationalist paradigm is 
reinforced in Virilio’s reading, namely, the putative independence of technology and 
the body.  
For Virilio, war and politics are somehow co-constitutive. At a certain technological 
stage of development, this relationship is not inimical to the conduct of meaningful 
politics, because both war and politics are conducted by human bodies. However, 
modern technology alienates certain functions from the body and permits war and 
politics to be conducted at speeds which are far greater than the ‘metabolic speed’ of 
the body, and therefore the body is left behind, or consigned to obsolescence. 
Technology is endowed with the capacity to ‘take over’ functions from the body, and it 
is possible to envisage a framework for war in which the body does not feature and is 
not required. Kellner suggests that ‘[t]his vision of technological domination, of 
technology displacing human beings, has echoes of the theories of “autonomous 
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technology”’37 and represents a form of ‘military-technological determinism’.38 In his 
efforts to mount a critique of the operation of modern techno-military power, it is 
possible that Virilio has actually given far too much away to this power, partly by virtue 
of the fact that he sees it as an independently existing social force which is not tethered 
to politics of the body: it is non-political. In this sense, the body and technology are 
seen as being independent and the body appears as an object of technology. Christopher 
Coker, following Martin Heidegger, suggests that after industrialisation, ‘[m]an too had 
become the object, not subject, of technology... Men became commodities to be 
transformed or stored in a way that obliterated human agency’.39  
Kellner suggests that Virilio ‘denies the technological imperative and affirms the 
dignity and sovereignty of human beings over things’.40 However, insisting on a radical 
distinction between the body and technology does involve considering the body as an 
object to a degree. If the body can be an object for technology, then it must be 
presumed to be imbued with a certain set of fixed characteristics and properties. 
Virilio’s understanding arguably derives from his Christian beliefs and hinges around 
the arguably distinctively human capacities for freedom and meaning.41 But the 
problem here is that one arrives at a very restricted understanding of what the scope for 
this freedom and meaning-creation is, since clearly it does not encompass the 
construction of new technological worlds. Moreover, I would argue that Virilio’s 
account actually divests the body of real political significance in its haste to place the 
body at the centre of accounts of what politics is. Linking ‘politics’ to some fixed and 
stable measure, here, the ‘metabolic speed’ of the body, means that all change must be 
somehow non-political, and moreover, that the possibility for changes to the body are 
ruled out. In this sense the body is not itself intrinsically politically interesting, but 
stands only as the exterior measure for what politics is.  
 
 
                                                          
37 Douglas Kellner ‘Virilio, War and Technology: Some Critical Reflections’ at 
http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell29.htm Accessed 13/08/09 p.6 
38 Ibid. p. 7 
39 Christopher Coker The Future of War pp. 21-22 
40 Douglas Kellner ‘Virilio, War and Technology: Some Critical Reflections’ p. 6 
41 Ibid. p. 6 
108 
 
Military Research and the Instrumental Body  
Virilio takes a non-instrumental view of the technologies of war, choosing instead to 
see them in terms of an autonomous capacity to dominate politics and imperil the body. 
In some respects, this is the reverse of an instrumental view, since rather than 
technology being at the service of human bodies and politics, the latter are objects for 
autonomous technology. But I have suggested that Virilio himself reinforces this 
objectifying view of the body by ascribing to it a fixed set of characteristics and 
capabilities which cannot create or evolve but are vulnerable to being effaced by 
technology. This view of the vulnerable body is echoed by Tim Blackmore’s future-
orientated vision of the technologies of war. In his discussion of high-tech body armour, 
he suggests that the space for humanity is literally being eliminated by ever more 
sophisticated, ever more intimate technologies. He refers to the ‘dreadful convergence 
of medical and military technology [which] makes the body into a horror zone’,42 and 
suggests that ‘[a]s armour becomes more penetrating, the elusive self in its tricky, risky 
body container retreats…The armoured soldier will need to find a home for the self that 
is outside the body: there will be little room left inside’.43 Blackmore argues that 
‘[c]onfronting an armoured suit, the soldier recognizes the whole body as a marginal 
zone, an understanding that makes the soldier queasy about all technology since what 
were once external mechanical artefacts are now potential boundary breakers’.44 
Blackmore shares with Virilio the contention that technology has become non-rational 
in its functioning, but both support their claims on the basis of the supposition that the 
body has a defined set of characteristics and an established mode of functioning which 
may be disrupted by the intrusion of technology. The body is presented as being known, 
and change is brought to it from without by technology which imperils its existence in a 
zero-sum struggle for space and expression. The possibilities for a positive relationship 
between the body and technology are not taken into account, because this would entail 
accepting a degree of flexibility in terms of what the body is and what it can become. In 
order to mount a critique of technology, this flexibility is not admitted. This approach 
may be contrasted with that of DARPA, which is concerned to exploit and explore the 
fruitful possibilities arising from mergers between the body and technology, and in this 
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case might be expected to take a more equivocal view of what the body actually is, and 
what its capabilities are. Of course, the work of DARPA must be understood within the 
framework of an instrumentalist understanding of war and technology. In other words, 
DARPA is committed to the view that war is an appropriate instrument of policy, and 
that technology may improve the extent to which this is the case. ‘DARPA's mission is 
to maintain the technological superiority of the U.S. military and prevent technological 
surprise from harming our national security’.45 However, it introduces the possibility 
that the body and technology may be considered in terms of a productive and dynamic 
relationship rather than as negative determinism.  
DARPA was established in 1958 in response to the Soviet launch of Sputnik 1. Its 
mandate was creative thought with an emphasis on experimentation and innovation 
over feasible implementation.46 DARPA is concerned to make the capabilities of the 
US military fit for future challenges, and these include the fitness of soldiers, or 
‘warfighters’. The first point of interest is that DARPA is engaged seeking to engineer 
in suitability of soldiers for future scenarios that are not yet known. There is an 
assumption of a degree of elasticity in the capabilities of soldier’s bodies, which may be 
modified and enhanced for these unknown future scenarios. One researcher says that 
‘when we attempt to decode the biological fundamentals of questions…we are actually 
developing the potential to improve the warfighter’s experience in ways that we can’t 
even predict yet’.47 This suggests that the outcome of the research is not certain, but 
then nor is the end for which the research is being conducted, since this is also unknown 
and future orientated. DARPA runs such projects as the Peak Soldier Performance 
project, which is concerned to examine ways of enhancing ‘tolerance to extreme 
climates’48 and the Preventing Sleep Deprivation project, which investigates ‘novel 
pharmaceuticals that enhance neural transmission’.49 These are intended to allow the 
‘warfighter’ to function even in hostile environments, and deal with ‘known’ limitations 
on the body’s endurance. However, DARPA’s overall strategic goal of ‘prevent[ing] 
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technological surprise’50 seems to be concerned with more indeterminate parameters, 
since ‘it is nearly impossible to predict what threats might emerge in two decades’.51 
DARPA therefore needs to find a productive relationship with uncertainty and the 
unknown in order to protect against these uncertain future threats.  
DARPA is also concerned with engineering an ever more symbiotic relationship 
between the human body and technology both to enhance the body and to maximise the 
potential of the technology. J.C.R. Licklider, a DARPA employee in the 1960s,52 was 
an early proponent of ‘man-computer symbiosis’. He suggested that ‘[i]t seems entirely 
possible that, in due course, electronic or chemical “machines” will outdo the human 
brain in most of the functions we now consider exclusively within its province’.53 
Licklider said that ‘[i]n the anticipated symbiotic partnership, men will set the goals, 
formulate the hypotheses, determine the criteria, and perform the evaluations’,54 later 
averring that this will be the case ‘at least in the early years’.55 So DARPA has long 
been informed by the idea that a closer relationship between humans and technology 
has potentially productive consequences, running projects which treat the human brain 
like a machine, such as the Improving Warfighter Information Intake Under Stress 
(AugCog)56 project, and seeking to improve the relationship between the human and the 
machine in autonomous systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).57  
Ultimately, the symbiosis between body and machine may become such that the body 
can be evacuated from the theatre of war and replaced by machinery. To a degree, this 
is the aspiration of the US Department of Defense, which has a stated commitment to 
the development of UAVs and their gradual replacement of manned platforms. The 
Defense Authorization Act 2001 states that a third of all ground vehicles should be 
unmanned by 2015, as should a third of deep strike force aircraft by 2010.58 The 
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aspiration is that the network will achieve ‘worldwide connectivity and... be operated 
by remote crews from virtually any location’.59 So the vision is that human operators 
are decreasingly needed on the battlefield; they are not really present, but 
‘telepresent’.60 Bodies start to appear as an element within a system, and one which is 
somewhat frustrating for its resistance to being fully assimilated into the system: 
‘humans make trouble for vehicles’.61 It is hoped that ultimately, UAVs will be able to 
‘outfly and eventually outgun vehicles driven by biological packages (humans)’.62 This 
has obvious advantages in terms of freeing the body from potentially perilous missions, 
and significantly changes the parameters of ‘action’ such that one can be said to ‘act’ in 
ways which have their consequences hundreds or even thousands of miles away.  
DARPA’s research suggests that the body is an improvable element within a military 
system. The body is not apprehended in terms of its ‘humanity’ or ethical significance, 
but as a set of biological processes which may become the objects for scientific study. 
In this sense, the body is treated as an object for scientific knowledge, but not one 
which possesses a priori limitations on the changes it can productively undergo. 
Displacing ‘humanity’ as a central concern seems to create the space for the re-
imagining of what the possible relationship between the body and technology could be, 
such that a symbiotic improvement of the capabilities of both becomes possible. 
However, the focus on unmanned vehicles suggests that problems remain with the use 
of the body in war. Although there is a degree of flexibility admitted in the extent to 
which the body may be changed, military research must still deal with the problem of 
fatality which presents a number of political and operational problems, and which 
clearly does not arise in the case of autonomous technology. In addition, technologies 
may be apprehended as being purer objects of political will than bodies. For example, 
the reluctance of human players in nuclear war games to trigger a nuclear explosion 
lead to the development of programmes designed to do it instead.63 In this sense, the 
body is subordinated to the instrumental imperatives of the work in hand, and can 
legitimately be replaced when technologies are available to perform in more governable 
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and less politically problematic ways. However, the body is taken to be an object for 
exploratory scientific knowledge, rather than being a privileged ethical site for the 
preservation of humanity. In this sense, then the marginalisation of the extra-
instrumental concern for ‘humanity’ creates the space for the emergence of a more 
malleable body.  
The Politics of the Technological Body 
I have suggested that Virilio’s critique of military technology is dependent on a strong 
view of the identity of the body. That is to say, he assumes that one can know what the 
parameters of the body are, and what its ethical and ontological status is, and therefore 
that it can be used as a measure to condemn the insidious effects of technology: 
insidious above all because they alter this identity. The military industrial view of 
technology and the body marginalises the question of identity in order to focus more 
effectively on the question of efficiency or instrumental utility. No longer subordinated 
to the principle of identity, the body is no longer tethered to normative notions about 
what it should be and how it should relate to concepts such as humanity and selfhood. 
In this way it becomes possible to think more experimentally about the body in the 
absence of any foundational judgements as to what it ought to be and how it ought to 
intersect with politics. However, in the case of the military research agenda, this 
sidelining of identity takes place only so that the instrumental qualities of the body can 
be foregrounded. In other words, politics is again excluded as something external to the 
rational process of improving the efficiency of war-making instruments, of which the 
body is one. However, it is possible to think the relation between the body and 
technology in positive and productive terms without sacrificing politics for 
instrumentality, as illustrated by the work of Donna Haraway, which is precisely 
concerned to disaggregate the body from the principle of identity through an 
exploration of its intersections with technology.  
Haraway mobilises the figure of the cyborg in order to destabilise the hegemonic 
categories of ‘man’, ‘woman’, and so on, and thereby to overturn the hierarchies of 
being that they imposed. Her cyborg is a boundary creature,64 ‘a hybrid of machine and 
organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction’.65 She points out 
                                                          
64 Donna Haraway Simians, Cyborgs and Women p. 2 
65 Ibid. p. 148 
113 
 
that these cyborg beings are everywhere evident: in medicine, in fiction, in production, 
and in modern war, which she calls a ‘cyborg orgy’.66 She used the concept of the 
cyborg in order to escape the regulative Western narrative of the purity of origins, or of 
an original unity. For the cyborg being, selfhood is always contaminated by complexity 
and otherness, the body is always an aggregate of organic and inorganic influences. 
These complex aggregates cannot be captured or controlled by the markers of gender or 
humanity, and in this sense they begin to show us a way of thinking politics without 
identity. Haraway says that cyborgs are ‘wary of holism, but needy for connection’67 
and can show us how connection can lead the way into a ‘united front politics without 
the vanguard party’.68 For feminist theory, this means that rather than purifying the 
notion of ‘woman’, or seeking to locate it in some organic ideal, we should seek to 
expand upon contaminated, monstrous ‘women’ and their unsettling position in society 
in order to show that identity is itself a chimera.  
Haraway says that cyborgs are ‘the illegitimate offspring of militarism and of 
patriarchal capitalism’.69 For her, the consequences of body/technology couplings 
always exceed their original design. The instrumental view of the possibilities for the 
marriage of body and technology held by military researchers cannot successfully 
exclude unregulated change, as these are the inevitable and unpredictable consequences 
of new mergers between the body and technology. Although the rational instrumental 
view may seek to elide questions of politics, for Haraway, this is futile, because the 
mergers between bodies and technologies will always have political results excessive to 
their original instrumental purpose. She says that ‘illegitimate offspring are often 
exceedingly unfaithful to their origins. Their fathers are, after all, inessential’.70 In 
addition, it is possible to suggest that the contention that instrumental concerns are the 
sole influence on military research is erroneous. After all, ‘future war’ is not a known or 
objectively existing phenomenon, as highlighted by the convergence between science 
fiction and military planning.71 The notion that the body and technology are being 
intertwined in more intimate and more sophisticated ways purely for the practical 
purpose of winning wars conceals the extent to which the wars in question are the 
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outcome of a particular political imaginary, and the issue of the social and political 
effects of these body technologies. Haraway says that ‘[t]he cyborg is a condensed 
image of both imagination and material reality’.72 These imaginaries are directly 
engaged in the production of new bodies, however non-political and instrumental they 
may purport to be.  
The contention is that once the principle of identity has been sidelined as a way of 
viewing the body, a multiplicity of political consequences ensue, associated with the 
degradation of all boundaries: between human and machine, between human and 
animal, and between material and physical. The vanishing point of these boundaries is 
the point at which the cyborg emerges. This indicates that rather than fearing the 
increasing erosion of boundaries between body and machine, or between human and 
animal, they should be welcomed as the catalysts for a new landscape of political 
possibility in which the identities that have been ‘forced on us’ by the ‘terrible historical 
experience of the contradictory social realities of patriarchy, colonialism, and 
capitalism’73 no longer have any purchase. The point is that the connections between 
technology and the body presided over by pragmatic military necessity cannot help but 
to feed into a change in the social imaginary of bodies and selves. These implications 
may be cauterised by the military-industrial appropriation of the body-technology 
relation, but the implications of these relations do not stop at the (fictitious) boundary of 
pragmatics, but indeed have important implications for society, the body and identity in 
general.  
Freeing ourselves from identity as a prism through which to view the body arguably 
creates a problem for how we are to think, name, and know the body, if not according to 
categories such as ‘man’, ‘woman’ or ‘human’ and ‘animal’. Haraway argues that the 
increasing role of communications technologies has produced a ‘translation of the 
world into a problem of coding’74 whereby ‘[t]he world is subdivided by boundaries 
differentially permeable to information’.75 This suggests a shift, whereby previously we 
knew the body through discourse: through naming it as male or female, human or 
animal. Now, in the cyborg era in which information technology rules supreme, we 
know through technology itself, which emerges as a new language for the translation 
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and interpretation of bodies and things, which may no longer be usefully divided into 
‘bodies’ and ‘things’, but merely according to the degree to which they are available to 
technologically mediated strategies. In this sense, knowledge seems to be concerned no 
longer with judgement or differentiation but with connection, which is an important 
component of this post-identity politics. For Haraway, we should celebrate the closer 
merger between the body and technology, whether or not this is filtered through the 
‘pragmatic’ aims of the military engineering projects. Rather than being a zero-sum 
struggle between the body and technology, Haraway proposes a politics which seeks a 
way out of the strategy of identification which differentiates these categories.  
Haraway takes the increasing intimacy between body and technology as a trigger for 
rethinking a politics beyond identity. For her, thinking these mixed, ‘cyborg’ beings is 
far healthier than thinking the fictitious purity of ‘the human body’, the loss of whose 
integrity is lamented by Virilio and Blackmore. The provenance of these 
transformations is not of particular concern. In other words, it does not matter that these 
cyborgs are in the first instance engineered by military technocrats with a war-
mongering mission, because the connections forged in these marriages always exceed 
their purpose. Dianne Currier criticises Haraway on the grounds that she does not really 
succeed in this project of moving beyond identity, as she is still suspended between the 
categories that she seeks to erode. Currier says that ‘in so far as the hybrid cyborg is 
forged in the intermeshing of technology with a body, in a process of addition, it leaves 
largely intact those two categories—(human) body and technology—that preceded the 
conjugation’.76 She argues that Haraway’s cyborg is predicated on the markers of 
identity that it purports to move beyond, and that it is therefore not successful as an 
effort to move beyond a politics of identity and remains caught in the framework of 
identity/difference. If we are still measuring the cyborg according to its deviation from 
the ‘natural, organic’ body, then we have not significantly changed our understanding 
or reconceived our political imaginary.  
This criticism may be a legitimate one. Brian Massumi echoes the concerns of Currier 
when he says that the valorisation of the ‘in-between’ that hybridity theory enacts 
cannot show how the first terms are effectively transformed. He says that ‘[h]ow the 
subversion could react back on the positionalities of departure in a way that might 
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enduringly change them becomes an insoluble problem... Erase the progenitors and the 
hybrid vanishes: no terms have been provided with which to understand it in its own 
right’.77 Even though Haraway may insist on the illegitimacy and disloyalty of her 
hybrid cyborg children, they are still best understood primarily through the framework 
of their identity-bound parents, meaning that we have not moved as far beyond the 
principles of identity as it may seem. However, the reading I want to give is a slightly 
different one. In a sense these debates all revolve around the issue of how we know the 
body, and the constitution of the body as an object for knowledge. For Virilio, we know 
the body independently of technology, and technology presents a challenge to what we 
know the body’s attributes to be. Read through the prism of the military engineering 
projects of the body and technology, such as those of DARPA, the body comes to 
appear as something which is known through technology, with productive spaces in 
what we know which can be explored through experimentation. I have suggested that, 
for Haraway, the body may be something ‘known’ through information technology 
rather than through discursive categories, which enables a possible shift from these 
categories to a more connective and less categorical mode of knowledge.  
I would like to re-read the body in relation to technology from a slightly different angle. 
Rather than think in terms of an imaginary which determines how we see the body, or a 
scientific practice which determines how we know the body, I would like to try to think 
in terms of the body as being generative of a certain mode of connection, and in this 
sense as being somehow constitutive of what we think of as technology. The idea that 
the body may be the passive object of technological reckoning, and/or that it may be 
becoming redundant in a world of increasingly sophisticated automation, seems 
predicated on the notion that the body can be detached from thought or intelligence and 
is thereby reduced to ‘a... harvestable, highly lucrative resource’.78 J.F.C. Fuller 
lamented that ‘[t]he machine sprung from out the intelligence of man has, through 
man’s worship of it, turned man himself into a piece of machinery’.79 But one does not 
need technology to turn the body into a piece of machinery; a particular mode of 
thinking about the body will suffice. Instead of thinking of ways in which the 
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body/technology relation can be mobilised in certain ways, I want to try to suggest that 
we can think these terms as unfolding in a certain relation with respect to each other: a 
relation in which the body does not appear as an object for knowledge, but as a dynamic 
mode of knowing. 
The Imagined Body  
The increasingly intimate relationship between the body and technology seems to 
present a challenge for thinking about, and securing, the identity of the body. As 
technology becomes more closely integrated with the body, and a more essential part of 
everyday experience and action, differentiating the ‘pure’ body away from the 
contaminating effects of technology becomes problematic. For example, with respect to 
Stephen Hawking, Sandy Stone asks ‘[w]here does he stop? Where are his edges? The 
issues his person and his communication prosthesis raise are boundary debates, 
borderland/frontera questions’.80 Stephen Hawking fully identifies with his 
technological prosthetics81 and they are essential to his life and to extending his bodily 
capabilities. This makes judging between what is and is not of the body problematic, as 
do other complicating body/technology conjugations such as pacemakers and prosthetic 
limbs. As illustrated by the discussion of Donna Haraway, the aspiration to do away 
with identity as a prism through which to view the body is difficult to accomplish in 
practice, demanding as it does new ways of thinking and knowing. These new modes of 
thought may themselves be ‘technological’, in the sense that they are concerned not 
with what things are, but only with how they connect.   
The question remains as to how we are to think this connection. Haraway points out that 
the connection between body and technology may be put into play by military-industrial 
research, or by other agencies not usually thought to be allied to critical thought. The 
increasing intimacy between body and technology creates a problem for categorising 
these entities differentially, but this move from identity to a compromised or 
contaminated identity can only by thought by continuing to refer back to the original 
principle of identity, referring to a purity which the body/technology assemblage fails to 
embody. In other words, as Massumi suggests, we lack the terms to think the 
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contaminated body in positive terms, and are restricted to highlighting its points of 
deviation from the ideal of identity. Moreover, it seems that we are still dependent on 
some external agent to bring the body and technology together in the first place, 
although the logic of their connection will come to exceed the original purpose. In other 
words, the assumption is that a kind of intelligence or scientific will external to the 
body is necessary for the production of new relations to technology, and that in this 
sense the body remains caught in an objectifying frame of vision. Contrary to this view, 
I want to argue that understanding the relation between the body and technology must 
mean taking the body seriously as an agent and architect of this relation.  
Klaus Theweleit’s two-volume work Male Fantasies is a study of the Freikorps, the 
semi-autonomous anti-Communist militia of post-First World War Germany which 
went on to form the core of Hitler’s Sturmabteilung (SA). More particularly, it 
represents an attempt to analyse the ways in which the bodies of Freikorps soldiers 
emerged as bodies of a particular kind, and is interesting because is concerned to 
interrogate the psychoanalytic forces which govern the emergence of particular kinds of 
bodies. These forces are not extraneous to the body but are precisely bodily in origin 
and character. The question is not one of intersecting with technologies of certain kinds, 
but of the constitution of the body as a discreet and bounded object. For example 
Theweleit presents his soldiers as being fixated with the question of boundaries and the 
need to demarcate themselves from ‘contaminating’ influences. He points out the use of 
the imagery of the torrent or flood with respect to seemingly uncontrollable and 
contaminating forces such as Communists, profiteering soldiers, and women.82 
Theweleit suggests that ‘soldier males freeze up, become icicles in the face of erotic 
femininity... by reacting in that way... the man holds himself together as an entity, a 
body with fixed boundaries. Contact with erotic women would make him cease to exist 
in that form’.83 This need to repel intrusive contaminants demands ‘a kind of sustained 
erection of his whole body’.84  
In one sense Theweleit’s Freikorps soldier is thoroughly hardened against his own 
longing and passion because it is seen as being a threat to the integrity of the body. 
However, he suggests that desire is given an outlet in war and violence. ‘[The soldier] is 
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either the source of, or is in some way connected to, every explosion; the end of the 
world is staged on his behalf and from within him’.85 In other words, ‘[w]ar is a 
function of the body of these men’.86 War is the domain in which desire can be 
unleashed, but also in which the body of the soldier must aspire to become as a ‘figure 
of steel’.87 For Theweleit’s fascists, the body is both a source of anxiety and of 
fetishisation, it is the object of technological improvement and the potential downfall of 
aspirations to martial purity. But what is notable is that the changing images of the body 
do not depend upon the existence of technological prosthetics or a certain degree of 
technological sophistication. Rather, it is the investment of libido in the body which 
determines the way in which the boundary of the body is conceived. The protection of 
this boundary may be regarded as essential with respect to the insidious environments 
of feminity or Communism. It may be seen as less so in the context of war. But this 
does not mean that ‘war’ is a term which exists independently of the body. Rather, the 
body’s investments in war are themselves immediately productive of the image of war.  
Theweleit approaches the question of identity through its construction in war and 
images of war. In other words, for him, identity is not taken as a pre- or objectively 
existing phenomenon, but rather one that emerges in a dynamic relation with the world. 
He seeks to escape from the dyadic understanding of identity in terms of difference: 
specifically, of male identity in terms of female difference. Rather, his work represents 
a shift towards thinking of the body in terms of its own production of itself, and of a 
certain social reality. In other words, rather than seeing the body in terms of an identity 
which is somehow independent of social context, or seeing it as being socially (and 
technologically) constructed from without, Theweleit’s body is thoroughly implicated 
in its own production and the production of a certain kind of social world. Rather than 
being endowed with an objective boundary, the image of the body and its perimeter are 
consequences of the libidinal investment of the body itself, which is productive of a 
certain mode of investment with the world, and consequently of a certain kind of world. 
Rather than think of identity, it becomes more coherent to think in terms of a process of 
identification in which the body itself actively participates.  
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The extent to which the body may be thought of as being a dynamic entity capable of 
being expressed in a variety of different ways may be illustrated by the ways in which 
‘disorders’ of the body are perceived to be active in changing the parameters of the 
body and its relationship to the external world. For example, Roger Caillois posits a 
kind of psychosis in which ‘space seems to constitute a will to devour. Space chases, 
entraps, and digests them in a huge phagocytosis… the subject crosses the boundary of 
his own skin and stands outside of his senses. He tries to see himself, from some point 
in space. He feels that he is turning into space himself—dark space into which things 
cannot be put... And he dreams up spaces, that “spasmodically possess” him’.88 What 
he terms ‘legendary psychasthenia’ is a form of psychosis in which the subject cannot 
locate himself in space. Indeed, it is possible to suggest that the subject does not have a 
self to locate, since he has dissolved into the space from which he should be separated.  
The emergence of a bounded conception of a coherent body may be presented to be one 
which emerges developmentally, over time. In this sense, it is as part of the activity of 
growing up that the body becomes articulated and experienced as a discreet and finite 
entity. This trajectory eventually gives us a body which is experienced as a coherent 
object for the self who inhabits it, but which is also articulated as a self, in other words, 
I experience my body as my own, as me. Elizabeth Grosz suggests that ‘[t]he idea of 
space, the child’s notion of location and positionality... is acquired only gradually and 
through various phases of neurological and psychological development’.89 This 
psychological development may be interrupted or impaired such that the way in which 
body is experienced and expressed is altered, making the boundary ‘unnaturally’ 
permeable or unstable. Margaret Mahler’s research on ‘psychotic’ children suggests 
that their problems derive from the fact that they ‘have never attained the security of 
body boundaries libidinally invested from within’.90  
The point is the biology alone cannot enlighten us concerning the nature and capacities 
of the body, and that the identity of a body as mine, and as separate from the world, is 
an accomplishment rather than a starting position. Didier Anzieu suggests that the 
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psyche emerges out of the interface between the biological body and the social body.91 
He discusses case studies in which those who have suffered severe burns may 
experience relief through talking and emotional support, partially ameliorating their 
pain. He says that the ego may thrive on ‘socio-cultural’ rather than physical support; 
that ‘the skin of words that is woven between the burns victim and an understanding 
interlocutor may re-establish symbolically a containing psychical skin that is able to 
make more bearable the pain caused by a wound to real skin’.92 Alternatively, a lack of 
maternal affection in infancy may produce what Anzieu refers to as a ‘body on 
sufferance’, whereby it ‘has been emptied of affect, reduced to mechanical 
functioning...bodily functioning is not assumed as one’s own, that is, as a possible 
object of knowledge and enjoyment’.93 
I have suggested that there are reasons to be suspicious of the idea of a facile distinction 
between ‘biology’ and ‘society’, and have proposed instead that the idea of a division 
itself can be seen as the consequence of political work. But Anzieu is interesting for the 
way in which he traces the process by which the body becomes an object for 
knowledge, and an object which is possessed by an owner. For him, the body as object 
for knowledge is not stable and does not automatically exist. Rather, it emerges through 
the nurturing processes which govern ‘normal’ infant development, and may be 
interrupted by abnormalities in this process, or by physical or psychical injury at any 
stage in life. Although Anzieu’s ‘abnormal bodies’ are very clearly juxtaposed to 
normal ones, through the emphasis on deviation and disorder, for me his work 
dramatises the extent to which the ‘normal’ body is a fragile and provisional one, and 
that the boundary of the body is in constant contestation. That the ‘disordered’ body 
may be experienced in a multiplicity of different ways calls into question the stability 
and ‘naturalness’ of the ‘normal’ body, and even challenges the notion that any body is 
the coherent stable object of thought that we might presume. Rather than being an 
unproblematic object of knowledge, the object-like properties of the body appear to be 
dependent on a particular mode of libidinal investment which may always give rise to a 
body of a different kind.  
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This seems to militate towards a change in the way in which we see the body, whether 
as an object for knowledge, or as a dynamic participant in the construction of its own 
relationship with frameworks of knowing and acting. What we might call the 
‘psychoanalytic’ approach briefly outlined here (and notwithstanding the difficulties of 
generalising about ‘a psychoanalytic approach’) can speak to both the techno-phobic 
view of Virilio and Blackmore, and the more adaptive experimental perspective of 
DARPA and Haraway. In the first instance, the identity of the body is of paramount 
importance in challenging the insidious effects of technology, and indeed in having the 
capacity to name them as insidious. Virilio in particular ascribes a certain normative 
identity to the body, related to its humanity and its ability to act as the foundation for a 
certain kind of politics. On the other hand, the work of DARPA sidelines the question 
of identity in favour of a consideration of utility, a move which is taken up by Donna 
Haraway in her insistence that the connections made between the body and technology 
always have a political impact in transforming our expectations of what a body is and 
should be. However, the impression one has from these readings is that identity and 
technology intersect with the body from without, which appears in each case as an 
object for technology, albeit in some cases a malleable object.  
The problem with these readings is that the body itself remains relatively unexamined, 
and appears only as the surface upon which various technological imaginaries play 
themselves out. The body appears as the object for knowledge, and only the paradigms 
of knowledge change. The politics of knowledge, and the politics of technology, are 
thereby occluded to a degree, for although it may be possible to interrogate the effects 
of changing ways of knowing the body on politics, the politics of the body itself 
remains opaque. In order to counter this impression, I have suggested that the body may 
be considered to be active in its own self-constitution. That is to say, that the image of 
the body originates with the body itself, and that this image is constitutive of a certain 
kind of relation with the world, and consequently with technology. No ‘natural’ 
boundary exists between the body and technology, only that which is created by the 
body itself. Elizabeth Grosz says that acquiring the ability to use tools involves ‘not 
simply the technical problem of how they are used but also the libidinal problem of how 
they are invested’.94 This investment does not take the form of a decision, we are not 
necessarily aware of the ways in which the body is engaged in constituting a fluid 
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relation with the world. This indicates that the ‘rationalist’ framework may not be 
sufficient in thinking through the relation between the body and technology. The 
libidinal investment of the body which brings in to existence this body/technology 
relationship cannot be considered from the point of view of instrumental reason, but 
must be thought of as underpinning instrumental reason: as providing the framework 
within which judgements of reason can be made.  
Rethinking the Body and Technology 
The concept of humanity may be invoked to overcome partisan lines between 
competing identity groups, or may be juxtaposed to the ethnic or religious divisions 
which characterise internecine strife. The idea of a ‘shared membership of the human 
race’95 may be a challenge to those who would seek to do violence to certain groups on 
the basis of their perceived racial or religious characteristics. However, the idea of 
humanity may not be as inclusive as it first appears, as ‘humanity’ comes with attendant 
demarcations into sub-categories which are more or less worthy of political 
significance. The archetypal distinction is that between ‘man’ and ‘woman’, which, as I 
suggested in the introduction, may be associated with the distinction between the body 
and the ‘will’ or ‘reason’ whereby the body and female are the denigrated terms.96 In 
this sense, the concept of humanity is thoroughly striated by lines of differentiation 
which operate along the lines of identity, and which function so as to determine the 
degree to which a particular individual embodies the ideals of ‘humanity’.  
David Campbell and Michael Dillon argue that the ‘rational political subject’ of modern 
political thought, is also a ‘violent political subject’ due to the underlying conception of 
politics, and the expectations of the subject that it entails.97 In other words, there is a 
mode of thought associated with the political subject that is arguably associated with 
modern conceptions of ‘humanity’, so therefore if we are to think differently about the 
subject, or the body, to return to the focus of this thesis, then we need to think the entire 
political landscape, and indeed, thinking itself, differently as well. If ‘[f]orms of 
life...are...functions of how we think and imagine the human condition and the world 
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which sustains it’,98 then it may profit us to supplant humanity as the central image of 
the world and to consider the politics of the production of these forms of life. Some 
theorists have established vivid images through which they do just that. Coker’s 
Heideggerian reading suggests that the key theme for modern technology was ‘that man 
himself was now exploited as a resource, or... a ‘standing reserve’’.99 Although this 
may be the grounds for lamentation, as Virilio takes it to be, it may also serve as the 
trigger for a rethinking of the space of politics which displaces humanity from the 
central position, and thereby severs the collusion of reason with violence. Technology 
may therefore function as a catalyst for a new way of thinking politics which is not 
beholden to the central image of the [hu]man.  
Marshall McLuhan has suggested that technology has reduced us to being the ‘sex 
organs of the machine world’.100 In his study of the modern military systems and 
technologies, the philosopher of technology Manuel DeLanda declares from the outset 
his intention to write ‘from the robot’s point of view’.101 He imagines a ‘hypothetical 
robot historian’102 tracing its own evolution through military organisational and 
technological developments to which humans are merely the accidental adjunct and 
occasional facilitator. The robot historian ‘would see humans as no more than pieces of 
a larger military-industrial machine—a war machine’.103 Rather than being the creators 
of this military-industrial machine, humans are merely its functionaries, ‘as little more 
than...industrious insects pollinating an independent species of machine-flowers that 
simply did not possess its own reproductive organs during a segment of evolution’.104 
The whole evolutionary landscape is characterised by a migration of capabilities from 
the human body to machines, and machine code.105 This vision is predicated on a 
technological gaze which refuses any creative or dynamic capacity to the body, and 
thereby allows its gradual evacuation from the military system through the acquisition 
of accelerating technological sophistication. It provides an evolutionary teleology 
which, while de-vitalising, is also reassuring in that it eclipses the need to accommodate 
any irritatingly irresolvable ambiguities and contradictions such as inhere in the body.  
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DeLanda attempts to re-imagine our political future without humanity at the centre of it, 
displacing the body in favour of the machine, for which it is merely a functionary, or 
appendage. However, he has perhaps been too hasty in de-centring humanity. 
Attempting to do without identity as a prism through which to view the body, DeLanda 
jettisons the body as a perspective on the world. The foundational distinction between 
the robot and the body, however, is that the latter is the product of its own self-
imagining, whereas the former is an objectively existing fabrication. By suggesting that 
the robot is the future of humanity, DeLanda denies the importance of libido. Contrary 
to this, I would suggest that the idea of libido has a two-fold importance. The first is 
that the body is not exhausted by being surveyed and managed from without. Although 
one can approach the body from an instrumental perspective, the body is always in 
dynamic interplay with the world and is active in its own self-constitution. Secondly, 
and somewhat contradictorily, I want to argue that one cannot approach the body from 
a purely instrumental perspective. For such approaches are always made by other 
bodies which are perpetually engaged in the libidinal investment of themselves and the 
social world.  
Richard Doyle writes that ‘[s]ometimes... there was a tendency to act as though there 
was nothing but information...[but]... these creatures can be quite seductive...machinic 
seduction is itself a kind of possession’.106 The point is that the instrumental view is 
itself the outcome of a certain mode of libidinal investment, or, in other words, that the 
rational, instrumental view is predicated on a pre-rational bodily imaginary. If this were 
not the case, then we would not really have displaced the instrumental view from the 
centre of the political framework, but merely shifted the burden of reason from 
‘humanity’ to ‘technology’. I have sought to suggest that the stability of both 
‘humanity’ and ‘technology’ as categories depends upon the prior animation of these 
categories by the body. In this way it becomes possible to see the instrumental view of 
the body and technology as an effect of a certain mode of investment by the body. This 
insight requires first calling into question the stability of the body as an object for 
knowledge or for an ethical view of the political landscape, as Virilio’s view proposes. 
Denying the possibility of a facile distinction between ‘the body’ and ‘technology’, and 
refuting the contention that the body has a fixed set of characteristics permits 
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experimentation on the relationship between the body and technology, and the way in 
which they intersect. This prefigures a politics beyond identity, such as that described 
by Donna Haraway. However, I have suggested that a second move is necessary if we 
are to displace the centrality of the instrumental view of the body, and that this involves 
considering the body’s own activity in determining its own parameters and in 
constituting ‘technology’. Without this move the body remains a passive object for 
technologically-driven change, and the instrumental logic of thought with respect to it is 
not significantly challenged.  
I have presented the body as being the source of a different, non-rational mode of 
thought. I have suggested that there is a bodily imaginary, the first task of which is to 
imagine the body itself. This may be contrasted to the instrumental view of the body 
technology relation. The body becomes the thinking substance, rather than merely the 
object for thought. This presents a challenge to the notion that any mode of thought can 
be purely instrumental, if the objects for thought are active participants in it, and are not 
stable referents but fluid and dynamic modes of interaction. The instrumental mode of 
thought relies on bodily complicity: on the body functioning as its object, and being 
seduced by this image of thought. Jünger asks; ‘[w]hat purpose would be served by all 
these iron weapons levelled against the universe, were they not intertwined with our 
nerves, were it not our blood that hissed on every axis?’107 In this sense, I want to 
suggest that the notion of war as purely instrumental elides the extent to which it 
animates us on a non-rational and indeed pre-subjective level out of which the 
appearance of instrumentality emerges.  
Michael Shapiro points out that, for Max Weber, ‘the process of rationalisation is a 
relentless force, opposed by the human desire to achieve coherence and control over 
meaning’.108 However, I have tried to suggest that the autonomy of technology is 
illusory. Rather, we should be thinking in terms of levels of engagement with 
technology, whether conscious or unconscious, rational or irrational. Shapiro refers to 
‘a valuing process that valuing subjects do not understand and control, for the meanings 
of the objects resonate with dimensions of subjectivity that are not parts of conscious 
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and rational choice procedure’.109 In other words, technology cannot be fully 
autonomous, but it can come to surpass the conscious, rational ability of humans to 
control it. Similarly, it is possible to suggest that care needs to be taken in discussing 
the extent to which the body can become alienated from technology and war through 
the increasing sophistication of autonomous technologies which do not require bodily 
participation. For example, the use of projectile weapons imposed a distance between 
killers and killed, and thus offered a way of overcoming the ambivalence about killing 
that many soldiers felt. However, Joanna Bourke’s study of killing in the First, Second, 
and Vietnam Wars concludes that ‘while technology was used to facilitate mass human 
destruction, it did little to reduce the awareness that dead human beings were the end 
product’.110 This is at least in part because ‘[c]ombatants used their imagination to ‘see’ 
the impact of their weapons on other men, to construct elaborate, precise and self-
conscious fantasies about the effects of their weapons’.111  
Although technology may have the capacity to operate without human intervention to a 
degree, this does not mean that it is fully autonomous from the body. This is the case 
not least because images of war are dependent on our imagining them. Discussing 
DARPA, I suggested that the politics of imagining the pressures of future war was 
concealed beneath the pragmatics of planning for it, but that this distinction could not 
really be sustained. Planning for war always involves a degree of imagination, or 
fantasy, in conjuring the image of the war that is being planned for, and this cannot be 
contained within the rational logic of military engineering. It is possible to argue that an 
image of war must be created before it can become the foundation for future planning. 
This act of creation is precisely political in the sense that it does not depend on any 
necessity, and this takes it into the domain of something other than the mere application 
of knowledge. Maja Zehfuss says that ‘when ‘the path is clear and given’... we are 
dealing with a matter of applying knowledge rather than exercising responsibility’.112 
From a Derridean perspective, it is the confrontation with the aporia of the undecidable 
which demands a decision rather than something ‘part of a calculable process, merely 
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an application’.113 Calculation is only possible once certain decisions have been taken. 
In this sense, I want to argue that the (social-) science of war, bodies and technology is 
more than scientific, and therefore cannot be understood through the framework of the 
application of knowledge.  
In planning for future war, DARPA scientists, and others responsible for military 
technology, make a decision about what this future war will look like and entail. This 
judgement may be couched in terms of the available data we have about current wars, 
together with evidence of trends over time, but nonetheless it involves a high degree of 
incalculable decision about what that future war will look like. Tim Blackmore points 
out that Robert Heinlein’s Starship Troopers (1959) and Joe Haldeman’s The Forever 
War (1975) and Forever Peace (1997) are required reading at West Point,114 indicating 
that the convergence between fictional future war and the future war that is planned for 
is significant. This relates, I want to suggest, to the contention that the body is active in 
changing its own parameters beyond the boundaries of knowledge. For what animates 
and sustains these images of contemporary and future war, if not the libido of the body 
itself? As with Theweleit’s Freikorps, for whom war represented an environment within 
which a certain kind of bodily life was possible, I want to suggest that the images of 
war which populate military and popular culture are sustained because they represent 
the possibility of a certain kind of bodily reality.  
The location of politics in the question of the relationship between the body and 
technology is of prime importance, as the responsibility for the instigation of war is 
differentially located according to the image of war/body/technology in play. For 
example, Sue Mansfield suggests that it has been ‘fashionable’ since the Second World 
War to argue that ‘human beings are naturally aggressive and therefore that war is 
inevitable, [and] that war making is somehow an innate human propensity or 
instinct’.115 It is possible to locate the responsibility for making war in the body itself, 
possibly at the pre-rational level. In this sense, wars tend to follow from the fact of 
humanity itself, as the inevitable consequence of innate violence. Alternatively, one can 
place the responsibility for war with technology which overrides natural human 
inhibitions on killing. Technology may impose a distance between humans, making 
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killing ‘with relative ease’ possible.116 More dramatically, with nuclear power, 
technologies of war have the capacity not only to make bodies redundant on the 
battlefield but to make them obsolete as living entities. The technologies of war seem to 
impose a war-like logic of their own, imposing rhythm and necessity onto the conduct 
of war, from which humans are increasingly alienated. In this way, ultimately, 
technology can threaten the instrumental utility of war as it is no longer able to serve 
human politics.  
The problem is that these views do not take account of the politics involved with the 
creation of an image of war as a whole. By locating ‘war’ in either the body or 
technology, the processes through which these identities come to exist in certain 
relation to each other are elided. I have suggested that the imaginary of war does not 
derive from any instrumental logic of calculation, but must depend on some prior 
construction of a certain vision of war. Similarly, the relationship between the body and 
technology does not unproblematically exist, but is the consequence of an anterior 
dynamic of creation out of which the appearance of independent ‘body’ and 
‘technology’ categories emerge. In either case, what is elided is the political moment at 
which the identities are formed and relationships are set into motion. For the point is not 
to say that the objective body and autonomous technology ‘do not exist’. Rather, my 
purpose has been to call into question the naturalisation of particular images of reality 
whereby the body, technology and war seem like self-evident categories of concern. 
Instead of despairing at the potential of technology to expedite the demise of humanity, 
or rejoicing at its capacity to minimise death in war and thereby further enhance its 
utility, it may be more productive to enquire how these images come to have such 
purchase over our thinking. This in turn will involve a different mode of thinking, 
considering the way in which ‘war’ and ‘technology’ grab us at the visceral level and 
contribute to the emergence of a certain type of body.  
John Armitage discusses the way in which ‘religious, mobilizing, or dissident socio-
political discourses’ and ‘[c]ontemporary film and literature’ act so as to ‘accomplish 
the translation of civilian bodies into militarized bodies’.117 These agencies all express 
images of war which structure our thinking and determine our responses. Images of war 
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are not contrasted to the ‘real thing’, however. I do not mean this only in the sense that 
war has come to be dominated by the extent to which it can project certain images of 
itself through television and photography. Rather, I have suggested that war can only 
ever be apprehended via a certain image, as ‘war’, ‘the body’, and ‘technology’ do not 
have pre-existing identities which are independent of context. Instead, I have suggested 
that they should be considered in dynamic interplay with each other; a process through 
which identities emerge and are contested. In this sense, rather than the body being 
amenable to unproblematic classification as ‘military’ or ‘civilian’, I have tried to 
suggest that identity categories are the consequence of a prior bodily investment. 
Conceiving of different categories as objects for knowledge elides the politics at work 
in determining the way in which these identities emerge and are sustained. In this sense, 
an instrumental knowledge of the body is insufficient for the interrogation of the 
conditions under which the body emerges in relation to other bodies and to the social 
world, and the ways in which its investments come to constitute technology as such.  
Conclusion: Thinking Beyond Instrumentality 
It has been my aim in this chapter to insist upon the inadequacy of ‘technological’ 
readings of the body and military technology, and to indicate that rather than being the 
passive object of technology, the body may be understood as being an active agent in 
the construction of its own material reality. I sought to illustrate this point through a 
discussion of libido, through which I indicated that the parameters and capabilities of 
the body were constructed by the body itself, and, rather than being fixed, had the 
potential to express themselves in a variety of ways. The consequences of this reading 
of the body and technology are multiple, and in the conclusion I want to draw out a few 
points of significance which have arisen in the course of this discussion. Slavoj Žižek 
argues that ‘[w]ith biogenetics, the Nietzschean program of the emphatic and ecstatic 
assertion of the body is thus over. Far from serving as the ultimate reference, the body 
loses its mysterious impenetrable destiny and turns into something technologically 
manageable…something the ‘truth’ of which is this abstract genetic formula’.118 The 
increasingly sophisticated modes of knowledge through which we come to apprehend 
the body seem to signal a transformation in its political significance. This 
transformation may be viewed in a positive light, as with the conviction that the 
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increasing role of technoscience in modern warfare may render it ever more amenable 
to control and may enable the evacuation of the passional or irrational elements of war. 
Alternatively, following Haraway, it may be the case that new modes of knowing the 
body—through information rather than discursive categories—enable it to forge new 
connections with technologies and bodies, and thereby facilitates a re-conception of the 
terrain of politics. For me, all these points are problematic because they share an 
assumption that the body is an object that we can know, and if our knowledge is 
incomplete, then the fault must lie with the modes of knowledge we employ, not with 
the object that we seek to know.  
However, these ways of thinking about the body themselves contain grounds for being 
suspicious of this view of the body and technology. For example, DARPA’s work 
involves engaging with the future which cannot be known but must be somehow 
imagined in order for it to be secured militarily. This imagination is not a process which 
is contained by science/knowledge, but actually involves a leap of political creation 
which is overwritten by the pragmatics of engineering that it seems to require. While 
not rational, I have suggested, this process is bodily, in the sense that it involves the 
consideration of what the realm of bodily possibility is, as well as a ‘non-rational’ 
investment in a particular image of future war. Indeed, this insight is not confined to 
future war, as I have suggested that war is inherently difficult or impossible to totalise, 
or to generalise about. In this sense, all images of war are an imaginary construct which 
are not exhausted by ‘rational calculation’. Moreover, Haraway’s vision of the future 
politics of the cyborg, read as a manifesto for open ended change, incorporates the 
impossibility of knowing the outcome of such bodily changes, as well as 
acknowledging that the imaginaries of bodily becomings are an active component of 
any such cyborg politics.   
In this sense, I want to argue for the non-rational to be taken seriously in considerations 
of the body and military technology. By this, I do not mean the irrational, but rather that 
which forms part of the conditions of possibility for the judgement of rationality to take 
place. Before the body and military technology can be posited as distinct, I have tried to 
suggest that they must already exist in certain relation to each other, and that this 
relation is determined by the libidinal investments of the body. Similarly, planning for 
any current or future war involves a political moment of imagination which constructs 
the image of war which then becomes the object of calculation. In this sense, it is 
132 
 
erroneous to hope that technology can make war a more perfect instrument of reason, 
because the use of technology is always predicated on a non- or pre-rational investment. 
In addition, images of ‘high-tech’ warfare may be intensely seductive and exert a 
powerful hold over the imagination even in the face of evidence which calls into 
question the efficacy of certain technologies. Moreover, distancing the soldier from the 
battlefield in no way cauterises the mode of identification with the weapon in question, 
and by extension the act of killing.  
What we might call the defence of the body waged by Virilio holds that the body is an 
entity with certain fixed properties, and is a vehicle for personhood which cannot 
endure radical transitions in form. Technology is positioned as being the agent of 
change and transformation, whereas the body is attributed properties of constancy and 
predictability. I have tried to suggest that this involves a de-politicising move which 
ironically denigrates the body by denying it any transformative power of its own. For 
the technologists of military engineering, the body is an object for calculation and 
improvement in the service of future war. It is malleable within certain scientifically 
knowable parameters. This too occludes the extent to which this body may be the active 
agent of change itself, as well as concealing the embodied investments of the 
technologists themselves in constructing an image of future war. Categories such as 
‘male’, ‘female’ and so on signify efforts to impose a certain identity on the body. 
Technological modes of knowing are equally designed to fix the body according to 
certain parameters, but they cannot account for the ways in which the investments of 
the body in certain technologies and images of thought are preconditions for this 
knowledge. I want to suggest that all such prisms through which we can view the body 
at war, whether they be ‘technological’ or normative, serve to restrict our understanding 
of the body and act as a barrier to appreciating the extent to which bodily investments 
are thoroughly implicated in the conceptions of ‘war’ and ‘the body’ that are too often 
taken as starting positions.  
Christopher Langton says that “Only when we are able to view life-as-we-know-it in the 
larger context of life-as-it-could-be will we really understand the nature of the beast”.119 
Taking account of the transformational potential that is immanent to the body is vital 
for understanding the politics at work in every reductive decision which seeks to pin 
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down what characteristic is essential to that body. However, the truth of this really 
depends on what is meant by ‘taking account’. For if it entails submitting the mutability 
of the body to a process of scientific calculation, then this does not represent a 
significant development in the way in which we should expect to know the body. For I 
have tried to argue that the body as object, or the body as calculable, is secondary to the 
primary investments of the body in an image of itself, and in various technologies, 
images and institutions in the world. These investments are not calculable, but they are 
intensely political, because they provide the underlying conditions for all subsequent 
calculation. Therefore, understanding what is at stake in the relation between military 
technology and the body must involve a consideration of the politics of the body which 
takes account of its self-generated relation to the world.  
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Chapter 4 
Rethinking the Body: Deleuze, Guattari and the Political Body 
 
War is a confusing environment in which to think. Accounts of war may give voice to 
the impossibility of attaching a coherent narrative to events, or of giving an accurate 
account of what the body has undergone. In many cases, accounts of battle convey only 
confusion. Joanna Bourke says that ‘in the heat of battle, experiences were often 
confused, indeterminate, and unarticulated’.1 She quotes a soldier in a Manchester 
regiment in the First World War: ‘Ay! but that was a fight. If only somebody could 
describe it. But, there, they can’t, for it was dark, with very little room, and nobody 
could say exactly what he saw’.2 The body at war seems problematic, due to its 
indeterminate, unpredictable, and confusing nature, and the apparent impossibility of 
thinking clearly in battle. If those who have been there ‘understand’ war, they do so in a 
way which appears difficult to articulate and communicate. The suggestion that ‘[t]he 
man who has not understood with his flesh cannot talk to you about it’,3 seems to point 
to a particular form of understanding, and a particular relationship to the body. This 
singular response seems to resist generalisation; as Tim O’Brien says ‘[t]o generalize 
about war is like generalizing about peace. Almost everything is true. Almost nothing is 
true’.4 The idea that there can be any ‘universal response to modern war’5 appears 
imperilled by the momentary impressions which make up a persons’ war. This calls into 
question our capacity to rely on any apparently ubiquitous features of the human body 
to disclose the truth of the experience of the body at war.  
But if it is difficult to think about war through the prism of the body at war, it is equally 
or more problematic to try to think without the body. This is not only because war is 
primarily about killing and being killed, but also because excluding the body means that 
we must dismiss accounts of the seduction and pleasure of war. It becomes very 
difficult to account for the pervasive influence of discourses and images of war in 
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society, and for the very persistence of war as such, in the absence of any consideration 
of the seductive or ‘irrational’ aspects of war. Julian Grenfells, serving in the First 
World War, wrote home ‘I adore war. It’s like a big picnic without the objectlessness of 
a picnic. I’ve never been so well or so happy’.6 It is tempting to dismiss this as hopeless 
naiveté, or indoctrination, or illusion. To be sure, much is made of the innocence of 
those who went to fight in the First World War, an innocence destroyed by the war.7 
However, it is possible to insist that every war has components which attract as much as 
they repel, and if we have seen—with the benefit of 90 years of hindsight—the futility 
of the First World War, we are far from apprehending the futility of war as such. To 
argue that war is merely an instrument of policy and nothing more is to discount a 
swathe of evidence suggesting its transformative, thrilling, alluring and petrifying 
effects. It entails dismissing these effects as mere epiphenomena emerging from the 
serious business of war, diplomacy and realpolitik  
There are a number of ways in which seeking to rethink the body (at war) could become 
problematic. For example, David Harvey suggests that an impetus in favour of a 
rethinking of the political body is an effect of post-structuralist, and particularly 
deconstructionist, thinking. He suggests that this thinking has called attention to the 
fallibility of the categories of reason and science which necessitated the flight from the 
body in the first instance, so demanding a return to it. Harvey suggested that the body 
may be ‘the site of a more authentic (epistemological and ontological) grounding of the 
theoretical abstractions that have ruled for too long’.8 But the problem is that this image 
is that it presents the body as not being itself political, notwithstanding the fact that it 
has an acknowledged ability to make a useful contribution to political thought, and act 
as a corrective to its wilder excesses. If the body is looked to as an antidote to the 
complexities of contemporary thought, then it is being treated as a homogenous 
category; ‘silent, neglected, and violently objectified’.9 Moreover, emphasising the 
biological naturalness of the body leaves it vulnerable to relegation to the status of ‘‘the 
toil and trouble’ inherent in the biological cycle to whose motor human life is bound’.10   
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There is a potential problem with what we think in thinking the body, and accounting 
for the body as an object for knowledge is a limited approach in terms of vitalising the 
body and highlighting its political significance. But there is also a potential problem 
arising from how we think. Thinking the body as political may be interpreted as simply 
applying established political philosophical terms to the body as a way of taking 
account of it. The problem with this is that it serves to efface the distinctiveness of the 
perspective of the body, and thereby to largely obliterate the value of considering it at 
all. Paul Harrison, remarking on the project of (re-)thinking emotions as a kind of 
knowledge, says that we ‘all too easily tend towards discrediting and atrophying 
emotions within the sophism of the subject, making emotion into a set of strategies, 
conjectures and judgements by other means and so removing the aspects of exposure 
and nonintentional affectation which... mark out the origins of ‘the emotional’ as 
such’.11 In other words, it is no use identifying an alternative perspective such as 
emotion, or here, the body, if in the very act of identification its alterity is effaced. And 
‘other words’ are what is called for if this is to be avoided, for to avoid the regulatory 
effects of habitual modes of thought which position the body in certain ways relative to 
politics, the subject, and so on, then it is necessary to experiment with new ways of 
bringing language to bear. Harrison muses that perhaps his disquiet is ‘no more than 
grammatical’,12 but the difficulty of the task of writing a different perspective into view 
should not be underestimated.   
Thinking the body, there is a danger that the body is essentialised into an object for 
knowledge, which is open to analysis. But thinking from the perspective of the body is 
also problematic inasmuch as we are trying to bring an alternative perspective to bear 
on thinking about war and politics. There is a real risk of sacrificing alterity for clarity 
so that the idea of the body as offering an alternative perspective from which to think is 
compromised to facilitate the ease of the thinking. What is needed is ‘a new thinking of 
the body, a different way of enabling the body to think, not a new theory about the body 
as an object of knowledge’.13 This chapter aims to introduce a way of thinking about 
the body which does not take the body as an object for thought, but attempts to develop 
an understanding of it whereby it becomes a prism through which thinking takes place. 
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To this end, I begin with an introduction to Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking about the 
body before moving on to a consideration of the consequences of this work for (re-
)thinking the body and war. Deleuze and Guattari may be considered to be philosophers 
of the body who are concerned with provoking a wholesale reassessment of what we 
thought we knew about bodies: their potentials, relationships and constitution. As such, 
they may be deployed as a starting point for a reconsideration of the body which must 
also produce a rethinking of war, society and politics; and possibly a rethinking of 
thinking itself.  
The Social Construction of Bodies: Nietzsche and Deleuze.  
Thinking the body as something other than an object for knowledge seems to require 
that it is wrested from the arms of biological determinism, in order that it can be 
thought of as being in a dynamic relationship with politics, rather than simply the 
foundational material upon which politics, culture and society are built. This section 
outlines the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari (and their interlocutors), dramatise the 
contention that ‘one is not born a body but becomes one’,14 in order to suggest some 
possible ways in which one might think the body as something other than merely an 
object for thought. For Deleuze and Guattari, the body is thoroughly political, not in the 
sense that it is a material upon which political power works, but as the outcome or 
product of this political work. I will try to argue that this position is a necessary one if it 
is to be possible to disentangle the body from both biological and social necessity, and 
therefore to introduce an element of uncertainty within the body which makes it more 
than a distillation of social and biological forces. There are two moves necessary to 
express this point. The first conceives of the body as being the outcome of social and 
political techniques of fabrication which discipline the way in which the body is 
expressed and articulated. In this sense, there is an argument against the biological 
determination of the body, which insists instead that it is thoroughly and originally 
political. The second must somehow refrain from the conclusion that the body is 
thoroughly determined by politics rather than biology in order to retain an element of 
uncertainty and unpredictability in the body. If this were not the case, I will suggest, it 
would be unclear why the body should be privileged as a perspective, or why it is 
                                                          
14 Gayle Salamon ‘The Bodily Ego and the Contested Domain of the Material’ pp. 95-122 in Differences: 
A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 2004 Vol. 15, No. 3 p. 105  
138 
 
desirable, or even possible, to think the body as something other than an object of 
thought.  
For Friedrich Nietzsche, a certain kind of embodied subject has to be constructed 
through a disciplinary bodily process. In order that one might refer to my body, and to 
experience and articulate that body in a certain way, there is political work that needs to 
be done. Nietzsche insists that ‘[p]eoples were the creators first; only later were 
individuals creators. Indeed, the individual himself is still the latest creation’.15 If 
society is to be predicated on the existence of individuals, then it must first create these 
‘autonomous, more than moral individual[s]’.16 And the way in which this creation 
takes place is through a violent process in which the body is subject to various 
disciplinary strategies in order to mould it in a certain way. Nietzsche calls this 
‘mnemotechnics’, and it is carried out in accordance with the principle that ‘“[a] thing 
is branded on the memory to make it stay there; only what goes on hurting will 
stick”’.17 So all societies, conventions and beliefs have cruelty at their origin: 
‘whenever on earth one still finds solemnity, gravity, secrecy...in the life of an 
individual or nation, one also senses a residuum of that terror with which men must 
formerly have promised’.18 Nietzsche recites a litany of cruelties that were visited upon 
subjects to create them as subjects: ‘drawing and quartering, trampling to death with 
horses, boiling in oil or wine... By such methods the individual is taught to remember 
five or six “I won’ts” which entitled him to participate in the benefits of society’.19  
For Deleuze and Guattari, this is the principle of social discipline: ‘with its imprint of 
fire, its alphabet inscribed in bodies’,20 which lays the groundwork for all subsequent 
forms of representation and control. It is through the body that politics and economy are 
at first constructed and sustained, as in the beginning, [wo]men must be made to 
remember the rules of society and to believe that its injunctions have real force. 
Deleuze and Guattari say that ‘[a]ll the stupidity and the arbitrariness of the laws, all the 
pain of the initiations, the whole perverse apparatus of repression and education, the 
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red-hot irons and the atrocious procedures have only this meaning: to breed man, to 
mark him in his flesh’.21 As societies mature they rely less on the bodily practices of 
subject-creation, and more on the moral restraints of religion, conscience and the norms 
of society. But underlying the purchase that these regulative ideas have, underlying the 
society as such, is the originary pain which brought it into being, such as existed in 
what Deleuze calls ‘savage formations’ or ‘primitive societies’.22 This does not mean 
that they do not exist in contemporary politics. As Polymeris Voglis says, ‘[i]n acute 
socio-political crises like civil war, the state, in order to regain and establish its power, 
rediscovers the whole arsenal of punishments at its disposal’.23 However, as society and 
politics evolve, so does the way in which the body is controlled, which becomes less 
explicitly violent and more dependent on abstract laws and prohibitions. For Deleuze 
and Guattari this is because the body has learnt to be self-regulating, and so does not 
generally require the forcible intervention of the state in order to ensure its compliance.  
In a ‘mature society’, the body is controlled by the individual subject, and so begins to 
appear to be private and non-political. Hannah Arendt’s insistence on the importance of 
the private realm to ‘shelter the intimate’24 and the care of the ‘biological life process of 
the family’25 suggests that the processes of biological bodily life are independent of the 
exercise of political power. Deleuze and Guattari insist, however, that rather than being 
a ‘natural’ state of affairs, this appearance of independence between the body and 
politics is actually the consequence of a history of discipline intended to construct the 
body in a certain way. Rather than being the direct concern of the state, the body is 
administered by the subject which has been formed through the generative process of 
disciplinary socialisation: I am conscious of my body, of orientating and articulating it 
in certain ways, and of controlling the way in which it comes into contact with other 
bodies (Deleuze and Guattari’s paradigmatic example of this is the ban on incest). And 
because of this, as far as the political economy is concerned, the body starts to appear as 
a resource. Deleuze and Guattari say that ‘the elements of production ... are not 
reproduced in the same way as humans themselves, but find in them a simple material 
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that the form of economic reproduction preorganizes in a mode that is entirely distinct 
from the form this material has as human reproduction’.26 In other words, after 
centuries of bodily discipline, the political economy now need not concern itself 
directly with biological life, but can merely take advantage of the resources that the 
biological body offers up to it. 
Deleuze and Guattari chart the changing relationship between the state (politics) and the 
body in order to confound the impression that the state belongs to artifice and the body 
belongs to nature. They insist that there is nothing particularly ‘natural’ about the body. 
Indeed, it is only as a consequence of a certain political technique that bodies are 
expressed and experienced as bodies at all. This is indicated by the potentially 
confusing distinction they make between the ‘organism’ and the ‘body’. The crucial 
thing about the organism is that it is organised in a certain way, so that the organs have 
a certain hierarchical relationship to each other. For example, discussing the face, 
Deleuze and Guattari insist that the face does not ‘belong to’ or express the person 
‘behind’ it: ‘The face is not an envelope exterior to the person who speaks, thinks, or 
feels’.27 We do not ‘have faces’ by virtue of some biological fact of our embodied 
existence, but because of a political fact related to our social existence. Rather than 
being associated with expression, the face is related to the power to impose order: both 
in society (“the judge had a firm expression, his eyes were horizonless”...28) and over 
the body, as the face becomes the focus for significance and signification. What 
Deleuze and Guattari are concerned with is ‘the face’ as a concept as it operates in 
society. When they say ‘if human beings have a destiny, it is ... to escape the face’,29 
they do not mean that one should tear the skin from one’s head, but that one should 
deny ‘the face’ the capacity to organise. There are multiple modes of social and 
political control which construct an organism through the decree ‘You will be 
organized, you will be an organism, you will articulate your body—otherwise you’re 
just depraved’.30  
The idea that an organism is a specific political product, rather than being in some 
senses ‘natural’, seems counterintuitive. It is tempting to suggest that it is self-evident 
                                                          
26 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p 285  
27 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (trans. and foreword Brian Massumi) A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia London: Continuum 2004 p. 186 
28 Ibid. p. 196 
29 Ibid. p. 189 
30 Ibid. pp. 176-177 
141 
 
that the organs have a particular relation to each other and to the world, which is 
ordained by biology, rather than determined by politics. Discussing the organism, 
Deleuze and Guattari invoke a litany of tragic bodies from history. For example, ‘Miss 
X claims she no longer has a brain or nerves or chest or stomach or guts. All she has left 
is the skin and bones of a disorganized body’; and Judge Scheber: ‘“He lived for a long 
time without a stomach, without intestines, almost without lungs, with a torn 
oesophagus, without a bladder, with shattered ribs... But divine miracles (‘rays’) always 
restored what had been destroyed”’.31 They cite multiple examples of bodies which 
refuse the proper functioning of the organism, for example, hypochondriacs, paranoiacs, 
anorexics, masochists and drug addicts.32 These are what we would tend to classify as 
aberrant or deviant organisms, in need of treatment and ‘normalisation’. But our 
confidence in this conclusion cannot withstand a consideration of the politics inherent 
in deciding between the normal and the deviant,33 and the recognition that the body is a 
resource for the political economy begs the question of whether the edifice of biological 
determinism which conditions our thinking about the body is not one of its greatest 
achievements. In discussing the significance of the idea of the organism, Deleuze and 
Guattari make great play of these unhappy, ‘deviant’ bodies. They ask themselves 
‘[w]hy such a dreary parade of sucked-dry, catatonicized, vitrified, sewn-up 
bodies’?34The answer is in part that the ‘normal’ body is also in some senses thus shorn 
of its potential, and the ‘deviant’ body is used to dramatise both the politically 
constructed character of the organism, and the extent to which this construction should 
not be uncritically accepted as an optimal mode of existence.  
The Unknown Body: Transformation and Becoming   
This vision of the constructed body is potentially problematic in terms of catalysing a 
rethinking of the body. For if the body is the outcome of a work of power political 
construction, then it becomes difficult to see what the significance of thinking from the 
perspective of the body is. One could respond that it may be able to function as some 
kind of symptom from which one could diagnose the way in which state power operates 
in certain times and places. But it would be possible to think the body in this way while 
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continuing to regard it as an object for knowledge, and therefore the significance of the 
perspective of the body is diminished. In addition, if the body is the consequence of the 
operation of state power, and is entirely constituted by this power, it is unclear whether 
it has any resources over and beyond this from which to wage a critique or through 
which to engage in any kind of rethinking or re-evaluation. In this sense there is the 
danger of simply replacing biological determinism with a kind of political fatalism. 
Most seriously, the kind of body politics briefly introduced above seems to speak little 
to quotidian bodily life, which is much richer and more confusing than the notion that 
the body is the outcome of a political work of construction. In this sense, we have 
arrived at a curiously disembodied thinking about the body.  
However, the idea that the body is manufactured, rather than being ‘natural’, does an 
important work of ‘ungrounding’ and de-essentialising it which creates the space for a 
more positive rethinking. If it is accepted that the body is the outcome of political work; 
constructed rather than biologically grounded, and that the body is not the same in all 
places and times, then it must follow that ‘the body’ has the potential to be expressed in 
a variety of different ways. In this case, seeking to define what a body is, we are faced 
with the task of itemising all these different bodies and cataloguing their attributes. This 
task is an impossible one, not least because one could not know what kind of bodies 
will exist in the future. These problems are amplified if we introduce the possibility that 
the body is not only the object of political will, but also that it has active properties of 
its own. The body is not only moulded by external forces, but interacts positively with 
them. For example, Deleuze says that ‘Nietzsche criticises [Charles] Darwin for 
interpreting evolution in a purely reactive way. He admires [Jean-Baptiste] Lamarck 
because Lamarck foretold the existence of a truly active plastic force’.35 His point is 
that neither ‘nature’ nor politics can exhaustively determine what a body is, or delimit 
the scope of its activity. For Benedict de Spinoza as well as for Nietzsche, it is precisely 
the impossibility of entirely subordinating the body to any single explanatory regime 
that accounts for the significance of the body, and for the starting point for rethinking. 
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Spinoza says that ‘we do not even know what a body can do’,36 a statement which for 
Deleuze is ‘practically a war cry’.37 This claim requires closer scrutiny in order to 
reveal why, for Deleuze, it is such a radical and important one. An essential tenet of 
Spinoza’s thought is that there is a single substance from which life, in all its 
complexity, is composed. This is the idea of the ‘univocity of being’, which suggests 
that there is ‘a single substance having an infinity of attributes’.38 This view is one of 
‘extreme corporeality’,39 according to which ‘the mind and the body are one and the 
same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the 
attribute of extension’.40 What makes the difference between things in the world—what 
makes difference itself—is a matter of expression or a mode of existence, not of 
essence. That is to say, it is the way a body is which is distinctive, not what it is. There 
is no essential difference which lies behind the actual manifestation of a thing. One 
consequence of this position is that a large degree of possibility for transformation or 
change is introduced, since there is no essential character to the body, but only a 
contingent one which is expressed at a certain time. Deleuze and Guattari use the 
example of a carthorse, which may have more in common with an ox than with a 
racehorse, in terms of the function it performs, the way it responds, and so on.41 What 
this indicates is the desire to escape from essential definitions of what a body is, 
whether they are framed in terms of biology or through any other mode of 
identification. In turn, this leads to an appreciation for what is particular in a certain 
body, rather than seeking to identify generalisable principles concerning bodies of a 
certain type.  
The insistence on the variability and specificity of bodies seems to preclude the 
possibility of devising a definition of ‘the body’, and therefore calls into question the 
utility of the concept, which seems to connote only the impossibility of connotation. 
However, the idea of the body does have a positive function, which is arguably to 
identify this changeable property itself. Deleuze says that ‘[w]hat defines a body is... 
[the] relation between dominant and dominated forces. Every relationship of forces 
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constitutes a body—whether it is chemical, biological, social or political. Any two 
forces, being unequal, constitute a body as soon as they enter into a relationship’.42 The 
point is that the body is a system in disequilibrium, and it is this which accounts for its 
ability to be transformed by the encounters it has with other bodies. The kinds of 
encounters to which the body is susceptible varies according to the specific body: ‘[a] 
horse, a fish, a man, or even two men compared with the other, do not have the same 
capacity to be affected: they are not affected by the same things’.43 These encounters 
may be positive, whereby the body becomes more powerful, or they may be negative, 
when the body becomes weaker, or is even destroyed. And in this context, ‘powerful’ 
and ‘weak’ refer to the capacity to affect and be affected. It might seem to be 
problematic and potentially misleading to insist that any relationship of forces 
constitutes a body, in that we seem to be being led very far from a consideration of 
material human bodies. But taking seriously the rejection of biological determination 
makes it incoherent to do otherwise, as the idea of the human body reintroduces a 
standard against which bodies are judged, and therefore tends to efface their specificity 
rather than reinforcing it.  
I want now to address in more detail the question of why Spinoza insists that we do not 
know what a body can do, and why this claim is so significant, before moving on to 
suggest some potential implications that this has for rethinking the body. This is called 
for because the notion that the body is defined by its capacity to change seems to 
present a serious challenge for a positive rethinking of the body. There are a number of 
different components to the problem of thinking the body, the first arising out of the 
apparent illegitimacy of using general categories to organise knowledge about bodies. 
As has already been suggested, for example, forbearing from using the category ‘the 
human body’ for discussing the body creates an anxiety for capturing what is particular 
about that body. However, the category ‘the human body’ operates as a regulatory 
category, according to which bodies which fall short of the attributes necessary for a 
body to be classed as human can be excluded. For example, it has been subject to 
conjecture that what is properly ‘human’ is something more than ‘mere’ bodily 
existence. However, if one accepts the politically constructed nature of the body, it 
appears that this is dependent upon a form of bodily existence which consents to this 
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division of life into the political and the non-political. That is to say, it is a condition of 
possibility for thinking the human in terms of language, or action (in the Arendtian 
sense) that the body be organised in a certain way, one which permits its subdivision 
into politically significant and insignificant components.  
It might seem that some forms of classification are more problematic than others, and in 
a sense this is so. But in fact, the gesture of naming, or classification is always fraught 
with difficulty, because it operates according to the principle of identity. For example, 
the category ‘woman’ is associated with a certain set of images and criteria which 
actually existing women must reflect or be deemed to embody, in order that they be 
properly categorised as women. This category thereby tends to discipline the bodily 
expressions of women who must orientate themselves with respect to it. Even women 
who somehow subvert the ideals of the category (and of course, most do) do so 
according to degrees of difference. In other words, they are positioned relative to the 
ideals of this category, and ordered hierarchically according to their capacity to reflect 
them. One can envisage ‘an oppositional framework of culturally constructed 
significations: male versus female, black versus white, gay versus straight and so on. 
The body corresponded to a ‘site’ on the grid defined by an overlapping of one term 
from each pair. The body came to be defined by its pinning to the grid’.44 However, the 
category of ‘woman’ is also an important one for Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of 
how to think not with categories, but through and beyond them. 
Classification has a restrictive effect inasmuch as it introduces a set of criteria by which 
a body must be judged, and a set of expectations as to what the body can and properly 
should do. It also obscures the particularity of a body by interpreting it in terms of 
general categories. However, the existence of different categories of bodies brings with 
it the possibility for the degradation of these categories. For example, Deleuze and 
Guattari refer to the possibility of ‘becoming animal’. This does not mean imitating a 
dog, for example, because that would involve one category (human) consciously 
interacting with another category (dog), whereas the point is to get beyond categories 
altogether. They say that ‘becoming is not a correspondence between relations. But 
neither is it a resemblance, and imitation, or, at the limit, an identification... Becomings-
animal are neither dreams nor phantasises. They are perfectly real’.45 This sounds 
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deeply problematic, for one cannot literally turn into a dog, so how can a becoming-
animal be ‘real’? The answer is that to turn oneself into a dog (even if such a thing were 
possible) would be to move from one category of being to another. The significance of 
becoming, on the other hand, is that it is opposed to being: it is the movement or the 
connection in itself: ‘What is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the 
supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes’.46 The idea of 
‘becoming’ is used to signal the inadequacy of categories such as ‘man’, ‘woman’, 
‘animal’ in exhausting the potential of the body. It points instead to an ongoing process 
of transformation which takes place not from one term to another but through and 
beyond the terms themselves.  
The idea of ‘becoming-woman’ is especially significant for Deleuze and Guattari, 
because the category of ‘woman’ has a privileged status as the intimate, and inferior 
other of ‘man’. ‘Man’ is the category that we must get away from, because it is the ideal 
organising category par excellence,47 which underpins the entire hierarchy of 
categorisation. ‘It is perhaps the special situation of women in relation to the man-
standard that accounts for the fact that becomings... always pass through a becoming-
woman’.48 This does not mean that one should imitate actual woman. For ‘[e]ven 
women must become woman’.49 The deployment of the concept ‘woman’ in this way 
has been unsettling for many feminist thinkers.50 However, what is at stake is a 
rejection of the categories of being, and the hierarchy within which they are organised 
in order to liberate the capacity of the body to make connections. In thinking the body 
as having a fixed identity, its possibility for transformation is obscured and presented 
only in the sense that one might emulate other identities, or possibility move from one 
to the other, but rather than the identity, Deleuze and Guattari want to privilege the 
movement itself, untethered from the points of identity through which it passes.  
The necessity for this refers back to Spinoza’s insistence on the use of the question 
‘What can a body do?’51 as a starting point for thinking about it. Deleuze and Guattari 
say that ‘[i]n the same way that we avoided defining a body by its organs and functions, 
                                                          
46 Ibid. p. 262 
47 Ibid. p. 322 
48 Ibid. p. 321 
49 Ibid. p. 321 
50 See Jerry Aline Flieger ‘Becoming-Woman: Deleuze, Schreber and Molecular Identification’ pp. 38-63 
in Ian Buchanan and Claire Colebrook (eds) Deleuze and Feminist Theory Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press 2001 pp. 38-41 
51 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p. 283 
147 
 
we will avoid defining it by Species or Genus characteristics. Instead we will count its 
affects’.52 ‘Affects are becomings’.53 The problem with categories such as ‘man’ or 
‘woman’ is that these categories predispose certain assumptions as to what affects the 
body in question is capable of; in other words, what it is and what it can do. Rather, we 
are encouraged to think of the body in process, rather than as an object or a ‘being’ with 
stable properties and attributes. This in turn suggests that we should have different 
expectations about what thinking the body should entail, and should abandon the notion 
that we should be able to say ‘the body is x’. ‘We know nothing about a body until we 
know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter 
into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body, either to destroy 
that body or to be destroyed by it, either to exchange actions and passions with it, or to 
join with it in composing a more powerful body’.54 The trouble with using named 
categories such as ‘man’ or ‘woman’, is that they do not tell us what the body can do, 
they tell us only what it is not permitted to do, and in this sense limit the capacity to 
countenance expressions of different kinds.  
The Limitations of Consciousness: Rethinking ‘Thinking’ 
The mode of ‘rethinking’ the body that I have adumbrated above presents a number of 
challenges in terms of how this new thinking should be conducted. I have tried to show 
that re-thinking the body along the lines that Deleuze and Guattari (informed by 
Spinoza and Nietzsche) advocate presents a challenge because the kind of body they 
enjoin us to think cannot be defined according to any classificatory system, and is 
always underpinned by its capacity to change, which means that any conceptualisation 
must be provisional. Our sudden apprehension of the slipperiness of the body as an 
object for thought creates an anxiety for thinking about it, given the lack of clarity about 
what ‘it’ is. But this elides the question of what it is to think, in the sense that it 
constructs the image of a coherent process of thinking which struggles to get to grips 
with the ephemeral object of thought. But of course, from a Spinozist perspective, we 
cannot separate thinking and the object of thought in this way, nor leave unexamined 
the question of who thinks. For if the body is both unknown and subject to continuous 
open-ended change, then it cannot be the case that the capacity for thought remains 
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itself unchanged. So in order to think through the possibility for rethinking the body 
along Deleuzian lines, it is necessary to consider both the body, and thinking, in order 
to demonstrate the relationship between them, and the problems and possibilities of 
thinking through the Spinozist body.  
Nietzsche suggests that the notion of a unified subject who is conscious, analyses and 
makes decisions, is an illusion. Rather, what we would call ‘the subject’ is composed of 
a competing multiplicity of drives. And ‘it is our drives that interpret the world—and 
not our egos, not our conscious opinions. It is not so much that I have a different 
perspective on the world than you; it is rather that each of us has multiple perspectives 
on the world because of the multiplicity of our drives’.55 So when we say ‘I have 
decided...’ what we mean is that one drive has triumphed over the others. Nietzsche 
says that ‘[w]hile ‘we’ believe we are complaining about the vehemence of a drive, at 
bottom it is one drive which is complaining about another, that is to say: for us to 
become aware that we are suffering from the vehemence of a drive presupposes the 
existence of another equally vehement drive, and that a struggle is in prospect in which 
our intellect is going to have to take sides’.56 These drives are to be understood as 
aspects of the body, not least because for Nietzsche, the body is all there is. He says that 
‘‘I am body and soul’—so speaks the child. And why should one not speak like 
children? But the awakened, the enlightened man says: I am body entirely, and nothing 
beside; and soul is only a word for something in the body. The body is a great 
intelligence, a multiplicity with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and a herdsman’.57  
What this suggests is that what we call ‘consciousness’ is actually a retrospective 
identification with whichever drive has emerged victorious, and so that consciousness is 
not an active capacity which determines the body’s actions and affects, rather it is the ex 
post facto rationalisation of the ego attempting to make sense of these. Deleuze says 
that ‘[c]onsciousness is essentially reactive; this is why we do not know what a body 
can do, or what it is capable of. And what is said of consciousness must also be said of 
memory and habit’.58 And Nietzsche suggests that there is a distinction between the 
self, which resides in the body, and the ego which purports to rule it: ‘Behind your 
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thoughts and feelings, my brother, stands a mighty commander, and unknown sage—he 
is called Self. He lives in your body, he is your body. There is more reason in your body 
than in your best wisdom’.59 This seems to create a distinction in two possible ways of 
thinking, between the ego-driven conscious thought, and the bodily ‘thinking’ which 
undergirds and informs this. This is not to cleave back to binary body/mind divisions, as 
Deleuze says, ‘[w]hen Descartes says...‘I think therefore I am’ but not ‘I walk therefore 
I am’ he is initiating the distinction between the two subjects’.60 But it is to distinguish 
between the form of thinking that makes this distinction and that which does not.  
It is immediately evident that this demand to rethink thinking raises some serious 
problems. Nietzsche refers to a kind of linguistic deficiency according to which we can 
only describe the more ‘extreme’ drives which move us, ‘the milder, middle degrees, 
not to speak of the lower degrees which are continually in play, elude us, and yet it is 
they which weave the web of our character and our destiny’.61 But this difficulty is not 
only linguistic, it is one of consciousness, as if we are not conscious of these ‘lower’ 
drives, then surely we cannot ever express or articulate them. This is only a problem, 
however, if we are seeking to ground thought in certainty, or to demand that thinking 
may be easily communicable. In fact, for Deleuze, what is ethically significant about a 
certain kind of thinking is the very fact that it refuses or evades certainty. And it is 
thinking the body, and thinking through the body, which introduces the extent to which 
the unknown and the uncertain underlie all the confidences of consciousness. Deleuze 
says that ‘[t]he body is no longer the obstacle that separates thought from itself…It is 
on the contrary that which it plunges into or must plunge into, in order to reach the 
unthought, that is life. Not that the body thinks, but, obstinate and stubborn, it forces us 
to think what is concealed from thought, life’.62  
If by ‘thought’ we mean the correspondence of signs and objects, and the coherence of 
the representational universe, then the body does create a serious problem for thought. 
However, this is not what Deleuze means by thought. He says ‘[w]e no longer believe 
in the whole as interiority of thought—even an open one; we believe in a force from 
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outside which hollows itself out, grabs us and attracts the inside’.63 Rejecting 
‘interiority’ must mean doing away with the distinction between inside and outside the 
body, and this entails doing away with the image of the body itself: ‘the “body image” 
[is] the final avatar of the soul, a vague conjoining of the requirements of spiritualism 
and positivism’.64  What this indicates is that it is not a matter of thinking through the 
body, or thinking with the body, but of thinking along the connections that the body is 
capable of making if it is not regulated by an image of what the body should be. The 
real danger for thought is not that it is chaotic or incomplete, but the very opposite, that 
it might collapse into a solipsistic system which is concerned with the production only 
of more of the same, rather than allowing different connections to be forged, and kinds 
of life to emerge.  
Resources for Rethinking the Body at War: Affect 
It has been my aim to indicate some of the ways in which Deleuze, with Guattari, 
Nietzsche and Spinoza, departs from convention (and ‘common sense’) in thinking the 
body, and thinking ‘thinking’ itself. In refusing the distinction between thought and the 
body, Deleuze presents the body as neither an object for thought nor an obstacle to it, 
but rather as its impetus. Deleuze proposes that we think the body as an object of 
indeterminacy. As Brian Massumi says, ‘[t]he charge of indeterminacy carried by a 
body is inseparable from it’.65 This indeterminacy means that we can never know in 
advance what a body will be capable of in a given place and time, but we are assured 
that the normative, constructed political body does not have priority, and should not be 
accorded any privileged position in terms of ordering or disciplining other, ‘inferior’ 
bodies. In terms of the body at war, then, this conduces to taking seriously all 
expressions of bodily experience at war, and not only forbearing from judging them 
according to normative criteria such as ‘bravery’ or ‘patriotism’, but also refraining 
from classifying them according to the sense-making standards of ‘normal’ narrative or 
speech.  
The disjuncture between regulative norms and warrior body is evinced on return from 
battle, when the sense made of war does not chime with the expectations of how the 
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experience should be assimilated. For example, a British soldier who fought in Iraq 
writes:  
War’s beauty’s delicate, he finds 
It snags and tears, as friends 
  in London nod 
Or flinch and ask, and was it bad? 
 
It was, he says, and yet.66  
 
Catherine Merridale discusses the responses to post-war psychological trauma in the 
Soviet Union, which came to be seen in some quarters as a failure to embody the 
socialist ideals of the Soviet Union, a kind of retrograde weakness which could only 
signify ideological unsoundness whereby ‘[a]ny individual who fell short of the 
collective criteria came to be regarded as deviant’.67 From a Deleuzian perspective, the 
response to these different bodily experiences should avoid the application of normative 
criteria to returning ‘damaged’ bodies, but, as with his ‘deviant, vitrified’ ones, should 
mobilise them to unsettle the concept of the stable, sound, functional body.  
Another axis along which the potential of the body can be explored relates to the 
apparent incoherence of experiences of war, which seem to resist being compiled into a 
clear narrative, and occasionally elude the consciousness of the person in question, 
appearing only in shadow. Writing about war can dramatise the limitations of 
consciousness in apprehending the experiences and capabilities of the body. For 
example, the narrator of All Quiet on the Western Front writes that ‘[a]n animal instinct 
awakens in us, and it directs and protects us. It is not conscious, it is far quicker, far 
more accurate and far more reliable than conscious thought…If you had relied on 
thought, you would have been so many pieces of meat by now’.68 What the body can do 
exceeds what consciousness apprehends of its capabilities, as well as the capabilities of 
consciousness itself. Deleuze and Guattari would enjoin us not to re-package these 
experiences in the light of the norm of the disciplined image of body and thought which 
prioritises the latter and asks of it certain standards of reasonableness. The potential 
insurgency and unpredictability of the body at war is vulnerable to being re-grounded, if 
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not in social norms, then in biological or pseudo-psychological ones. For example, in 
the Second World War, ‘‘normal’ men were psychologically capable of killing’69 while 
‘[m]en unable to cope with killing were an aberrant group’.70  
When thinking about the body at war, the temptation is to think about it relative to some 
normative vision of what the body should be. More often than not, the body is thought 
either in relation to the image of the domesticated civilian body, or to the idealised 
warrior body. And insofar as this is the case, thinking continues to travel along 
regulatory lines which continuously relate the body to a categorical image of it which 
contains certain assumptions about what the body is and what it can do. This is not to 
say that this way of thinking is ‘wrong’, and indeed it must be taken into account in 
light of its pervasive influence on the self-understandings of soldiers and the policies of 
military organisations.71 However, there are possible other ways of thought, which 
exploit the destabilising and disorientating effects of war on the body, rather than 
seeking to contain them. I have suggested the concept of affect as being important for 
the constitution of the body, in that ‘[w[hat a body can do corresponds to the nature and 
limits of its capacity to be affected’.72 I will try to show that the idea of affect, or what I 
have called ‘becoming’, has the potential to stimulate a non-categorical thinking about 
bodies, and to provide us with the resources for thinking about bodies (at war) without 
restricting the potentially transformative effect of their experiences.  
Defining ‘affect’ is not straightforward. While ‘[a]ffect is most often used loosely as a 
synonym for emotion’,73 this use is misleading, because emotions are the predicate of a 
subject: I feel fear, or joy. Affect, on the other hand, is outside the boundaries of 
subjectivity, and while affective responses may be interpreted in the language of 
emotion, this does not make them synonymous. Affect is a bodily response or capacity 
which may be only partially registered consciously, or not at all. The suggestion is that 
the body is richer than we can ever think it is, because ‘[w]ill and consciousness are 
subtractive. They are limitative, derivative functions that reduce a complexity too rich 
to be functionally expressed’.74 The principle of the univocity of being suggests that all 
substances are different expressions of the same thing: there is no essential ground for 
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distinguishing them. There is a sense of ‘the One manifesting itself in the Many’.75 This 
suggests that the body should be thought of as containing the potential to be different in 
an enormous variety of ways, as it is merely an expression of [a single] substance, and 
‘substance contains within itself the infinity of its points of view upon itself’.76 In other 
words, what a body is cannot be separated from what it could have been and what it 
could become. In Deleuzian terms, it is virtual as much as it is actual. Massumi says 
that ‘[t]he body is as immediately abstract as it is concrete; its activity and expressivity 
extend, as on their underside, into an incorporeal, yet perfectly real, dimension of 
pressing potential’.77  
Discussing the United States’ Homeland Security colour-coding system, which ranks 
the threat level from green to red depending on its severity, Massumi suggests that this 
is an expression of the way in which affect can be deployed for political ends. Devoid 
of any real content or meaning, the codes work not on ‘subjects’ cognition but rather 
bodies’ irritability’.78 Devising a coherent message which appealed to American 
citizens across the board would present a serious challenge in the context of the 
variability of those subjects and their ideas,79 and also limit the utility of the appeal, 
which would become anchored within a specific set of contexts and concerns. Rather, 
the result of the colour coding system was to generate an atmosphere of fear bypassing 
conscious evaluation. This fear becomes integrated within the bodily performance of 
everyday life, and because it takes place on the pre-conscious level it comes to 
determine the content of experience while itself being prior to this. Massumi says that 
‘[p]art of the affective training that the Bush color alert system assures is the engraining 
in the bodies of the populace of anticipatory affective response to signs of fear even in 
contexts where one is clearly in no present danger’.80 Fear is introduced on the affective 
level and therefore the hope is that the subject accounts for this fear through 
explanations supplied by the government: global terrorism, so that’s why I am afraid. 
This is not assured, however, as responses to an affective stimulus may vary in 
unpredictable ways.81  
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The suggestion is that the body may react on a pre-conscious, affective level, and that 
any cognitive response is driven by the bodily one. William James says that ‘bodily 
changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and our feeling of the same 
changes as they occur IS the emotion’.82 In other words, the bodily response is prior to 
the conscious perception of the response, and is never exhausted or fully determined by 
cognition. Tim O’Brien’s novel Going After Cacciato dramatises the role of pre-
conscious sentiments in creating a sense of unease which cannot be satisfactorily 
explained. Of his protagonist, he writes that ‘Paul Berlin was the first to feel uneasy. He 
couldn’t quite place it. A milky film clouding the hot days. Lapping motions at night. 
Artificiality, a sense of imposed peace’.83 Later, ‘[h]e thought about the difference 
between good times and bad times, and how funny it was that he could not state the 
difference, only feel it’.84 There was a sense of being in a ‘[b]ad place, bad 
time...Silence that wasn’t silence’.85 The unease is an affective response, which lacks 
content; in other words, which cannot be rationally explained. It comes as a relief when 
something happens, as this enables the floating, ill-defined sense of tension to be 
ascribed to something: so that’s what we were worried about. O’Brien says that ‘[w]hen 
Rudy Chassler hit the mine, the noise was muffled, almost fragile, but it was a relief for 
all of them’86. Until then all symptoms of unease had been somatic ‘Harold Murphy’s 
face puffed up in a rash of boils and open ulcers. Stink Harris complained of numbness 
in his fingers and feet. Even Doc felt it’.87  
For both Tim O’Brien’s Vietnam War soldier and Brian Massumi’s mobilised citizen, 
fear or unease is characterised by a lack of certainty, an apparently content-free sense of 
destabilisation. The medic for O’Brien’s group of soldiers diagnoses the problem thus: 
‘A vacuum. No substance, no conceptual matériel. Follow me? Bad logistics. We’re 
getting short-changed on conceptual supplies... Can’t win in a vacuum’.88 For Massumi, 
this uncertainty is the contemporary experience of fear, whereby ‘[t]he pertinent 
question is not Who?, Where?, When?, or even What? The enemy is Whatnot?—an 
unspecifiable may-come-to-pass, in an other dimension. In a word, the enemy is the 
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virtual’.89 This is the case even though the virtual was earlier identified as that which 
signifies the multiple (or infinite) potential of the body, and the impossibility of pinning 
it down to an ‘it is’. What was formerly described as being a source for transformation 
and a resource for critical thought appears now to be being named as the origin of an 
oppressive and pervasive fear. Massumi discusses the way in which war, or danger 
develops in ‘proximity to pleasure... intertwining with the necessary functions of body, 
self, family, economy’.90 He suggests that this produces a ‘loss of the specificity of the 
landscape of fear’.91 This does not mean that we cannot speak of ‘war’ in any positive 
sense, for war is not synonymous with fear. But it does suggest that taking seriously the 
body as a prism through which to view war, we may have to reject the notion that it can 
be comfortably divided away from what is not war. And to accept that certain affects of 
war may bleed far beyond the battlefield. The confusion and uncertainty associated with 
war may in fact be part of the fabric of everyday life for many, meaning that some 
bodies may be at war without ever having seen combat.  
Resources for Rethinking the Body at War: Desire  
Discussing affect, the impression is of the body denied the resources for activity in the 
face of the disorientating effects of war. The suggestion has been that fear can hold us 
in a paralysing limbo, and that this fear is associated with preparations from war (on the 
understanding that even when ‘at war’, one is always also preparing for the next battle, 
the ultimate encounter with the face of war). This runs the risk of reinforcing an 
insidious misconception about war, namely, that it comes to us from without, and we 
are helpless in the face of its inexorable logic—or violent lack thereof. Rejecting the 
idea that war is imposed on us from without seems to present difficulties, however. 
Arguing that we are not passive in the face of war seems to demand a belief in the 
integrity and autonomy of subjectivity which runs counter to the ideas developed in this 
chapter about consciousness. For how else can we position ourselves against these 
potent forces working at the level of pre-conscious affect? Related to this is the 
problematic nature of the apparent corollary of arguing against the idea that we are 
powerless in the face of war, namely the conclusion that we must therefore choose war. 
In fact both these problems are chimera based on a common assumption concerning the 
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autonomy of choice. It is no contradiction to say that one may be seduced by war 
without having chosen it. This seduction is thoroughly corporeal. Indeed, activity and 
passivity are two sides of the coin when it comes to the body at war, with neither 
entirely determining our being towards it.  
The exploration of the idea that war can structure experience, and be interacted with 
positively on a bodily level, will be developed through Deleuze and Guattari’s concept 
of desire, which may be understood as being synonymous with Nietzsche’s concept of 
‘drives’, discussed above.92 In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari state that they are 
concerned with developing a ‘materialist psychiatry’.93 The flaw with the ‘idealist 
psychiatry’ of Freud, as they see it, is that it proposes a structural distinction between 
unconscious desire and fantasy, on the one hand, and society and politics on the other. 
Contrary to this, Deleuze and Guattari insist that desire does not produce fantasies or 
illusions, but reality itself. They say that ‘[i]f desire produces, its product is real. If 
desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only 
reality’.94 Desire has an unmediated correspondence with the social world, such that 
there is no structural difference between ‘reality’ and ‘fantasy’: ‘[t]here is no such thing 
as the social production of reality on the one hand, and desiring-production that is mere 
fantasy on the other’,95 because the social and the unconscious are actually far more 
interdependent than this. Deleuze and Guattari say that ‘[w]e maintain that the social 
field is immediately invested by desire, and that the libido has no need of any mediation 
or sublimation, any psychic operation, any transformation, in order to invade the 
productive forces and the relations of production’.96 In this way, Deleuze and Guattari 
combine Marx and Freud and through them devise a new understanding of the social 
world in which desire is given an immediate productive power.97  
The idea that desire produces reality should not be interpreted to mean that reality is 
actively desired, as in wanted, by subjects. For this would be to conflate desire, which is 
pre-personal and pre-subjective, with interests, which are the outcome of a particular 
social-political arrangement. Daniel Smith dramatises the distinction through the 
quotidian example of buying toothpaste: ‘at the drug store, I almost automatically reach 
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for one brand of toothpaste rather than another, since I have a fervent interest in having 
my teeth cavity-free and whiter than white... but this is because my desire is already 
invested in the social formation that creates interest, and that creates the sense of lack I 
feel if my teeth aren’t whiter than white, or my breath fresher than fresh’.98 In other 
words, (‘rational’) interests are the consequence of the investment of desire in a 
particular social network of institutions and values. So what is wanted, on the conscious 
level, is secondary to the investments of desire which create the conditions of 
possibility for wanting that thing. This is how Deleuze and Guattari approach the 
problem of fascism, which they say is the ‘fundamental problem of political 
philosophy’99: why do people not only allow themselves to be repressed, but actively 
work to bring this situation about? Their answer is that ‘under a certain set of 
conditions, they wanted fascism, and it is this perversion of the desire of the masses that 
needs to be accounted for’.100 This does not mean that they were suffering from ‘false 
consciousness’, or irrationalism. It means rather than under certain conditions the 
historicised desire of the social field and the ‘group fantasy’101 of ‘the masses’ 
resonated together.  
In insisting on the congruity between the social world and unconscious desire, Deleuze 
and Guattari are arguing for the immanently political nature of the unconscious. In 
terms of the body, this suggests that the body is the outcome of the specific investments 
of desire in the social world, as well as the disciplinary outcome of the historicity of the 
social. In other words, the body appears in the space between desire and the social, and 
the same applies to interests. And this accounts for the character of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s prescriptions for revolutionary politics, which emphasise the liberation of 
desire over any policy or interest based action, which would leave the underlying 
configuration of the social world intact. Guattari said that ‘[b]y contrasting the two 
different types of social investment, we’re not contrasting desire, as some romantic 
luxury, with interests that are merely economic and political. We think, rather, that 
interests are always found and articulated at points pre-determined by desire’.102 Hence 
for a ‘revolutionary politics’ along Deleuze and Guattari’s lines, ‘it’s not a matter of 
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escaping “personally”... but of allowing something to escape... Desire never resists 
oppression, however local and tiny the resistance, without the challenge being 
communicated to the capitalist system as a whole, and playing its part in bursting it 
open’.103  
Deleuze and Guattari’s insistence that desire and the social are immediately related to 
each other may assist in a rethinking of the body and war by enabling a new perspective 
to emerge on the status of the concept of war. This can be explored if we equate ‘war’ 
with Deleuze’s ‘institution’. In line with the conviction that all being is immediately 
social and political, Deleuze theorises the institution as a framework within which 
desire is translated into interest. In other words, it is a device for the organisation of 
experience. He says that ‘money will liberate you from hunger, provided you have 
money; and marriage will spare you from searching out a partner, though it subjects you 
to other tasks. In other words, every individual experience presupposes, as an a priori, 
the existence of a milieu in which that experience is conducted’.104 It is possible to 
understand the military as an institution as being something which structures our 
experience and conditions the way in which interests are articulated and experienced. 
Deleuze says that ‘[e]very institution imposes a series of models on our bodies, even in 
its involuntary structures’.105 In other words, the military may be part of the 
institutional fabric of our experience. In this sense the military actually determines how 
interests are developed, how bodies are orientated, and thereby acts like a kind of social 
world of its own. 
Thinking war as an institution, however, creates a potentially misleading impression of 
the ways in which we interact with the idea of war, and the extent to which they 
permeate culture. There are multiple ways in which war is represented to us, composed 
of a plethora of tropes of heroism, suffering and patriotism. Representations also take 
the form of the compelling images of military technology in action, from Second World 
War tanks to the ‘spectacle’ of the First Gulf War. It is both historical, undergirding 
ideas of statehood and family relationships, and futuristic, incorporating high 
technology and the colonisation of new planets. We access these representations 
through the news, through film, through the proliferating set of computer games 
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concerned with wars past, present and future. Images of war are presented through 
multiple contradictory and irreconcilable messages and media, the fascination of which 
is evidenced by their very pervasiveness. I have suggested that social organisations and 
institutions owe their existence to their ability to channel or organise desire. They are 
invested with desire, and all subsequent subjective judgements emerge out of this 
relationship: the body itself is a consequence of this investment. Therefore it seems 
reasonable to propose that since the military may be understood as an institution, it may 
have a structuring effect on desire and thus come to form part of the background to 
social life. However, I want to suggest now that something does not have to be an 
institution to have this capacity to organise desire.  
Deleuze and Guattari are suspicious of the idea of ‘representation’. The problem with it 
is that it does not take account of difference, because representation is founded on the 
principle of the identity or similarity between image and the copy, in which the latter is 
inferior. Keith Ansell Pearson explains that ‘[i]n the crucial difference that Plato makes 
between the original and the image, and the model and the copy, the first term refers to 
the superior, founding identity in which the Idea is nothing other than what it is…and 
the copy it to be ‘judged’ in terms of its internal resemblance…[a system designed to] 
provide criteria for selecting the ‘good images’ (those that resemble) and eliminating 
the ‘bad’ ones (the simulacra)’.106 What this means is that both the ‘original’ and the 
‘copy’ are subject to a kind of restriction in which they are made to be coherent. In the 
case of the represented item, then this may mean extracting its essential features so that 
they may be replicated, and excluding the contingent and specific. Deleuze said that 
‘[i]t is strange that aesthetics (as the science of the sensible) could be founded on what 
can be represented’.107 So the problem of representing war would be: which war do we 
represent? Which aspect of war do we represent? But there is an additional problem 
with representation, based on Deleuze and Guattari’s commitment to ‘materialist 
psychiatry’.  
Deleuze and Guattari hold that desire is productive, and that it immanently invests the 
social field without mediation. However, the fact is that we do not always apprehend 
this unity, and indeed are frequently convinced that the body is private and non-
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political, that desire is only concerned with fantasy, and so on. It is representation 
which forges this separation by constructing a set of limited criteria by which desire can 
be interpreted. In the paradigmatic example, Oedipus purports to represent the 
unconscious, and thereby to provide the criteria by which it can be explained. 
Therefore, we never need know about the social and political potency of desire, because 
these can always be explained in terms of the terms set out by Oedipus. This the 
significance of Deleuze and Guattari’s aspiration to ‘blow up all of Oedipus and totally 
demolish its ridiculous claim to represent the unconscious, to triangulate the 
unconscious, to encompass the entire production of desire’.108 The problem with 
representation is that it produces ‘an unconscious that no longer produces but is content 
to believe’.109 Representation founds the distinction between the ideational/imaginary 
and the material.  
The point of thinking about war beyond representation is to expose the extent to which 
the idea of war is predicated upon the investment of desire. And it is here that the 
distinction between aesthetics and institutions collapses to a certain extent. Because 
there is nothing ‘frivolous’ or non-political about the circulating images of war which 
condition our understanding of it, any more than there is frivolity in the military 
institutions that are commissioned to undertake the actual work of war fighting. 
Accepting that cultural forms of war are ‘representations’ elides the extent to which 
they also depend upon investments of desire and assimilate themselves into the fabric of 
daily life. To dramatise this point, one could refer to the computer game America’s 
Army which was developed by the US Army to ‘provide civilians with insights on 
Soldiering from the barracks to the battlefields’.110 The extent to which games such as 
America’s Army can be accepted as ‘mere’ representations is very limited, particularly 
given the ever increasing synchrony between ‘recreational’ war games, and simulations 
used in military training.111 But the point is that one need not refer only to ‘high-tech’ 
simulations of war. Questioning the integrity of the concept of representation, it 
becomes possible to suggest that all ‘representations’ of war have a productive role in 
structuring desire, and that desire is productive in generating expressions of ‘war’.  
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Viewing desire as productive suggests that the images of war which populate our 
universe may be integral in structuring it. A Deleuzian perspective would suggest that, 
rather than being dismissed as representations, images and ideas about war are to be 
taken seriously as social and political entities as ‘real’ as government and military 
institutions. That is to say, ideas about war and images of war play an active part in 
constructing the social political landscape which forms the terrain of everyday life, 
because they are invested with desire. It is for this reason that it makes sense to say that 
we desire war, or are seduced by it. This is precisely not to say that we endorse it, but 
rather that it creates the conditions in which we make decisions. War is part of the 
historical conditions of life, and therefore part of the systems of social power which 
condition our existence to the extent that we may be considered Homo historia 112 from 
the very beginning. And this suggests that one cannot defeat war on the grounds of its 
irrationalism, since it provides the context for the distinction between the rational and 
the irrational.113 This should not be taken to imply, however, that because it forms part 
of the conditions for life, ‘war’ in all its multiple forms cannot be challenged. For 
example, Deleuze and Guattari say that ‘[a]rt often takes advantage of this property of 
desiring-machines by creating veritable group fantasies in which desiring-production is 
used to short-circuit social production’.114 Taking art seriously, in terms of desire and 
production rather than representation, means handing to it greater ‘revolutionary’ 
power.   
Reimagining the Body and War 
I have suggested that war has the capacity to structure experience by being part of the 
underlying conditions of everyday life within which ‘experiences’ take place. In this 
sense, war, as an aggregate collection of ideas, institutions and practices, has an 
ordering effect on life. But I have also suggested that war may unsettle the conditions of 
everyday life by constituting a new environment in which the usual rules and habits of 
social engagement do not apply. As an essentially unpredictable undertaking, war may 
have unexpected consequences for social life, releasing possibilities which were not 
originally present, or sufficiently powerful to take hold. In addition, the warzone itself 
may be characterised by a degree of chaos, or produce a heightened sensitivity which 
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makes new forces and sensations felt. As such, war appears as an event which unsettles 
the previously stable referents of the body, making it difficult to make sense of the new 
environment and the body’s role in it. This is indicated by a degree of disorientation and 
confusion of the body at war, whereby meanings and relationships slide into 
indeterminacy. The concept of the event in Deleuze is designed to refer to this situation 
in which something comes to the body from without, and transforms it. He says that 
‘[t]he event is always produced by bodies which collide, lacerate each other or 
interpenetrate, The flesh and the sword. But this effect itself is not of the order of 
bodies’.115 What this means is that we cannot employ the standard empiricist rules of 
causation to explain the transformation which the event produces in the body, because 
the transformation which takes place subverts and changes these rules themselves.  
While this appears confusing, the idea of the event is here intended to point to war as 
having the capacity to expose bodies to a new range of possibilities, thereby effecting a 
bodily transformation. The Deleuzian event is not an event in the conventional sense, in 
that it does not take place, and then become assimilated into experience without 
significantly changing it. This kind of event is a phenomenological one, in as much as it 
presumes a being to whom things happen. But this is not at all what Deleuze is 
interested in, because for him what is important is the transformation of being through 
exposure to an infinite range of possibilities. The event signals the openness of the 
body, where it is not possible to designate what the body is open to. So rather than 
being something that has happened, the event is something that might happen; or rather, 
it is a space within which anything might happen. Jack Reynolds says that ‘the event 
never actually happens, or is present; it is always that which has already happened, or is 
going to happen’.116  
This can be dramatised by another reference to Tim O’Brien’s character Paul Berlin, for 
whom the Vietnam War is understood through the prism of possibility. He is accused of 
speaking only in possibilities,117 and the story contains many instances in which it 
seems that ‘a genuine miracle to confound natural law’118 has made the impossible 
possible. He is aware that later, a framework will be imposed, and these chaotic and 
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seemingly impossible events ‘would become a war story’.119 The war is a slippery 
twilight zone in which facts and established knowledge cannot be made to cohere. But, 
contemplating his pre-war days, Paul Berlin suggests that this slipperiness, this lack of 
certainty, are not only features of ‘the war’, but are aspects of life which are immanent 
to life.120 In other words, one does not have to go to a specific place or wait for a 
specific politico-military occasion in order to be subject to an event in the Deleuzian 
sense. Rather, this possibility is a permanent feature of bodily life, whereby the body, a 
consequence of socio-political ordering, is always skating on the thin surface over 
disorder, and sometimes cracks may appear. The point is not to argue that war is the 
arena proper to the event, but that the event is a concept through which war may be 
explored, and which may disturb the positional status of war, so that we see 
‘breakdowns’ distant from the ‘warzone’ as being intimately connected with war.   
As well as being associated with uncertainty, war is also connected with a highly 
regulatory military system which has a disciplinary function on the bodies it commands. 
The military is concerned to simulate war, so that, should war occur, its soldiers will be 
pre-acclimatised to it to a certain extent. In this way it is associated with the 
manufacture of a certain kind of body: an especially obedient, resilient and strong one. 
In addition, I would suggest, it is engaged in producing a certain relationship between 
the body and technology so that this relationship becomes natural, and augments the 
capability of the body: it extends the range of what the body ‘can do’. Deleuze and 
Guattari suggest that bodies and technologies have to be understood in relation in a 
specific ‘assemblage’. For example, ‘[t]he lance and the sword came into being in the 
Bronze Age only by virtue of the man-horse assemblage... The stirrup, in turn, 
occasioned a new figure of the man-horse assemblage’.121 The term ‘assemblage’ here 
indicates a body of capability; the man-horse, which makes new weapons and new 
relations possible. Anthony Swofford recalls the slogan of US Marines: ‘This is my 
rifle. There are many like it but this one is mine. My rifle is my best friend. Without me, 
my rifle is nothing. Without my rifle, I am nothing’.122 What is important is the 
capability of the soldier and the rifle: of the soldier-rifle assemblage.  
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The consequences of a new assemblage cannot be foreordained. Each brings in new sets 
of relations and new possibilities which cannot be known in advance. As an example 
one could cite an unexpected outcome of Swofford’s war, ‘Gulf War syndrome’; an 
apparent consequence of the very soldier-drug assemblage which was intended to 
produce resilience and invulnerability. Moreover, ‘[a]ssemblages are passional, they are 
compositions of desire... the Eros of war changes’.123 There is always the chance that 
desire may escape or forge unexpected connections. The point is that the opposition 
between order and disorder is always in the process of collapsing: when things seem 
chaotic and fluid, there is a process of ‘making sense’, ascribing a narrative, telling a 
war story, establishing the facts. And similarly, the greatest efforts at producing order 
and predictability cannot help but unleash the forces of unpredictability and disorder as 
new connections are made. And this is why the body is so important as a perspective 
from which to view war. The body is always oscillating between ‘judgement, and the 
plane of consistency in which it unfurls and opens to experimentation’.124 It is the 
product of social disciplinary manufacture, which organises it and mandates certain 
modes of bodily expression and experience. This becomes part of the fabric of bodily 
life, like Bourdieu’s habitus, the ‘structuring structure’ which takes the form of 
‘embodied history, internalized as second nature and so forgotten as history’.125 
Recalling Spinoza’s ‘war cry’ the body is of ethical and political interest because it is 
also essentially unknown (and unknowable). Intimacy and immanence to this cipher to 
the unknown thereby makes it possible to think without the ‘common sense’ given by 
habit. The body is in a constant state of transformation, as it comes into contact with 
other bodies, and this transformation can never be known in advance but only 
deciphered as part of the process of transformation. Massumi says that ‘[a] body is 
defined by what capacities it carries from step to step. What these are exactly is 
changing constantly. A body’s ability to affect or be affected—its charge of affect—
isn’t something fixed’.126 As always ordering and disordering, the perspective of the 
body introduces the possibility of thinking the chaotic/disciplinary characteristics of 
war without contradiction, which is to say, without seeking a resolution or a middle 
ground. Rather organisation and disorganisation may be understood as tendencies of the 
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body, or ways in which the body might possibly interact with technology and other 
bodies. In the end, the concepts of ‘order’ and ‘disorder’ themselves must be judged on 
the type of body they produce. In other words, in thinking war, the aim is not to apply 
certain criteria to the body, to ascertain how organised (or otherwise) it is. Rather it is to 
think through the body under certain conditions and diagnose its changing possibilities.   
Conclusion: Producing Bodies, Producing War  
In this chapter I have tried to show the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari can be 
pressed into service to produce an understanding of the body which does not reduce it 
to being a mere object for knowledge. Rather, the body is highly contingent, and cannot 
be founded in biological readings which occlude the extent to which the way in which 
the body is experienced and expressed is highly socially particular. I have argued first 
of all that the body is always immediately political, both in the sense that it is the 
consequence of a certain work of artifice, and in the sense that its conformation with the 
strictures of a certain social form is a condition of possibility for the survival of that 
form. However, while it is the product of a work of social discipline, the body is not 
exhausted by any particular political iteration, as it always has the potential to be 
otherwise. This is evidenced by the ‘disorders’ and ‘deviations’ which afflict bodies 
which fail to conform to the socially prescribed mode of expression. But what is 
important is that the body is always in some senses unknown or uncertain, and we never 
know the limit of what it might become. In order to think with this uncertainty, the 
imperative is to avoid thinking the body in relation to a set of regulative normative 
criteria, and instead to think it in terms of the connections it makes and the 
transformations it undergoes, ‘transformation’ referring not to the change from one 
thing to another, but to the fluidity which is the immanent property of all things.  
In thinking war, I have tried to show that one must take seriously all the proliferating 
forms in which war is expressed or through which it resonates. One cannot confine 
considerations of war to policy documents, foreign policy activities or troop 
movements. Nor can one assume that there are theories which are proper to an 
understanding of war—deterrence theory, strategic theory, game theory—and those 
which are not. All modes of interaction with war, hallucinatory or ‘rationalistic’, are 
connected and must be taken equally seriously. For example, it has been suggested that 
deterrence theory became an article of faith in the US Administration during the Cold 
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War.127 The spectre of mutually assured destruction is the subject for O’Brien’s novel 
The Nuclear Age, in which the protagonist is haunted by the nightmare of nuclear war, 
the fear of which produces in him a variety of physical and psychological ‘disorders’. 
‘One minute I was sitting quietly in study hall, finishing up some geometry problems, 
then a dizzy-scrambly feeling came over me... topsy turvy, no traction... everybody 
yelled, “Give him air”. I almost laughed. I didn’t need air. I needed peace’.128 His 
parents, and later his wife and daughter, think he is crazy and irrational. But for Deleuze 
and Guattari, this distinction between the rational society and the irrational individual is 
predicated on an erroneous distinction between the two. For them, there is no such 
distinction. Deleuze and Guattari refuse to separate ‘the real object rationally produced 
on the one hand, and irrational, fantasizing production on the other’.129 There is only a 
certain structure to the investment of desire which produces the ‘irrational’. Each 
society produces a specific kind of ‘madness’.  
Deleuze and Guattari say that ‘it is not possible to attribute a special form of existence 
to desire, a mental or psychic reality that is presumably different from the material 
reality of social production’.130 It follows that one cannot distinguish the serious 
business of war from the ‘frivolous’ production of ‘recreational war images’ such as 
films, video games and so on: they are all structuring, and structured by, desire. The 
suggestion is that ‘desire constitutes the very texture of society in its totality’.131 But 
what this means is that art, for instance, can make a meaningful intervention into the 
social world, for it is to be taken no less seriously than a military coup. In fact, it should 
be taken more seriously, since a military coup would be in some senses in accordance 
with the existing logic of society, whereas art can produce a questioning of this logic, or 
even bring about its downfall. elin O’Hara slavick’s work creates maps of the sites of 
US bombing, decorated with beautiful, abstract colours which seem to be at odds with 
the horror of the events which took place there.132 But it is possible to suggest that this 
is a kind of reclamation, providing a new way to respond to the unthinkable through the 
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‘open-endedness in form and content’.133 In addition, slavick’s splodges of paint push 
to the limit the abstraction and ‘dangerously awesome beauty of war’134 which is 
particularly evident in air war. In this sense, the work aspires to reclaim this beauty, and 
these views from above, from their militarised context. In addition, perhaps the 
paintings succeed in producing an ‘unexpected memory’135 dramatising the extent to 
which war is personal and intimate.  
There are significant implications for how we think about war and the body arising 
from the Deleuzian perspective outlined here. If we are enjoined to think about the body 
without constraining it with definitions and judgemental concepts, then it becomes 
unclear which bodies we should be thinking when considering the body at war: what is 
a military body? What is not? For concentrating on ‘soldiers’, for example, brings with 
it an panoply of attendant assumptions about what a soldier properly is, does, and can 
do, and therefore constrains a thinking through the body that takes an exploratory 
approach to these questions. It is also too restrictive in terms of its accounting for 
individual involvement in war. Jean-Paul Sartre writes that ‘[w]hen a peasant falls in a 
rice paddy, every one of us is hit... little by little the whole human race is being 
subjected to this genocidal blackmail piled on top of atomic blackmail’.136 But it is not 
only in terms of the moral accountability for war that we are all connected to it, but due 
to the extent to which images and affects of war pervade our culture and our politics. 
Insofar as war is part of the social imaginary, we are all ‘military bodies’. A dimension 
of discussing the body at war must therefore surely involve an ongoing reflection on our 
own relationship with war, and the extent to which we are fascinated, appalled, 
horrified, and so on. Through these affects, we produce a war of a certain kind. 
Therefore account must be taken of the production of war as well as of war’s 
production of bodies, in order to illuminate an understanding of war and the body which 
sees neither as fixed and determinate, but rather as being engaged in an ongoing process 
of co-production.   
 
                                                          
133 Carol Mavor ‘Blossoming Bombs’ pp. 13-33 in Ibid. p. 27 
134 Ibid. p. 30 
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Chapter 5 
 
Shell Shock and the Deterritorialised Body 
 
Who are these? Why sit they here in twilight? 
Wherefore rock they, purgatorial shadows, 
Drooping tongues from jaws that slob their relish, 
Baring teeth that leer like skulls' teeth wicked? 
Stroke on stroke of pain, - but what slow panic, 
Gouged these chasms round their fretted sockets? 
Ever from their hair and through their hands' palms 
Misery swelters. Surely we have perished 
Sleeping, and walk hell; but who these hellish? 
- These are men whose minds the Dead have ravished. 
Memory fingers in their hair of murders, 
Multitudinous murders they once witnessed. 
Wading sloughs of flesh these helpless wander, 
Treading blood from lungs that had loved laughter. 
Always they must see these things and hear them, 
Batter of guns and shatter of flying muscles, 
Carnage incomparable, and human squander 
Rucked too thick for these men's extrication.  
Wilfred Owen ‘Mental Cases’.1   
 
Arthur Hurst, a Major with the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC), reported a case of 
apparent shell shock. ‘Private M’ ‘became dazed and lost the power of speech... He 
believed he was still in the trenches which were being heavily shelled; his pupils were 
widely dilated and he sweated profusely... In his dreams he saw the ghosts of Germans 
he had bayoneted come to take their revenge on him... Repatriated to England, Private 
M became paralysed from the neck down, lost all memory’.2 Both Owen and Hurst, the 
poet and the medic, can be seen struggling to express the phenomenon of shell shock. 
They describe soldiers being lost to the present, suffering from mysterious bodily 
paralyses and malfunctions, disabled by the war, but not straightforwardly through 
injury. These men were transformed by the war, but they were not changed into a form 
of body or subject that could be unproblematically named or understood. The 
                                                          
1 Wilfred Owen ‘Mental Cases’ at http://users.fulladsl.be/spb1667/cultural/owen/mental-cases.html 
Accessed 29/04/09  
2 In Charles S. Myers Shell Shock in France 1914-1918 :Cambridge: The University Press 1940 p. 14 
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disordered bodies and fractured psyches of soldiers could stand at once as a haunting 
critique of the cruelty of the war, as symptoms of a flawed or defective manhood, or as 
an indictment of a society which had lost its will and resolve. But they also have the 
potential to express the degree to which these categories of body, war, and society, are 
more fragile and more interconnected than might be supposed.    
The First World War has been the subject of a wealth of literature, scholarly work and 
artistic representation. For many, it stands as an epochal event which gave birth to the 
bloody twentieth century3 and which brought to a close the golden Edwardian 
innocence which had gone before.4 In addition to its social impact, the catastrophic 
effects of the First World War on the human body have been well documented.5 All of 
this seems to call into question the value of selecting the First World War as the 
perspective through which to suggest some fresh approaches relationship between the 
body and war. However, I want to suggest that it is precisely this highly represented, 
intensely historicised character which makes the First World War a potentially fruitful 
perspective through which to see the body and war differently. From a certain angle, it 
would appear that we know a lot of the important information about the First World 
War as an event: we know when it began and ended, and there is a general convergence 
of historical thinking surrounding its causes and broad geo-political effects. In this 
sense, the First World War seems thoroughly embedded in the past. However, this 
image of a past (and passed) discreet historical event can be unsettled through the figure 
of the shell shocked body, for whom the war will not pass, and in whom the 
unpredictable and affective effects of the war resonate, irresolvable by technological 
discourses about the geopolitical causes and effects of the war.  
At the same time, the body itself was unsettled by the war, and the contingency of its 
construction exposed. The shell shocked body did not function in prescribed ways, and 
subverted the categories which had habitually been used to contain and explain bodies, 
for example ‘courage’, ‘manliness’ and the triumph of the will over the body. 
Foundations for understanding the body were disturbed, and this created the possibility 
for the unknown aspects of the body to momentarily appear. In Deleuzian terms, we 
                                                          
3 See Eric Hobsbawm The Age of Extremes: 1914-1991 London: Abacus 2003  
4 See Paul Fussell The Great War and Modern Memory Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000 (3rd ed.). 
For a critique see Lynne Hanley Writing War: Fiction, Gender, and Memory Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press 1991   
5 See especially Leo Van Bergen Before my Helpless Sight: Suffering, Dying, and Military Medicine on 
the Western Front 1914-1918  London: Ashgate 2009 
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might say that the war and the body deterritorialised each other. What this means is that 
their relationship effected a movement from a system of organised ‘things’ with 
coherent identities, to a more indeterminate system of becoming which functions not by 
identity but by affect.6 Bringing war and the body into relation in this way, it may be 
possible to see both of them differently, not as discreet objects or historical moments 
with coherent identities, but as entering into an affective relationship with each other. 
Of course, this does not mean that identity has no role to play. On the contrary, 
emphasising the contingent and constructed nature of ‘war’ and ‘the body’, it becomes 
possible to ask how these constructions are carried out. I aim to show the multiple ways 
in which the shell shocked body was constructed and explained. I have suggested that 
the shell shocked body rendered problematic the categories habitually used for 
constructing the body, but, in ways in which I will develop below, the disordered body 
was re-ordered and re-constructed in accordance with various images of the body. To 
return to Deleuzian terminology, we might say that reterritorialisation accompanies 
deterritorialisation. The ‘coming undone’ of deterritorialisation7 is always followed by 
a process of remaking a subject, albeit possibly a ‘flawed’ one which suffers from 
‘neurosis, perversion, and psychosis’.8  
I am suggesting that there are multiple ‘apparatuses of capture’9 to which the body is 
subject. If it fails to conform to the social regulatory norm, there are other disciplinary 
structures which construct and regulate disordered ‘deviant’ bodies. Deleuze says of the 
schizophrenic that ‘the one who does not allow himself to be Oedipalized is 
psychoticized in the land of the asylum; when the one who escapes the family and the 
asylum is perverted in the artificial locales’.10 In other words, there are multiple modes 
of bodily organisation or ‘reterritorialisation’, and flights of the body from organisation 
and regulation are always subject to recapture. Being named as such, deviant bodies are 
replaced on the hierarchy of bodies and organised relative to the ‘normal majority’. 
However, the departure of bodies from the normal ordered standard has an effect on this 
standard, causing it to be brought into question, and weakening it as an organising 
                                                          
6 Allusions to deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation exist throughout Anti-Oedipus. See Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari (trans Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane) Anti-Oedipus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia London: Continuum 2004  
7 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p.354 
8 Ibid. p. 353 
9 This phrase is taken from A Thousand Plateaus. See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (trans. and 
foreword Brian Massumi) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia London: Continuum 2004 
p. 468 
10 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p 351 
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force. Deleuze says that ‘deterritorialization is always double, because it implies the 
coexistence of a major variable and a minor variable in simultaneous becoming’.11 
What this suggests is that the shell shocked body (the minor term) and the ‘normal’ 
soldiers’ body (the major term) unsettle each other through their proximity, and the 
parameters of both are changed.  
This chapter examines the shell shocked body in the First World War in order to expand 
on the question of how a Deleuzian perspective can assist us in rethinking the body and 
war. I structure this exploration through the Deleuzian concepts of deterritorialisation 
and reterritorialisation. I focus initially on the reterritorialisation of the shell shocked 
body: on the analytic and disciplinary tools which were used to make sense of the body 
and to ensure that it fitted into the broader social organisation of bodies. Construction 
and description are seen as part of the same process of organising and subdividing 
bodies in such a way as they may be ‘managed’. Therefore, the way in which shell 
shocked bodies were named, diagnosed and treated are all relevant in tracing the way in 
which the body is disciplined. The goal was generally to return the body in question to 
the front in a useful state. However, even where this was not possible, the task of 
naming and treating the shell shocked soldier was necessary to render the body 
comprehensible within the existing social order, and to orientate it relative to ‘normal 
bodies’ and to other categories of ‘lunatic’.12 I try to show the ways in which therapists 
attempted to return the shell shocked body to a ‘normal’ body image. In the second 
section, I focus on the moments of deterritorialisation which existed between the body 
and war, and which put the coherence of both identities into question. Through this 
reading I try to show that the body and war may be understood not only through the 
language of bio-medicine and geo-politics, but that they may also be understood to be 
in a dynamic relationship of co-existence and co-becoming.  
                                                          
11 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p. 338 
12 Fiona Reid points out that, in England, care was taken to differentiate shell shocked men from 
‘ordinary lunatics’. See Fiona Reid ‘Distinguishing between Shell-shocked Veterans and Pauper 
Lunatics: The Ex-Services’ Welfare Society and Mentally Wounded Veterans after the Great War’ pp. 
347-371 in War in History 2007 Vol. 14, No. 3 
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Territorialisation  
Introducing Shell Shock: Naming and Diagnosis   
Contemporary theoreticians of the problem of shell shock suggested that ‘never before 
in the history of mankind have the stresses and strains laid upon body and mind been so 
great or so numerous as in the present [First World] war. We may therefore expect to 
find many cases which present not a single disease, not even a mixture, but a chemical 
compound of diseases, so to speak’.13 Shell shock presented a challenge to diagnosis 
because of the way in which it seemed to complicate the parameters of individual 
responsibility, and the boundary between the individual and the wider community. Not 
only this, but the eventual grudging recognition that ‘even highly moral men can be 
subject to shell shock’14 challenged the notion that will-power could be the supreme 
determinant of manliness, as well as the idea that war was the proper arena in which 
this masculinity was exercised and developed.15 As a consequence, the idea that the 
body and mind were mirrors of each other, and that will-power could exercise total 
control over them both, came under threat. In this section I wish to explore the ways in 
which conceptions of shell shock reflected a certain image of the ‘normal’ body, and its 
relationship to society and to ‘the mind’. I suggest that the condition could be said to 
have emerged as a kind of borderline disorder which positioned it in disturbing 
proximity to the ‘normal body’. I discuss this in the context of Deleuze’s work on 
diagnosis and the work of constructing a certain kind of (in this case, degenerate) body.  
The psychological and psycho-somatic diseases of shell shock were prefigured by a rise 
in apparently ‘hysterical’ conditions around the turn of the twentieth century which 
were generally ascribed to accelerating industrialisation. For example, ‘railway spine’ 
was an apparently hysterical paralysis which was found in people who had been in train 
crashes but who had escaped seemingly uninjured, only to be stricken in subsequent 
days. The rising prominence of nervous disorders led one doctor in 1909 to suggest that 
‘[n]ervous breakdown is the disease of our age’.16 The implication was that the socio-
economic conditions were active in the production of a certain kind of psychological 
                                                          
13 G. Elliot Smith and T.H. Pear Shell-Shock and its Lessons Manchester: Manchester University Press 
1917 p. 2 
14 George L. Mosse ‘Shell-shock as a Social Disease’ pp. 101-108 in Journal of Contemporary History 
2000 Vol. 35, No. 1 p. 105  
15 See Jessica Meyer ‘Separating the Men from the Boys: Masculinity and Maturity in Understandings of 
Shell Shock in Britain’ pp. 1-22 in Twentieth Century British History 2009 Vol. 20, No. 1 
16 Ben Shephard A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists 1914-1994 London: Pimlico 2002 p. 10 
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disorder. However, co-existent with this was the view that only people who were 
already in some senses defective succumbed to nervous disorders. George L. Mosse 
writes that ‘already in 1888 during the American Civil War, a report on soldiers’ 
afflictions ... singled out those not able to adjust to the hardships of war as young men 
of feeble will and highly developed imaginative faculties’.17 Though war neuroses 
predated the First World War, only then did they appear on such as scale that ‘it was 
first recognized as a problem that necessitated serious military-medico diagnosis’.18 The 
inability to cope with stresses was associated with certain groups, for example, the 
Irish,19 and it has been suggested that, in the German case, the demarcation of certain 
groups as latently psychologically defective segued into a post-war racism. Mosse says 
that ‘a line can be drawn from the wartime perception of shell-shock to the postwar 
defamation of left-wing and racial enemies. They also were suffering from the same 
unpatriotic social disease, except that if they were of an inferior race there was no 
cure’.20 In this sense ‘shell shock’ signifies a failure to live up to the expectations of the 
state.  
Because of the extent to which ‘shell shock’ was infused with assumptions about the 
proper function of the body and the moral failing behind bodily weakness,21 diagnosis 
and judgement were inextricably linked. The term ‘shell shock’ was first used by 
Charles S. Myers, and in the first instance the symptoms were thought to be the result of 
being too close to an exploding shell and suffering from the compression and release of 
poisonous gasses.22 This conviction of an organic cause became implausible, and was 
eventually supplanted by a more thoroughly ‘psychological’ view, and the term ‘shell 
shock’ was banned by the Army Medical Service in 1917,23 having become a 
stigmatised term.24 From 1915, instructions were that the ‘shell shocked’ individual be 
                                                          
17 George L. Mosse ‘Shell-shock as a Social Disease’ p. 102 
18 Wendy Holden Shell Shock London Channel 4 1998 p. 7 
19 Joanna Bourke ‘Effeminacy, Ethnicity and the End of Trauma: The Sufferings of ‘Shell-shocked’ Men 
in Great Britain and Ireland, 1914-39’ pp. 57-69 in Journal of Contemporary History 2000 Vol. 35, No. 1 
20 George L. Mosse ‘Shell-shock as a Social Disease’ p. 107 
21 See Joanna Bourke Dismembering the Male: Men’s Bodies, Britain and the Great War London: 
Reaktion 1996, Chapter 1 
22 Cathryn Corns and John Hughes-Wilson Blindfold and Alone: British Military Executions in the Great 
War London: Cassell 2005 p. 73; Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely ‘The Impact of Total War on the 
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judged differentially according to whether their trauma was proven to be the direct 
consequence of enemy action, or whether it came after engagement of the enemy and 
was therefore more ‘psychological’ in character. This led to some men being classified 
as either ‘shell shock—wounded’ or shell-shock—sick’.25 The latter attracted far less 
sympathy, and problems resulted from the time delay caused by attempts to discover 
into which category an individual properly fell.  
The diagnosis and judgement of shell shock reveals the way in which the body was 
fractured along certain lines. For example, a purely psychological reaction to the war 
was regarded with a scepticism which did not attach to those who were physically 
injured. Physical injury was seen as being something which could happen to anyone, or 
was even read as a sign of heroism. In this way, a distinction was made between body 
and mind in which the latter was supposed to have complete mastery over the former. 
However, not only did shell shock and other nervous disorders complicate the 
relationship between body and mind, but they also blurred the boundary between 
individual or minority group responsibility and general social phenomena, so that it 
became possible simultaneously to suggest that neurosis was the consequence of 
industrialisation, and to argue that it was an affliction of enfeebled individuals or 
denigrated social groups. Finally, the boundary between a shell-shocked soldier and a 
‘normally traumatised’ one was at times unclear. Pleading before an Army Medical 
Board for his friend Siegfried Sassoon to be labelled ‘shell-shocked’, Robert Graves 
burst into tears several times, leading a ‘well known Harley Street psychologist’ in 
attendance to remark, “Young man, you ought to be before this board yourself”.26 
Moreover, the boundary between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ could be very small in 
temporal terms, with cases moving from one to the other in a very short space of time. 
Charles S Myers observed that ‘[s]everal of my cases have been so temporary as to pass 
the border line from insanity to sanity while under care here [at a Casualty Clearing 
Station]’.27The work of conceptualising and diagnosing shell shock amounted to an 
effort to construct and organise distinctions between body, mind, and society.  
Deleuze discusses the way in which the work of identifying symptoms and gathering 
them into a ‘disease’ is creative in ways analogous to the author’s work of creating a 
                                                          
25 Cathryn Corns and John Hughes-Wilson Blindfold and Alone p. 74 
26 Robert Graves Goodbye to All That London: Penguin Books 2000 p. 216 
27 Charles S. Myers Shell Shock in France 1914-1918 p. 83 
175 
 
fictional character. A character in a novel is the embodiment and dramatisation of a 
certain way of life. It is not so much the personality and the individuality of the 
protagonist in question which matters, but the way in which they are the expression of a 
certain way of living, bringing together certain characteristics and aspects to produce a 
certain effect. He suggests that symptomatology, which is ‘the isolation of a set of signs 
which belong properly to that disease’28 is to medicine what character-creation is to 
literature. For Deleuze, medicine is both etiology (the discovery of causes) and 
symptomatology (the organisation of signs), and it is the latter which makes diagnosis 
resemble a work of art or literature. Deleuze says that ‘‘[e]tiology, which is the 
scientific or experimental side of medicine, must be subordinated to symptomatology, 
which is its literary, artistic aspect’’.29 The physician is somehow engaged organising 
the multiple expressions of deviation from ‘normal’ bodily behaviour, and deeming 
them to be indicative of (to be signs of) an umbrella syndrome designated ‘shell shock’.  
In other words, the physician must interpret certain behaviours and feelings as signs of 
something else (a broader clinical phenomenon) before naming this syndrome.    
Of course, the identification and organisation of signs is not ‘simply’ a matter of 
representation. As I outlined in the previous chapter, Deleuze and Guattari are troubled 
by the role of representation in psychoanalysis, because of the way in which it places 
constraints on the way in which signs must be interpreted. They are never in 
themselves, but are always understood with reference to some theory about what certain 
signs or symptoms ‘really’ mean. In the case of the Oedipus Complex, for example, its 
powers of explanation ‘are ideological forms, which have taken the place of units of 
production’.30 The effect of this is to materially restrict the extent to which desire 
invests the social world directly and is seen as so doing, for the ideological forms act as 
a mirror which reflects desire back onto the individual body. Thus, the individual is 
pathologised and society is exonerated and allowed to continue unaffected. The danger 
is that diagnosis becomes a conservative device which underwrites the bodily ideal 
when it names deviance from it. The extent to which the diagnosis itself is a product of 
a certain socio-political configuration of power is elided by the re-inscription of signs 
onto the body itself. The danger is the diagnosis takes place with respect to the ‘normal’ 
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ego, and therefore takes the form of an identification of the avenues of departure from 
this.31  
H.C. Marr wrote in 1919 that ‘[n]umerous anomalies of the bodily framework and 
organs are now universally acknowledged as indications of mental deficiency, 
backwardness and instability’;32 the idea being that physical features could be used as a 
diagnostic tool to reveal underlying psychological defects. The causes of these could be 
heredity,33 physical damage34 or nervous strain without physical damage.35 The work is 
one of gathering up various expressions and behaviours and returning them to a body 
which can be apprehended as an object for knowledge. This process changed bodies and 
changed the knowledge that was held about them. But it also revealed much about the 
way in which bodies are (re-)constructed, and the lapses in this process through which 
we can see the escape of desire, or the reservoir of the unknown, which lies behind 
every body. I expand on the idea of the construction of a divided body in the section on 
psychoanalysis and shell shock below.  
The Ego and the Divided Body 
The ego was one device through which to explain and constrain the unruly body of the 
shell-shocked soldier. The psychoanalytic approach tended to posit the cause of shell 
shock as residing within the ego, or as being caused by a crisis in the ego triggered by 
war. In this way, the body and the ego are presented as being functionally independent, 
albeit with mediated relations between them. I discuss the way in which this body/war 
relation is produced and what is excluded or taken for granted by it. Moreover, in 
producing shell shock as a personal and somehow internally generated dysfunction, the 
wider socio-political implications of it are concealed. The political character of bodily 
expression is excluded both in terms of the causes of shell shock and in terms of its 
consequences.36 As a therapeutic stratagem, psychoanalysis was of limited utility in the 
First World War, not least because it was too time-consuming. In addition, there was 
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arguably a suspicion of psychoanalysis in Britain,37 because of a general ‘physicalist’ 
bias, and due to a distaste for what were seen as its excessively sexual preoccupations.38 
This notwithstanding, it became incorporated into British practice in diluted form.39 
Moreover, it was often regarded as being a more ‘humane’ counterpoint to some more 
‘physical’ methods which will be explored in further detail below.  
Shell shock presented a challenge to Freud in terms of the need to establish the extent to 
which ‘war neurosis’ was a specific form of neurosis separate to that seen in peacetime. 
Freud argued that ‘most of the neurotic conditions which had been brought about by the 
war disappeared on the cessation of the war conditions’,40 and therefore that the war 
must be active in producing a certain kind of neurosis, which must nonetheless be 
explicable in terms of the ego. He determined that the war produced a certain form of 
ego conflict which accounted for the symptoms of neurosis or ‘shell shock’. War 
neuroses were understood to be the consequence of ‘the conflict [which] takes place 
between the old ego of peace time and the new war-ego of the soldier, and it becomes 
acute as soon as the peace-ego is faced with the danger of being killed through the risky 
undertakings of his newly formed parasitical double. Or one might put it, the old ego 
protects itself from the danger to life by flight into the traumatic neurosis in defending 
itself against the new ego which it recognises as threatening its life’.41 These are distinct 
from a ‘traumatic neurosis’ which does not depend on any ego conflict, and occurs after 
a fright even in peacetime.42  
This conflict arose in part because ‘[t]he manhood of a nation is in war not only 
allowed, but encouraged and ordered to indulge in behaviour of a kind that is 
thoroughly abhorrent to the civilised mind, to commit deeds and witness sights that are 
thoroughly revolting to our aesthetic and moral disposition’.43 One ego was bound by 
the norms of war, the other by the norms of peace, and this produced violent conflict 
between them. But the question is also one of narcissism, because the flight from this 
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conflict which neurosis was the expression of was based on the desire for self-
preservation, or even simply for an easier life. In a speech given at the ‘Fifth 
International Psycho-Analytical Congress’, Freudian analyst Dr. S. Ferenczi argued that 
there was an element of ‘wish fulfilment’ in war neurosis, according to which the 
patient has an interest in a military pension, security away from the front, and so on. To 
support this point, he argued that ‘traumatic neuroses are practically never seen in 
prisoners of war. The prisoners of war have no interest in remaining sick after being 
captured... The theory of mechanistic shock can never explain to us this difference in 
the behaviour of our own soldiers and prisoners of war’.44  
The (divided) ego is posited as being the foundation upon which the shell-shocked45 
body may be understood. These active components in the production of disorder are 
isolated from the ‘organic’ or ‘mechanistic’ aspects of the body, which must be 
presented as being irrelevant to the understanding of shell shock. Dismissing the 
connection between physical trauma and shell shock, Karl Abraham insisted that ‘men 
who have received severe organic injuries show such mental attitudes which must 
surprise us. For example, I have always found that in the amputation hospitals a 
strikingly cheerful mood prevails’.46 Physical symptoms which are manifested as part 
of the neurosis are precisely only symptoms of something mental: ‘all physical 
symptoms represent conversions of something psychical’,47 since ‘[t]he body is the 
instrument of the mind upon which it (the mind) allows its unconscious to manifest 
itself in plastic and mimic expression’.48 Paul Lerner suggests that ‘[i]n their steadfast 
rejection of traumatic pathology, psychiatrists implicitly denied the traumatizing impact 
of war as a whole and in many cases embraced it as a positive influence on the minds of 
individuals and the spirit of the nation’.49 Psychoanalysis enabled its practitioners to be 
positive towards the war while continuing to treat those whom it had ravaged by 
dividing the ego off from ‘the body’ (narrowly conceived).  
In order to preserve the ego and the wider psyche as the privileged domain for causation 
and explanation, it was necessary for the psychoanalysts to demarcate the ego from the 
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physical body so that hurt or trauma to the latter could not be a causal factor in 
disorders of the former. Influence was seen to run from the ego to the body, which was 
only the ‘instrument of the mind’ so that all disorders of war could be seen to originate 
from within the neurotic. As Lerner points out, many psychoanalysts were actually firm 
adherents to the idea that the experience of war could be highly beneficial in curing a 
‘“decaying culture... [and a] degenerate nervous epoch”’.50 He quotes a doctor as saying 
that “[t]he experience of war causes things that concern the individual ego to appear 
less significant, the attention is devoted to the body populace [Volkskörper], the 
individual feels no longer in the center of things, rather as a member of the whole 
nation”.51 War can overcome the narcissistic impulses of the ego. What this indicates is 
that the coherence of the ego is of the utmost importance, while the body is only 
incidental. As long as a soldier is fully invested in the body-politic, then it should not 
matter that his own flesh is damaged.  
From a Deleuzian point of view, there is a homology between the coherence of the 
subject and the coherence of the body: ‘The dissolutions of the logical identity of the 
subject has as its correlate the physical disintegration of the organic body’.52 The 
endurance of this arrangement is dependent upon the wider social order which regulates 
desire in such a way so as to support the organised body, for it cannot depend on any 
foundation in nature. In many instances, Deleuze uses theistic language to express the 
way in which the integrity of the body and the self are anchored to each other. For 
example, he says that ‘[e]very time desire is betrayed... a priest is behind it’,53 adding 
that ‘[t]he most recent figure of the priest is the psychoanalyst’.54 What is meant by the 
‘betrayal’ of desire is that this priest figure strives to bind it to the individual 
subject/body who is subject only to personal desires, hallucinations and nightmares 
which have nothing to do with the rest of society and mean only that this individual has 
failed to overcome some issue from their childhood, or to resolve their relationship with 
their parents.  
Continuing in this language of religiosity, Deleuze says that ‘[Pierre] Klossowski insists 
that God is the sole guarantor of the identity of the self and of its substantive base, that 
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is, of the integrity of the body. One cannot conserve the self without also holding on to 
God. The death of God essentially signifies, and essentially entails, the dissolution of 
the self: God’s tomb is also the tomb of the self’.55 What is meant by ‘God’ here? I 
suggest that ‘God’ refers to the capacity for judgement, specifically, the judgement 
between things; the capacity to distinguish between one thing or being and another, and 
to assign them relations of priority with respect to each other.56 In order for the 
psychoanalyst to be able to determine what is properly of the ego, what of the body and 
what of the world, he must operate in a social environment which is structured such as 
to make such distinctions possible. That is to say, God (an organised social structure) 
must exist in order for the psychoanalyst/priest to do his work of binding desire to the 
ego. This being the case, the body is accorded a position inferior to that of the ego, and 
is given no positive creative power of its own.  
However, if we question or refuse the social conditions and underlying assumptions 
which serve as the conditions of possibility for the hierarchical organisation of the ego, 
body, and social world, it becomes more difficult to make these psychoanalytic 
distinctions. Deleuze and Guattari argue that ‘[f]rom the alienated starting point of our 
pseudo-sanity, everything is equivocal. Our sanity is not ‘true’ sanity. Their madness is 
not ‘true’ madness. The madness of our patients is an artefact of the destruction 
wreaked on them by us and on them by themselves. Let no one suppose we meet ‘true’ 
madness any more than we are truly sane... True sanity entails in one way or another the 
dissolution of the normal ego’.57 It might seem curious or even callous to suggest that 
the shell shocked soldier is not absolutely more ‘insane’ than the non-shell shocked one, 
given the level of suffering involved. However, Deleuze does not mean to argue that the 
sane or the insane are any ‘happier’. Indeed, ‘pleasure’ (or ‘happiness) is problematic 
for Deleuze because it is concerned with reinforcing the organised body/coherent 
subject.58 In other words, pleasure is personal: I feel it. Moreover, the ‘mad’, those who 
are dissolved bodies and dispersed identities, ‘know incredible sufferings’.59  
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I have tried to show that psychoanalytic understandings of shell shock involved 
dividing the body into the essential and the inessential, the active and the passive. The 
commitments of the Freudian psychoanalysts meant that it was necessary for them to 
see shell shock in terms of a disorder of the ego, where the ego was somehow doubled 
between a ‘war ego’ and a ‘peace ego’ which were in conflict and in need of 
reconciliation. Dismissing the wider affects and responses of the body as mere 
epiphenomena of the ego meant that the body was merely a passive reflection of the 
inner workings of the psyche. This sets up a distinction between the surface (the body), 
which was in need of interpretation in the light of the analysts inner knowledge of the 
depth (the psyche), which was the real source of all disorder and therefore the only 
possible site for its resolution. Contrary to this order of priority, Deleuze insists upon 
the privileged status of the surface,60 which is the space for becoming and change. This 
is in part because the notion of depth creates a distinction between the ego and the 
world which can only be bridged by mediation (through images and behaviours which 
require interpretation by the analyst). Moreover, the schism between the soldier and the 
war is absolute, since the internal ego is the source of all disorder, and the fate of the 
body make no impact upon it.  
Speech, Therapy and the Shell Shocked Body  
Shell shock had multiple bodily expressions or symptoms, which were found to be 
differentially distributed among soldiers of different levels of seniority. For example, 
officers were twice as likely to suffer from shell shock as those in the ranks.61 On the 
other hand, officers were less likely to suffer from physical paralysis, the suggestion 
being that their more ‘complex and varied’ mental life meant that they did not need to 
take recourse to these crude physical forms of shell shock.62 However, this does not 
mean that no officers suffered from paralysis, blindness or mutism.63 I want here to 
address the phenomenon of ‘mutism [and] hysterical mutism’64 as a component of shell 
shock. This is interesting from the point of view of the body because it entails a 
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rejection of the way in which the body is supposed to function, and a refusal to carry 
out the duties which it ought to carry out. This should not be taken to imply a conscious 
decision to refuse or reject. Rather the body itself is the source of this 
reconceptualisation of its social function, in which it ceases to function as an organism 
‘ought’. Moreover, the treatment may be understood as being a disciplinary measure 
which insists that the fractured body articulate itself as an organised body once more.  
It was not uncommon for a shell shocked soldier to be “entirely mute, unable to make 
the slightest sound, whistle or blow”.65 This made the ego inaccessible from a 
therapeutic perspective, and therefore presented a problem in terms of treatment. The 
history of the treatment of mutism and paralysis in the First War World often focuses 
on the work of L.R. Yealland, who was, according to Ben Shephard, ‘a medical 
primitive... who revealed a talent for treating hysterical patients—driving the devils of 
paralysis and mutism from their bodies with evangelical fervour and electric shocks’.66 
Yealland’s approach has been criticised on the grounds that it was inhumane, and that 
he deployed the inequality of power between him and the patient in order to ensure their 
compliance.67 It is significant, however, in terms of the way in which the body is 
disciplined into becoming again subordinate to the powers of language and reason, and 
due to what it reveals about the importance of speech in sustaining an organised body. 
The problem of mutism in shell shock is illuminating in terms of the work of making 
sense (of war), and the extent to which the body is implicated in this.   
Yealland’s technique generally involved restraining the patient in a darkened room and 
informing them that they would be unable to leave until ‘cured’. He then applied 
electric shocks (‘faradic current’) to the larynx (in the case of mutism) while asking the 
patient to speak. Reporting on the treatment of a 24 year old private suffering from 
persistent mutism, Yealland said that ‘[p]lacing the pad electrode on the lumbar spines 
and attaching the long pharyngeal electrode, I said to him, “You will not leave this 
room until you are talking again; no, not before”... a strong faradic current was applied 
to the posterior wall of the pharynx... “Remember, you must behave as becomes the 
hero I expect you to be,” I said’.68 Becoming distressed, and convinced that electric 
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current was the route to cure; the patient requested that more shocks be applied to speed 
the process up. Yealland responded “[s]uggestions are not wanted from you; they are 
not needed. When the time comes for more electricity you will be given it, whether you 
wish it or not”.69 Finally, the patient can speak. “Are you glad to have made such 
progress [Yealland asked]?” I expected him to answer me, but he did not; instead he 
began to cry and whispered in a stammer “I want a drink of water”.70 
The point is not to pass judgement on Yealland’s apparently harsh methods, although 
Joanna Bourke suggests that they contained ‘a strong element of torture’.71 The purpose 
is rather to investigate the ways in which speech and discipline come together to form a 
certain image of the body and to repress the fractures in this body image and conceal 
the extent to which it is a political construct. It is possible to suggest that the body-
image may be somehow shattered through war, and the mute or paralysed body is a 
form of expression of this, revealing at the same time the extent to which the ‘organised 
body’ is a political product rather than being a natural one. In this sense, the project of 
making the body speak and move as it should entails erasing the body’s capacity to 
express the sense and affect of war, and to return the body to its passive and subordinate 
position. Deleuze said that ‘language brings the identity of a person and the integrity of 
a body together in a responsible self, but maintains a silence about all the forces which 
cause the dissolution of this self’.72 There are things of which one cannot speak in as 
much as that speaking is about identity and integrity, so speaking of the forces of 
dissolution and the disorganised body must be a different kind of expression.  
For Deleuze, language does not originate with those who speak it. Rather than being a 
form of ‘self expression’, speaking is a gesture of conformity with a certain kind of 
social structure and a certain set of rules about what is articulable and how. Language is 
not about ‘communicating information’73 but exists in order to ‘be obeyed, and to 
compel obedience’.74 Language is a profoundly social institution,75 but one which 
functions such as to require a certain kind of body in those who speak it: a mouth which 
speaks, a body which is the silent objective object for knowledge and that which can be 
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spoken of but which can never speak: ‘It is not only our mouth that feels beset upon, 
forced to utter unending explications of every word, but our bodies. For words energise, 
prod, badger, poke at, harass, excite, agitate, soothe, hypnotise and stupefy our 
bodies’.76 Just as important as what is said, therefore, is what is not said. To speak in 
language means to speak according to the rule of language, which is accustomed to 
naming discreet bodies which belong to coherent subjects, so it involves a kind of 
acceptance of a certain kind of social order, as well as a repression of the capacity of the 
body for dissolution, change, rupture, and so on.  
For Deleuze and Guattari, speaking and saying ‘I’ is one of the ways in which a body is 
disciplined into a coherent form, identified with a subject. This is a process by which 
the individuality of the body is imposed. Of course, saying ‘I’ does not account for the 
different modes of being of those who pronounce it: the linguistic container ‘I’ is in this 
sense generic rather than ‘singular’. But its function is to act as part of the apparatus 
which forms the individual body and separates it from ‘politics’ and ‘society’. Hence 
Deleuze’s schizophrenic, a figure who expresses the possibility of refusing this 
disciplinary move, says that ‘“I won’t say I any more, I’ll never utter the word again; 
it’s just too damn stupid. Every time I hear it, I’ll use the third person instead, if I 
happen to remember to. If it amuses them. And it won’t make one bit of difference’.77 
In this sense, the failure to conform to the demands of linguistic convention is a form of 
resistance which is of importance for the body because it implicitly refuses the self-
evidence of the body, and thereby creates the space for alternate expressions to emerge. 
In other words, the possibility exists for the forces of dissolution to be expressed.  
Deleuze says that ‘[r]epressive forces don’t stop people expressing themselves but 
rather force them to express themselves’.78 Moreover, ‘[s]tupidity’s never blind or 
mute. So it’s not a problem of getting people to express themselves but of providing 
little gaps of solitude and silence in which they might eventually have something to 
say’.79 Those who speak unproblematically are not really saying anything new, but 
merely reproducing the forces of order and cohesion which underlie the construction of 
their ‘social reality’. But there is another reality, that of dissolution and the flux of 
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becoming which pays attention not to forms but to movements. In literature, Deleuze 
credits Franz Kafka with using language so as to expose its own fractures and partiality, 
and thereby creating the space for novelty: he manages to ‘bring language slowly and 
progressively to the desert. To use syntax in order to cry, to give a syntax to the cry’.80 
Returning to the question of mutism as a form of shell shock, it is possible to read this 
as an instance of the fallibility of language, whereby the horrors of war cannot be 
expressed in quotidian language. Moreover, to attempt to express them thus would 
efface the impact of the war on the body and the very intimacy of the forces of 
dissolution. Yealland’s therapy is an effort to compel compliance with the social order 
that language represents and thereby to discard the potentially unsettling or fragmentary 
consequences of war. Addressing a 24 year old Major with a stammer, Yealland records 
himself as having said “At present I do not care what you think or say, because you are 
not normal”.81 Only once ‘normalised’ is the patient able and permitted to speak (and be 
listened to), by which time there may very well be nothing left to say.  
Deterritorialisation  
State, Society and War 
Approaches to war and society tend to emphasise the primacy of the latter in 
constructing identities.82 In seeking to understand and explain the shell shocked body, 
attempts have been made to address it in terms of biology, either in the sense that it has 
an organic origin, or a congenital one. Alternatively, the psychoanalysts in particular 
sought to understand the shell shocked body through the prism of the ego and the ego 
conflict engendered by war. I want here to turn to the question of whether the space or 
idea of war can act as a foundation for understanding the shell shocked body, and if so; 
how. It is necessary to be careful about exactly what is meant here. The idea of a 
‘foundation’ indicates an explanatory power. For example, if we suggest that the shell 
shocked body is founded in ego conflict, this means that everything about it is reducible 
to, and explicable in terms of, this ego conflict. Ego conflict causes shell shock, and all 
its symptoms and behaviours are no more than expressions of this. Of course, this is a 
caricatured presentation in the sense that most analysts of shell shock would admit more 
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than one such foundation, or ‘cause’, or would allow that different causes may be 
operational at different moments. The questions under investigation here are: does war 
provide a foundation and context for the organisation of the body analogous to the 
state? If so, then one way in which we might consider the problem of the shell shocked 
body is as being ‘caused by’ war. But this does not produce a non-foundational thinking 
of the body, it rather territorialises the body through war. So the ultimate question 
becomes: can we think the relationship between war and the body differently? 
In the early twentieth century, war was sometimes held to be a curative for the problems 
and pathologies of an unhealthy society. Ernst Jünger said that ‘[w]e lived aimlessly 
and were even proud of it. As sons of an age intoxicated by material achievements, we 
believed that progress would bring bliss, that machines would be the key to becoming 
god-like. But beneath this artificial mask, beneath all disguises in which we draped 
ourselves as magicians, we remained naked and barbaric’.83 Technology was a modern 
instrument for man’s eternal will to power, serving only to make him more powerful.84 
The contention was that society restrained the natural will to power of man under the 
repressive blanket of civilisation, and that this caused neurosis and unhappiness and 
could be cured by the war environment, which was more ‘natural’ and more in keeping 
with man’s ‘true’ character. Fritz Kreisler wrote of his experiences in the Austrian 
Army that ‘[i]n the field all neurotic symptoms seem to disappear as if by magic, and 
one’s whole system is charged with energy and vitality. Perhaps this is due to the open 
air life with its simplified standards, freed from all the complex exigencies of society’s 
laws and unhampered by conventionalities’.85  
The idea was the war was a liberation from the stultifying demands of domesticity and 
‘polite society’, to which man had to bend his true desires. Carl Zuckmayer wrote that 
the war was a liberation from the ‘“pettiness and littleness” of the bourgeois family’.86 
This seems to present war as a space in which desire is less constrained by the demands 
of society, and we might expect to find a different kind of body politics in operation 
there. However, the quotidian means of war betrayed this vision. Industrialised war 
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deprived its participants of the space for heroism and individual agency.87 In addition, 
war was functionally closely integrated into society. Ernst Jünger said that ‘[i]n this 
clash, it is no longer, as it was in the days of the sword, the individual who counts, but 
the big organisms. Levels of production and technology, chemistry, the school system 
and railway networks: these are the powers that invisibly stand behind the smoke of the 
battles of material’.88 Moreover, bodies at war were very highly regimented, and rather 
than being an idealised return to some pre-civilisational atavism, the war was actually a 
kind of society of its own, and, in the case of the British forces in France, one which 
was very geographically and socially proximate to, and integrated with, ‘the home 
front’.89   
I would suggest that the First World War was not unproblematically ‘a space apart’ 
from society in general. Many of the organising principles of society (class, for 
example) were reproduced in the war. The extent to which military discipline attempted 
to make soldiers out of civilians was not a world away from the attempts of the public 
schools to do the same. To an extent, a key attribute of the early twentieth century 
‘man’ was that he was at all times ready to fight for his honour and that of his country, 
and always retained a martial discipline over himself and his emotions. In this respect, it 
would be erroneous to be convinced by the more florid responses to the war (which in 
any case tended to die out as it dragged on) which suggested that it could be this space 
outside society in which untrammelled desire could escape from the straightjacket of 
civilised society. In fact, when at war, the demand that men master themselves and 
permit no uncontrolled behaviour, no extraneous emotion, meant that the body was 
even more strictly regulated than usual. Because of the firm discipline it exacted, it is 
difficult to perceive the war as being a cause of, or foundation for, the transitive shell 
shocked body, at least in the straightforward sense. However, the war, like the body, 
was not exhausted by its formal and governable properties. Rather, to an extent, ‘World 
War I.... defied attempts to control it, and turned every participant into its sorcerer’s 
apprentice’.90 I will suggest three possible ways in which the war impacts on the (shell 
shocked) body: in terms of an image or idea which somehow liberated desire, in terms 
of bodily resistance and in terms of the ‘social outsider’.  
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War Fever: The Coming War 
The impending war was greeted with a measure of enthusiasm in the participant 
nations, and the responses to it are interesting in terms of the relationship between the 
war and the body, which was a potentially destabilising, unstructuring one. For 
example, Gertrude Bäumer of the League of German Women’s Associations, recalled 
that in August 1914, “[t]he limitations of our ego broke down, our blood flowed to the 
blood of others, we felt ourselves one body in a mystical unification”.91 Here the impact 
of the spectre of the coming war is presented explicitly in terms of the erosion of the 
normal body boundaries and the individualism of the ego, and a new form of 
community which is not composed of a collection of individuals but of a pure 
collectivity. Eric Leed says that ‘[t]he best analogy to August [1914] is not the 
revolutionary overthrow of an established social order but the temporary disordering or 
reversal of social status that takes place in festivals’,92 characterised by ‘“insubordinate 
libido”’.93 Rather than the overthrow of social order, which would deploy pre-existing 
identities as a trigger for a re-organisation of hierarchies, what is being suggested here 
is a situation in which hierarchies cease to have a capacity to organise life. Identities no 
longer regulate social interaction, and therefore what is being described is in some 
senses non-personal. Leed says that ‘[i]t was an outbreak of madness which raged 
through the streets at that time, an explosion such as had already been experienced and 
described, but which had never been fanned into such a world-burning flame’.94 
The suggestion is that, at least momentarily, the oncoming war triggered a new form of 
body and a new kind of community which does not supersede the existing one but 
rather operates alongside it. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri suggest a form of 
embodiment which is ‘really against the body and for the common performativity of 
queer social flesh’.95 The body is organised and ordered by social disciplinary forces—
this is why it makes sense to be ‘against’ the body. Once disordered, bodies may 
connect and interrelate in ungoverned ways which are not tied to the principle of 
identity. It then becomes necessary to enquire how the spectre of war could be the 
foundation, or cause, of this new bodily being. The answer is that it could not, at least in 
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the straightforward sense. Deleuze’s discussions of the ‘revolutionary’ events of May 
1968 resonate in certain ways with Leed’s observations about August 1914. And for 
Deleuze, May 1968 in certain senses defied the laws of historical causation. Rather, this 
was ‘a lawless deviation, an unstable condition that opens up a new field of the 
possible’.96  
Eric Leed suggests that August 1914 saw a kind of erosion of the powers of identity, in 
which a disobedient ‘madness’ took over from the strictly regulated normal business of 
society. This is not ‘revolutionary’ in the standard sense, since it did not involve a 
project to overthrow the government or take charge of the state (indeed, it may have 
been triggered by enthusiasm for the state). However, in a Deleuzian sense it may be 
considered ‘revolutionary’. Deleuze says that ‘May ’68 was an astonishing revelation. 
Desiring power accelerated to a point where it exploded all the splinter groups. They 
regrouped later on when they participated in the business of restoring order with other 
repressive forces: the CGT [Communist Workers’ Union], the PC [Communist Party], 
the CRS [the riot police]’.97 He is exasperated with those who despair at the possibility 
for a real revolution and who bemoan the fact that all revolutionary impulse is always 
being betrayed: ‘You really have to be dimwitted….’98 There have been authentic 
revolutionary moments throughout history ‘an absolutely revolutionary 
America…announced the ‘new man’ just as the Bolshevik revolution announced the 
‘new man’’.99 Revolutions are always with us. The confusion comes (for the 
dimwitted…) with the failure to distinguish between revolution and becomings-
revolutionary. 
One should not think the euphoria of August 1914, nor the ‘revolution’ of May 1968, in 
terms of their outcomes. August 1914 collapsed into the dreary and regimented work of 
waging ‘total war’, and May 1968 did not end with the ultimate collapse of the Gaullist 
government. But for Deleuze, this would be beside the point; or rather, to lament these 
failures indicates that we have missed the point. Insofar as the protesters of May ’68 
had aims, they were not revolutionary. Aims are connected to a certain identity, a 
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certain project, and a certain vision of society. What is revolutionary, however, is the 
dissolution of identity itself. One might say that August 1914 was revolutionary to the 
extent that it caused identity and individuality to become swept away, a necessarily 
temporary insurrection, or deterritorialisation, of ‘insubordinate libido’. Rather than 
seeing war as an organising foundation for the body, here the war-to-come is presented 
as being a disordering influence which erodes the identity of the body and the 
distinctions between bodies. Moreover, the position of these disordered bodies in 
relation to the war-to-come is unclear. They are not straightforwardly participants or 
non-participants, but may be said to exist in a certain mode of anticipation towards it.  
The purpose of highlighting the disordering influence of the war-to-come is to avoid the 
impression that the transformative powers of war are limited to changing one thing into 
another. For example, to propose that the First World War gave way to modernity is to 
posit its effect as changing one kind of social order into another. Similarly, the notion 
that men were changed from innocents into cynics by the war posits a change from one 
form of subjectivity to another. These changes may very well have taken place. 
However, I wish to suggest that what must also be taken into account is change in itself, 
the exploration of which must dispense with the idea that ‘war’ is wholly determined by 
a concrete political-historical occurrence with firm parameters and boundaries of 
experience. This is because to think in terms of experience tends to assume a coherent 
being which does the experiencing. On the contrary, I want to suggest that the shell 
shocked figure expresses the fractured bodily coherence and shattered ego which is in 
some sense the corollary of the ‘insubordinate libido’ which is said to have erupted in 
August 1914. Although war in one sense constructs bodies, for example, that of the 
disciplined soldier, it also deconstructs them through the unpredictable consequences of 
its frightening, exciting, exhausting and unknown aspects. In this sense, war is not only 
a mode through which the body can be explained and understood, through tropes of 
bravery and comradeship, for example, and through images of the idealised soldier. It is 
also a prism through which the disordered and unknown facets of the body may be 
expressed, and thereby may function also as an anti-foundation which serves as a cipher 
for deterritorialisation.    
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Resistance  
I have discussed the possibility that the anticipation that war might constitute a space 
separate from society which was characterised by a higher degree of freedom and 
authenticity. However, this possibility was thwarted by the realities of the First World 
War. On the contrary, the war was thoroughly contaminated both by social norms and 
the continuing relevance of the class system, for example, but also by the demands of 
military discipline. In a sense this should not surprise us, since there is no ‘authentic’ or 
‘natural’ mode of being, but only the possibility for becoming. Rather than suggest that 
there is some mode of life which is the ultimate goal, the Deleuzian point would be 
rather to consider the evasion of fixed and bounded forms of being and the emphasis on 
movement and becoming. It is only this mode of life which takes account of the 
ultimately unknown, and unknowable, character of the body, and does not foreclose the 
possibilities it has for forging connections. I want to suggest that one can understand the 
shell shocked body in terms of an expression of resistance, not only to the demands of 
military life, but to also to the organising principles of society in general, and their 
demands on the body. I take ‘resistance’ in this sense to refer to an assertion of the 
unknown potentials of the body, taking the form of an evasion of the disciplinary 
project of power. It is not a straightforward confrontation with power since, as 
suggested above, retaining the form of the organised body and changing only its 
position in the hierarchy of power is not ‘real’ change at all and expresses compliance 
rather than resistance.  
Ben Shephard argues that ‘we must see the shell-shocked soldier not simply as a victim, 
silently suffering, powerless to help himself, but as an agent, using his medical 
symptoms as a weapon of resistance to military authority’.100 However, I would suggest 
that it is not productive to focus on the question of agency and agents, or at the very 
least, that this needs to be handled with care. The notion of agency suggests 
intentionality, which is misleading and even cruel in the context of genuine and un-
affected suffering that many shell shocked soldiers endured. In the light of the 
contemporary suspicions about ‘malingering’ and the falsification of symptoms among 
soldiers,101 it seems inappropriate to allow room for misinterpretation here. More 
seriously, I would suggest that the point of exploring shell shock as a vector of 
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resistance is precisely that it seems to express resistance as a flight from the ordered 
subject-body which is the site for discipline and control. I have suggested that the 
organised body is the consequence of a work of social control, but also in some sense 
its condition of possibility, since disciplinary measures require a coherent object upon 
which to work. Allan Feldman has suggested that when power explicitly and directly 
takes the body as its object, it becomes vulnerable due to the extent that it has staked its 
claim to mastery on the compliance of the subjugated body.102 In this sense, shell shock 
as a fracture in the body image/ego may be seen in terms of the subversion of, or 
resistance to, the norms of body politics.  
Confined to a home for those traumatised by the war, the war poet Siegfried Sassoon 
was ‘diagnosed’ with a ‘very strong ‘anti-war’ complex’103 by his sympathetic 
therapist. He soon came to disparage his fellow suffers. He wrote that ‘[w]ith my 
“fellow-breakdowns” I avoided war talk as far as was possible... Sometimes I had the 
uncomfortable notion that none of them respected one another; it was as though there 
was a tacit understanding that we were all failures, and this made me want to reassure 
myself that I wasn’t the same as the others. “After all, I haven’t broken down; I’ve only 
broken out”, I thought’.104 Their ‘authentic’ shell shock was presented as being 
somehow inferior to his politically directed protest. A distinction is being drawn 
between a deliberate protest in which the former soldier retains a sense of agency and 
self-control, and ‘genuine’ shell shock, in which he does not. However, from a 
Deleuzian perspective, it is possible to suggest that all ‘breakdown’ is also ‘breaking 
out’ insofar as that it escapes from the restraints of the organised body. Deleuze says 
that ‘[m]adness need not be all breakdown …It may also be breakthrough…The person 
going through ego-loss or transcendental experiences may or may not be in different 
ways confused…True sanity entails in one way or another the dissolution of the normal 
ego’.105 In this sense it is not a matter of agency, and it is not a matter of personality, 
since these are aspects of being which may be dispensed with if other ways of being are 
to be made possible. 
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I have suggested that the body is not natural, but is organised in accordance with certain 
functions and hierarchies, the coherence of which are held together by the image of the 
ego, or individual subject. Of course, it sounds a little ridiculous to suggest that 
‘resistance’ might occur when these are damaged or destroyed, for example as when the 
shell shocked soldier loses his sense of himself and his personality. For surely the 
retention of this is necessary for any meaningful act of resistance is to take place, so 
that the same person resists, and is aware of resisting. But for Deleuze this is not the 
case. He says that ‘there is no need to uphold man in order to resist’.106 Indeed, 
dispensing with ‘man’ may be an important gesture of resistance. In the discussion of 
revolution, I suggested that, for Deleuze, one ought not to think of revolution in terms 
of its consequences. In other words, it does not make sense to say that the Russian 
Revolution ‘failed’ because it resulted in a totalitarian system which failed to hand real 
power to the workers.107 Deleuze suggests that, judged in this way, all revolutions ‘fail’ 
because they simply entail a reshuffling of the social order so that certain identities 
move up or down the hierarchy. But this is because we are misconstruing what is 
‘revolutionary’ about revolutions, and this is not when identities become privileged, or 
certain groups manage to take power, but the moment when identities cease to organise.  
Similarly in the case of resistance, one might think that this was an act in defence of the 
self: a confrontation with power in order to improve the conditions under which one 
lives: to move up or down a hierarchy. Of course, it is this to an extent. In terms of 
women’s rights movements, for example, Deleuze says that ‘[i]t is, of course, 
indispensable for women to conduct a molar politics, with a view to winning back their 
own organism, their own history, their own subjectivity’.108 By ‘molar politics’, he 
means a politics of identity, in which women affirm their identity as women. However, 
a more significant form of resistance is the rejection of the constraints of identity and 
personality altogether. In this sense, the breakdown of the shell shocked soldier may be 
understood as gesture of resistance, rejecting as it does not only this specific war, but 
social organisation and bodily discipline in its entirety. Elaine Showalter argues that 
‘[i]f the essence of manliness was not to complain, then shell shock was the body 
language of masculine complaint, a disguised male protest not only against the war but 
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against the concept of ‘manliness’ itself’.109 To truly protest the notion of masculinity, 
one must cease to be a man, cease to speak and act as one and become something other.  
Again, this may seem suspect in ethical terms, as it is difficult to shake the residue of 
agency or intentionality from the idea of resistance. Moreover, the idea that shell 
shocked sufferers accrued any benefit from their ‘resistance’ seems highly problematic. 
But in Deleuzian terms resistance involves a flight from the strictures of autonomous 
subjectivity and the dominance of reason, so that the unknown possibilities of the body 
can begin to emerge. Moreover, ‘resistance’ conceived in this way is not an ends-based 
notion, since in whose interests could any activity possibly be undertaken once identity 
and personality have been discarded? ‘Interests’ are the consequence of a particular 
social organisation which regulates desires and persons in certain ways.110 Once these 
constructions have been eroded, it does not really make sense to speak of ‘interests’ any 
more. The point is to think breakdown and breakthrough together, accepting that 
resisting the organised body might be fatal, and is certainly not the route to a 
comfortable life, greater privileges and so on. There is always the possibility that ‘you 
will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even dragged toward catastrophe’.111 In this 
sense, we should not think that Deleuze’s resistance is in our interests, or even 
necessarily in our conscious power to initiate. From this perspective the body of the 
shell shocked soldier comes to appear as a highly resistant one which refuses the power 
of society to organise bodies and order them to war.  
The Outlier and the Anomaly  
George L. Mosse suggests that shell shock was associated with the mental inadequacy 
thought to be characteristic of outsider groups. For example, ‘Jews had been accused of 
being especially prone to hysteria’, and Irishmen and lowland Scots were thought 
especially prone to malingering’.112 This was partially because it was difficult to 
reconcile shell shock with ideas about the characteristics of men of the state. Shell 
shocked soldiers could therefore present a problem in terms of being positioned relative 
to the state and social ideals. In one sense, they were clearly ‘of’ the state. By virtue of 
their shell shock they demonstrated that they had fought and suffered for it. In another 
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sense, however, they were an outlier category: difficult to classify, and of uncertain 
ethicality, their thoughts and capabilities mysterious. Shell shocked soldiers might be 
thought to have exhibited their anomalous character through suffering shell shock,113 
and thereby be retrospectively tainted with ‘otherness’. However, I want to suggest that 
there is something productive in positioning the shell shocked soldier in an anomalous 
position. Eric Leed says that ‘[i]n Indo-European literature the character of the warrior 
is anomalous, and this anomalousness is rooted in the nature of his project’.114 The 
suggestion is that the warrior always has a problematic status with respect to the state 
and society. I want to explore here the position of the shell shocked soldier as 
anomalous, and investigate the ways in which this is productive in terms of making 
sense of the body and war.  
A soldier is the servant of the state, but he must betray the laws of the state in order to 
serve it. Once at war, the soldier must learn to ignore the ingrained injunctions against 
killing in order to be an effective instrument of war. Because of this, on entering 
service, ‘the recruit must set aside for the duration his civilian life as a place of peace, 
women, and comfort, a time when killing people was forbidden and punished as 
criminal’.115 Leed presents the problem as being one of a kind of ‘double identity’, 
whereby to be fully ‘successful’, the soldier must be able to shift between military and 
civilian identities and employ a protective amnesia about past deeds. He says that 
‘modern wars... are fought by men who must change their identities, from civilian to 
soldier and back again’.116 Leed suggests that war neurotics, the shell shocked and the 
traumatised are those who have not succeeded in forgetting, or in shedding their old 
identity and the memories which are attached to it. I would suggest that there is 
difference between the concept of ‘soldier’ and that of ‘warrior’ which may be 
productively explored. The soldier is governed by the principle of identity; whether 
‘soldier’ is an identity he is seeking to acquire or shed. This is because the soldier is a 
servant of the state, and just as the state is composed of a clear demarcation between 
inside and outside, organisation, order and clear decision making power, so the soldier 
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is an organised and disciplined body who is subordinated to the will of the subject, and 
more importantly, of the state.  
Using Deleuze, I want to try to suggest that the warrior may be understood differently 
from this, and may be able to illuminate something of the outsider status of the shell 
shocked soldier. I have suggested above that Deleuze emphasises the body as 
undergoing a process of becoming, rather than being endowed with fixed properties and 
attributes. However, the state’s regulatory powers tend to be orientated towards 
insisting that the body retains some formal order and represses or conceals its 
propensity towards fluidity and change. As the servant of the state, then, the soldier is 
an organised body bound to the principle of identity. However, it is possible to suggest 
that the warrior stands as an alternative body to this, one which is expressed through 
becoming rather than static being, because for Deleuze, the warrior does not belong to 
the state and therefore is not subject to discipline and organisation by it. Deleuze and 
Guattari refer to ‘a veritable becoming-animal of the warrior’,117 and seek to indicate 
that the warrior does not have a stable human identity, or indeed a stable identity of any 
kind. It must be remembered that the concept of ‘becoming animal’ takes its 
significance not from the transformation into an animal, but from the movement away 
from any fixed or pre-given identity.  
Reading Deleuze, it is possible to suggest that the form of subjectivity associated with 
the concept of becoming is the nomad-warrior, and this, rather than the soldier, is the 
authentic ‘man of war’. Because he is not controlled by the state, the warrior is regarded 
with suspicion by it. Deleuze says that ‘[f]rom the standpoint of the state, the originality 
of the man of war, his eccentricity, necessarily appears in negative form: stupidity, 
deformity, madness, illegitimacy, usurpation, sin’.118 Evading the discipline of the state, 
the warrior deforms its standards and appears to be deviant and flawed. While the body 
of the soldier-citizen is organised by the state and obeys standards of regularity and 
identity, that of the warrior is not and does not. Therefore the warrior is always 
undermining the state’s claims to regulatory hegemony by expressing a different and 
disobedient style of life. Deleuze says that ‘[t]he warrior is in the position of betraying 
everything, including the function of the military, or of understanding nothing’.119 At 
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essence the point of divergence between the warrior and the citizen-soldier is that of 
exteriority.120 While the citizen-soldier is disciplined into constantly referring all desire 
and affect back to the centralising force of the ego and the body image, the warrior does 
not do this, and is therefore open to a continuous process of open-ended change. The 
citizen-soldier obeys interiority, the warrior exteriority: he is open to the world, 
unmediated by the interposing force of the personal or the body image.  
The warrior figure is ‘understood only through the categories of the negative’121 from 
the perspective of the state, because it deviates from or evades all the frameworks of 
organisation which the state imposes on the body. I want to suggest that the warrior 
may be a productive, if seemingly anomalous figure through which to understand the 
shell shocked soldier. In some senses, one could say that the shell shocked soldier has 
somehow broken the covenant with the state, in the sense that he has failed to retain a 
properly organised body, and has been unable to switch between ‘war’ and ‘peace’ 
identities adequately. Constrained by the state and evaluated according to its standards, 
the shell shocked soldier thus placed may seem ‘outmoded, condemned, without a 
future, reduced to his own fury, which he turns against himself’.122 The point though, is 
to dramatise the lines of possible/impossible in terms of modes of bodily being, and to 
highlight the extent to which modes which do not accede to the demands of 
state/society for a certain kind of order must be judged (whether harshly or 
sympathetically) as deviant, defective, in need of repair. 
There are some potentially problematic aspects of the relation that has been put into 
play here between the shell shocked soldier and the ‘warrior’ figure. It is important to 
clarify that neither the shell shocked soldier nor the warrior are being associated or 
identified with any individual. This must be the case, because the individual is 
constructed as such by the state, in accordance with the principles of identity and 
interiority. Rather, they are used here as concepts to think with which are more 
associated with multiplicity than individuality. This is to say that the various affects and 
desires are not restrained by and referred to an organised ‘individual’. A second area for 
caution is the potentially misleading impression that the warrior is somehow more 
perfectly adapted for war than the state’s soldier, therefore is incapable of readjusting to 
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civilian life. This is not the case, as for Deleuze, the idea of the warrior does not 
necessarily have any relation to war, it is simply something which is not of the state and 
defies organisation by it.123 Moreover, the notion of the warrior does not carry with it 
any positive normative evaluation. Although for Deleuze this way of life is interesting 
because it rejects the life-limiting construction placed on the body by the state, this does 
not mean that it is going to be experienced positively by the body which undergoes it. 
In fact, it is important to emphasise that what is being talked about here is a kind of loss 
of self whereby the kind of circular self-referentiality associated with continuous 
identity is abandoned.  
I referred above to the idea that the warrior’s position is anomalous, because it is 
somehow at odds with society in general while at the same time belonging to it in some 
way: familiar yet unknown. For Deleuze and Guattari, the idea of the anomalous is ‘a 
phenomenon of bordering’.124 The problem becomes, bordering between what and 
what? For Deleuze and Guattari, the state is a particular form of organisation which 
makes certain demands on the body and requires that it is organised in a certain way. 
Thereafter, it becomes possible to refer to individual subjects. However, I suggested 
above that the notion that war is ‘an other’ space is a problematic one, since in many 
respects the space of war replicated and even intensified many of the organisational 
imperatives of the state, making even more rigorous demands on the body. In this case, 
how can the idea of the shell shocked body, seen through Deleuze’s concept of the 
body, help to illuminate war, as war seems to be more statist business as usual 
according to this analysis? In other words, the demand seems to be for a different way 
of thinking the relationship between the body and war which does not simply involve 
the organised body relocating to a different space (the space of war), becoming 
disordered and then returning home to be the subject of re-organisation. I want to 
suggest that a productive way to think this may not be in terms of ‘this space’ or ‘that 
space’, but in terms of the border itself: between the disordered ‘flow state’ and 
‘playing the game of structure’.125  
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Histories of War, the Body, and Trauma  
I have suggested that the shell shocked body may be seen as a vector through which the 
de- and re-territorialisation of the war and the body take place in relation to each other. 
The war appears both as a concrete geo-strategic event with certain temporal and spatial 
parameters and as a kind of affective haunting which disorders the body. Further, I have 
suggested that this disordering has tended to be seen in negative terms as some 
pathological malfunction grounded in biology or psychology and thoroughly explicable, 
and curable, in these terms. In this closing section I want to draw out the ways in which 
it is possible to read this as a de-politicising move which shuts down many of the 
possibilities opened up by the unknown and insurgent body, and its capacity to disturb 
the existing social order. In a sense, I want to suggest that, once it has been labelled as 
deviant, the body has been somehow divested of much of its political potential. Having 
done this, I would like to make some broader suggestive indications as to how it might 
be possible to think about the body and war in a political sense. Throughout this chapter 
I have tried to allude to my dissatisfaction with the notion that war might be restricted 
to a ‘proper’ place in history. This notion is pervasive in the sense that returning 
soldiers are expected to ‘forget’ the war and take up their civilian lives once more. Eric 
Leed says that ‘[b]ecause industrial societies define war as an abnormal state of 
emergency and presume that war and peace are distinct and separate realms of 
existence, those who adapt to these contexts are presumed to have changed identities, 
and are required to forget, again and again, or they end up in a psychiatric ward’.126 I 
want to deploy Deleuze’s insistence on the ethico-political importance of the body as 
unknown to indicate reasons why the process of inserting the body into an 
organisational system of diagnosis and ‘cure’ closes down political possibility. 
I have suggested that Deleuze presents the body not in terms of being but of becoming, 
which is concerned with the affects the body undergoes, and the relations into which it 
enters. The process of becoming is not intended to refer to the passage from one identity 
to another, but the passage away from identity altogether. In this way, Deleuze aspires 
to disrupt the naturalness of bodily development. He says that for children, 
‘independent of the evolution carrying them toward adulthood, there [is] room in the 
child for other becomings, “other contemporaneous possibilities”... creative involutions 
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bearing witness to “an inhumanity immediately experienced in the body as such”... 
“outside the programmed body”’.127 That is to say, inherent in the body is the potential 
capacity to become in a multiplicity of ways, and these are not determined by biology 
or grounded in nature. In other words, ‘the inhuman’ is immanent to the human in the 
sense that ‘inhumanity’ stands for the unknown of the body which is not understood in 
terms of the norms and categories of the human. The very significance of the body 
derives from the immanent and dynamic relation it has to the unknown, because it has 
the capacity to introduce us to that which is outside the organised structure of language 
and culture, and thereby raises the possibility for novelty.128  
Deleuze’s work calls for experimentation, but he offers no assurances as to what the 
consequences of this might be. In order to be truly ‘experimental’, we must not know 
what the outcome may be. John Rajchman says that ‘[w]e should judge political 
regimes (including democratic ones) in terms of the space they allow for 
“multiplicities” and their “individuations”…But to do this we need to rethink the space 
and time of politics in terms other than those of a prior or future republic or of an 
original contract—“another politics, another individuation, another time”’.129 That is, he 
is calling for a politics which is open to the unknown, and which is not fixated on 
identity. This cannot be a question of representation, as who would one represent? 
Rather it is one of openness to the ‘to come’,130 that is to say, to some future form of 
life whose form is, and must remain, unknown. This entails forbearing from identifying 
and organising emergent forms of life. It is possible to suggest that identifying bodies as 
shell shocked (or ‘traumatised’) is damaging not only because it disables a potentially 
powerful corporeal critique to the existing social order, in that it involves ascribing all 
defectiveness and dysfunction to the body, rather than implicating the social order. In 
addition, however, it closes down the horizon of possibility for other forms of political 
life. A potentially other or ‘inhuman’ form of life is rendered intelligible by identifying 
it in relation to the norms of humanity, thereby potentially limiting its capacity to 
deterritorialise this normative figure of the human. The anomaly is somehow 
domesticated.  
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In the first instance, then, it is possible to suggest that the attempts made to 
reterritorialise the shell shocked body in accordance with certain diagnostic and bio-
medical criteria acts as a barrier to the potentially deterritorialising effect that this body 
could have. I want now to turn to the way in which we might understand this 
deterritorialisation in terms of the body and war. In calling into question apparently 
settled norms about the body and its proper functions, the shell shocked body also 
‘deterritorialises’ war by dislocating it from its seemingly settled place in space and 
time. Eric Leed suggests that forgetting is vital not only for the regularisation of time, 
but also for the impression of our independence of it. He says that ‘it is precisely 
forgetting that liberates us from the immediately preceding event, allows us to escape 
from the lock-step of the chronological series... The repression of our immediate past 
liberates us from over-determination by it’.131 But what happens if the body that is to 
undertake the work of forgetting is fractured and dissipated? To what extent does this 
undermine the independence between body and war? Here I would like to start to 
expand on these themes and suggest some possible perspectives for their exploration. 
I have suggested that, for Deleuze, it is more productive to think the body in terms of 
becoming rather than being. That is to say, if we concentrate solely on what the body 
‘is’, we remain bound by the perspective of the disciplinary social order which 
constructed and maintains the body in this way. By focusing on becoming, it becomes 
possible to take account of the multiple micro-deviations from this prescribed way of 
being, as well as the capacity that the body has to make connections far beyond those 
which are socially permissible. Becoming always takes place in the direction away from 
the socially esteemed identities, so there is no becoming-man, because ‘man’ is at the 
top of the hierarchy which organises identities.132 And the distinction that Deleuze 
makes between being and becoming also produces a distinction between becoming and 
history. History is the concern of majority beings. He says that ‘Man constitutes himself 
as a gigantic memory... Of course, the child, the woman, the black have memories; but 
the Memory that collects these memories is still a virile majoritarian agency’.133 In 
other words, just as ‘man’ organises bodies in inferior relation to it, so the memory of 
man subjugates all other memories, arranging them in relation to it. History is 
concerned with majority—with major terms such as ‘man’ and with organisations such 
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as the state, and all historical deviations are still deviations relative to this. History ‘is a 
question of knowing how to win or obtain a majority’.134  
There is nothing particularly novel about suggesting that history is associated with the 
memory of the state and with the identities it nurtures.135 However, Deleuze is 
concerned to expand upon the alternative to a history and memory which demand the 
coherence of identities through the concept of becoming. ‘Becoming is antimemory.’136 
While history orders entities in relation to each other, so one might refer to the body 
and war, for example, becoming is always with something, so that both identities (the 
body, war) degrade in their relation. Deleuze says that ‘[u]nlike history, becoming 
cannot be conceptualized in terms of past or future. Becoming-revolutionary remains 
indifferent to the questions of a future and a past of the revolution; it passes between the 
two. Every becoming is a block of coexistence’.137 He expands on this by arguing that 
‘[i]f becoming is a block... it is because it constitutes a zone of proximity and 
indiscernibility, a no-man’s land’.138 This is to say, to return to our previous 
terminology, that the body and war deterritorialise each other, that through the other 
they themselves become ‘other’. I have shown that shell shock may be analysed in 
terms of the failure of a divided ego to become whole, the failure of the soldier to forget 
the war, or a kind of fracture or disruption in the workings of the body. But these are all 
histories in the war in the sense that they measure the body according to a given body 
image, and insist on its separation from the war. However, it is possible to suggest that 
to understand the body and war from the perspective of becoming, it may be necessary 
to give up on ‘the body’ and ‘war’ and to think instead in terms of blocks of affective 
coexistence.  
Deleuze distinguishes between two forms of time: chronos and aion. The first refers to 
‘the living present in which bodies act and are acted upon’.139 The second relates to ‘the 
incorporeal effects which result from bodies, their actions and their passions’,140 in 
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other words, it relates not to a being, but to a way of being. In this sense, time is 
somehow doubled, so that it may work at the level of bodies and identities, and at the 
surface of these, dissolving and contorting them in affect. In one sense, therefore, one 
can tell a story of the shell shocked soldier in which a man goes to war, is traumatised, 
comes home and fails immediately to forget: to become normal. In this tale there is a 
coherent body which undergoes a coherent set of events and then must be returned to 
‘normal’ by encouraging him to forget the war and remember his civilian self. This 
story is told from the perspective of the state, in which there are coherent organised 
spaces (‘war’, ‘home’) between which coherent identifiable bodies move. However, 
there are different stories to be told, in which the body is itself a cause141, and in which 
there is no body image and war-image, and in which the war is never ‘past’ because it is 
always also in the future, caused and expressed by the body.  
Noting the way in which Erich Maria Remarque decided to write his celebrated account 
of the First World War, Eric Leed says that ‘[f]irst a pathology was felt, then a need to 
explain it’.142 In other words, it was not the case that Remarque remembered the war 
and therefore felt the need to write about it, but that he underwent certain affects which 
led him to start thinking about and investigating the war. While in one sense the body 
can be treated as a coherent object which returns from the war and can in time be made 
to recover from it, in another sense the body and the war may not stand as discreet and 
independent entities which move away from each other in time, but rather are taken up 
in a block of co-becoming, of co-existence, as Deleuze says. From this perspective, it 
becomes problematic to assert that the war is over, as it continues to repeat and resonate 
in its bodily affects. Much of the treatment of shell shocked soldiers seems to have 
involved the re-assertion of the body-image, so that the patient is encouraged to see that 
while he may think that he suffers from paralysis, actually he is able-bodied; while he 
may feel in his nightmares that the war is ongoing, actually it is over. In this way, the 
body is ‘always swinging between the surfaces which stratify it and the plane that sets it 
free’.143 The war is both a historical geo-political event and an immanent corporeal one.   
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Conclusion: Deterritorialising War, Bodies and History  
Deleuze uses the figure of the schizophrenic to signify a way of being which does not 
obey the injunction to be an organised body and a coherent identity, but which rather 
follows the lines of becoming. However, he says that ‘[w]e make a distinction between 
schizophrenia as a process and the way schizophrenics are produced as clinical cases 
that need hospitalizing’.144 In the latter instance, schizophrenics have been diagnosed 
and positioned on the social spectrum of normality. Their free-ranging desire is 
disciplined to refer back to their bodies, with the consequence that they may start to 
appear deficient and are defined in terms such as ‘“[d]issociation”, “autism”, and “loss 
of reality”’.145 In this sense, the schizophrenic figure serves a dual purpose, that of 
affirming a possible way of life different to that of the normal, ordered body, and of 
standing as a critique of the way in which the schizophrenic is usually arranged and 
treated within the social order which values norms and identities and obedient bodies.  
In a sense my intention has been similar in this chapter, as in a modest way I have 
aimed to show that the shell shocked body is constructed and positioned relative to 
other bodies in terms of the social esteem or opprobrium it attracts. But the ‘therapeutic 
treatment’ of the shell shocked body also involves the (re-)construction of the body 
itself, so that it is taken to be ‘essentially’ a matter of ego, or biology, or the body image 
itself. In the case of psychoanalytic approaches and of the ‘faradic therapy’ of L.R. 
Yealland, the objective is to return to the body an image of itself, and to insist upon its 
independence from the past, spatially separate war. However, I have also tried to 
indicate that the shell shocked body may be thought in more positive terms as a flight 
from identity and the strictures of the organised body. It is not a question of shell shock 
being a route to happiness, or understood in terms of the psychoanalytic notion of ‘wish 
fulfilment’. For Deleuze, ‘happiness’ and pleasure are associated with the coherent ego 
that schizophrenia flees from. This flight is itself potentially very dangerous. And the 
shell shocked soldier’s lot was often a very miserable one as a consequence of the 
prevailing social norms which militated towards a certain kind of self-understanding. 
This said, any breakdown of the ‘normal’ body gives a fleeting glimpse of the 
possibilities of other ways of being/becoming. And thought in a more positive sense, 
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the shell shocked soldier may be seen as putting the solidity of social structures such as 
‘war’ into flight.  
I have sought to indicate that the degree to which the First World War (or any such 
event) can pass into history (can be consigned to the past) may be considered to be 
highly limited, and the fixity of the war’s location in space and time can be unsettled 
through references to its profound and unpredictable bodily affects. In closing, I would 
like to offer some suggestive remarks about the deterritorialisation of body and war, and 
the possible implications that this holds for us as scholars of past or spatially distant 
wars. These suggestions may be animated through reference to the idea of nostalgia, 
which predated shell shock as the endemic psycho-somatic disorder which affected 
soldiers in large numbers. In 1678, the Swiss physician Johannes Hofer published an 
article suggesting that soldiers in the Thirty Years War were debilitated by nostalgia, 
defined as the painful longing for home.146 By the second half of the eighteen century, 
this debilitating disease, whose symptoms were both bodily and psychological, was 
regarded as being endemic in armies. Lost in fantasises about the idyllic nature of their 
home, affected soldiers would simply close down and give up on life. A military 
surgeon in Napoleon’s army, Dominique Larrey, observed that ‘[a]t last life becomes a 
burden; sometimes the patient commits suicide, but more often the victim surrenders to 
death without resistance’.147 In the first year of the American Civil War, the Union 
Army diagnosed 5,213 cases of nostalgia.148 
The nostalgia of the expeditionary soldier derives from the fact that he is not at home. 
Peter Fritzsche suggests that a general feeling of nostalgia may arise from the 
recognition that the ‘home’ no longer exists, that some revolutionary change has forever 
temporally shattered the sufferers relation with their past.149 Moreover, the nostalgic 
also in some sense loses his/her sense of him/herself as a fictive whole, and must 
forever make do with a ‘fugitive identity’ constructed on the shifting and unknown 
terrain of the present.150 In the case of nostalgia, the sufferer is never firmly present but 
is always yearning after a lost past. While at war, soldiers idealised their home and 
sickened for want of it. Similarly in the case of shell shock, the supposition is that the 
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soldier has failed to really depart from the theatre of war, and still somehow remains 
entrenched there, prey to its affective shocks. All of this makes perfect sense if we take 
the discreetness and temporal linearity of events for granted. If the war is over in the 
geo-political sense, then one who remains convinced that he is ‘at war’ is clearly shell 
shocked. Similarly, the nostalgic has invented a halcyon past which stands in the way of 
a full participation in the present.151   
These very ‘disorders’, however, also serve to dramatise the limitations of the coherent 
body and the degree to which it is entirely present. In both cases, the affective responses 
and libidinal investments of the body go beyond what is mandated by reason, and 
demanded by the discipline and organisation to which the body is subject. Adrian Parr 
suggests that ‘our problem here becomes one of how history can experiment with time 
and events without monumentalising the past, for instance, in the way that Freud tended 
to do when he privileged Oedipalised remembrance of the unconscious’.152 This is to 
say, the task is to avoid seeing history relative to some coherent body in the present 
which has a fixed identity and which is the arbiter of time and events. Rather, from the 
perspective of desire, it is a matter of ‘hallucinating all history, reproducing in delirium 
entire civilisations, races and continents, and intensely ‘feeling’ the becoming of the 
world’.153 The fortunes of the shell shocked soldier express the boundary quality of the 
body caught between the organising forces of state and history, which discipline and 
identify it, and the perpetual journeys in intensity which it undertakes which mean that 
all history is in becoming with it.  
Deleuze aims to ‘demonstrate the existence of an unconscious libidinal investment of 
sociohistorical production, distinct from the conscious investments coexisting with 
it’.154 The becoming of the ‘subject’ and the becoming of history take place in the same 
moment, because desire has invested the social and political world directly. There is no 
barrier between these ‘events’ and affective responses to them. What this indicates is 
that although in one sense we can apprehend the First World War (in this example) as a 
historicised event which is separated in time from us by what came next (the events of 
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the twentieth century organised in linear time), in another sense, affective responses to 
and investments in the images, ideas and intensities of the First World War are actually 
productive of it. As scholars we produce the First World War, in images and articles, 
and these circulate according to the degree to which they are held in relation to ‘state 
history’, and the extent to which they ‘function as part of the capitalist machinery’.155 
But there is also the possibility of entering into an affective relationship with the First 
World War, so that ‘one’s own body is hardly one’s own, since the zones on the body 
are liable to become somebody else; the body without a self is the body on which all 
subjects circulate’.156 What this indicates is that it is not possible to historicise the 
fluidity of the body, nor the deterritorialising effect that the war can have. Rather than 
thinking in terms of historical and bodily depth, where ‘majoritarian history’ and ‘the 
ego’ are essential anchoring and explanatory phenomena, it becomes possible to think 
only of the surface upon which becomings take place.  
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Conclusion 
 
I began the thesis by seeking to trace the ways in which the body was effaced or 
immobilised in certain discourses about war. I started with the strategic studies 
literature, which I argued was concerned to present an instrumental understanding of 
war which tended to exclude the body from consideration. Where it was included, it 
was understood as the passive object of an external political will; an object with which 
it is possible to do or achieve a number of things. I developed this reading in chapter 
two, in which I sought to trace the ways in which the body has been intended to stage 
an intervention into these instrumental discourses about war: body counts, and appeals 
to the dead body seek to expose the ‘truth’ about war, which is often concealed in the 
lofty discourses of statehood. For Elaine Scarry, war cannot be a means to an end, 
because the human life lost in war is an end in itself. However, my aim was to expose 
the assumptions being made about the body in these discourses. Although they do so 
with very different ethico-political priorities and agendas, I sought to show that both the 
strategic studies literature and the literature concerned with the dead body at war tend to 
make common sets of decisions about what ‘the body’ is, and what political status it 
has.  
In chapter three I developed this concern through a discussion about the interaction 
between military technology and the body. I suggested that modern military 
technologies have generally been greeted with dismay in terms of their effects on the 
integrity of the human body. Conversely, authors such as Donna Haraway welcome the 
potentially emancipating effects of modern technologies which they suggest have the 
potential to liberate ‘humanity’ from the claustrophobic confines of the human and its 
attendant disciplinary social norms. I argue that both of these perspectives tend to 
occlude the extent to which the body is active in determining its own relationship with 
technology: in determining what functions and potentials technology has. In this sense I 
tried to show that we should move towards thinking about technology in a non-
technological way. Rather than being something with autonomous status and capacities, 
technology must be invested with desire in a certain way in order to be imbued with 
certain properties. Following on from this position, in chapter four I used Deleuze and 
Guattari to develop an understanding of the body as an active and undetermined 
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potentiality which could be regarded in positive terms as a dynamic participant in the 
constitution of social reality, rather than being its passive object.  
Finally, in chapter five I deployed this new understanding of the body to illuminate 
some new avenues of insight in the case of the shell shocked soldier of the First World 
War. Throughout the thesis, I tried to gesture towards a space in various literatures 
where the body should be, or was being constructed or taken for granted in certain 
ways. Even where the body was taken into account, I sought to show that this was in an 
impoverished and devivified form. Moreover, I have tried to suggest that this limited 
understanding of the body was necessary for the sustenance of certain visions of war. In 
other words, the clarity and coherence of our understanding of ‘war’, whether as an 
instrument of inter-state policy, or as a murderous mistake in international politics, was 
predicated upon the construction and expression of the body in a certain kind of limited 
way: the body as an object for decision, as a non-political materiality or as a bounded 
and regularised reservoir for humanity conduced to a certain mode of thinking about 
war. Further, it produced certain expectations concerning the level of certainty and 
authority that ‘thinking’ itself could achieve. Contrary to this, I employed the insights 
gained from Deleuze and Guattari to chart a different mode of thinking about war, the 
body, and thought itself which was sensitive to the impulses of becoming, affect, and 
deterritorialisation as well as regularity and identity.  
My enquiry was catalysed by the impression that it was possible to identify two 
competing, and indeed contradictory, discourses about war. The first insists that war is 
an activity carried out between states for the advancement of certain goals, which are 
determined by politics. The idea of war as an instrument has produced a field of 
scholarly endeavour concerned with discovering the ‘laws of war’, or the more or less 
immutable scientific principles which govern the conduct and nature of war. Although 
this summary is a generalisation of the position found in much strategic studies 
literature, its intention is to identify a branch of thinking about war for which war is a 
knowable, governable phenomenon which can be deployed in the service of rational 
political goals. The second tendency in thinking about war held that war was a 
destabilising event which produced confusion and which was very difficult to make 
sense of. Discussing the Second World War, Paul Fussell says that ‘[f]aced with events 
so unprecedented and so inaccessible to normal models of humane understanding, 
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literature spent a lot of time standing silent and aghast’.1 An additional problem, he 
says, was the ‘difficulty of making moral sense out of circumstances and behaviour so 
destructive of normal moral assumptions’.2 In this sense, war so disrupts our social and 
mental frameworks for making sense of the world, that it presents a serious challenge to 
thought.  
I wanted to use the apparent tension between ways of thinking about war to explore the 
parameters of various ways of thinking about the body. I began from the position that 
‘the body’ cannot be accounted for through reference to nature, or by gesturing to some 
immutable material fact. This insight was reinforced by the work of Judith Butler, in 
which she illustrates that it is incoherent to posit an extra-discursive entity, when the 
very move through which this supposition is made is a discursive one.3 She says that 
‘[t]he being of life is itself constituted through selective means; as a result, we cannot 
refer to this “being” outside of the operations of power, and we must make more precise 
the specific mechanisms of power through which life is produced’.4I suggested that 
neither identity nor the body could serve as a fixed object for political analysis due to 
the contestability and malleability of these terms. However, I suggested that the body 
tends to occupy a kind of blind spot in many political discourses, whereby it is either 
excluded from consideration, or is included as bringing certain known qualities to the 
analysis. In either case, the body is being thought, but the practices through which it 
comes to emerge as a certain kind of entity are not being thought through.  
If we contest the notion that the body can be known in advance, and assumes the 
properties of an object, then this seems to have certain implications for practices of 
security and war. Pre-given identities and stable bodies can no longer be supposed to be 
independent from the practices that are intended to secure them. I explored this through 
a discussion of biopolitics, which is framed not as a politics of identity or of the body, 
but of life itself. Biopolitics emphasises the changing properties of life and the perpetual 
emergence of new forms of life. Rather than attempt to police borders, biopolitics seeks 
to regulate flow. In this sense, it seems that practices of security and war come to accept 
the impossibility of determining a priori and for all time what the body is. The referent 
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object of security is not a fixed object but an emerging one. According to the way that I 
set this discussion up in the introduction, this presents something of a problem. My 
discussion of the body began from a position of opposition to discourses which took 
either identity or the body as fixed and stable points, because I argued that these ways 
of thinking about the body effaced the moment at which the body was constructed as a 
certain kind of body: they concealed the political practices behind the appearance of the 
body. However, if new practices of security and war avoid this fallacy and concern 
themselves directly with this political point of emergence, then this begs the question of 
what is at stake with my project as I set it up in the introduction.  
In other words, there seems to be little to be gained in discussing the modes of 
organisation (territorialisation) of the body, and its vectors of deterritorialisation if this 
move has already been made by the logic of war and security. However, this conclusion 
is avoided in two ways. Firstly, I suggested that the biopolitical approach presented 
only half the picture. For Foucault, ‘biopolitics’ was coupled with the ‘anamato-politics 
of the human body’. Consequently, I suggested that the biopolitical approach would 
benefit from a more thoroughgoing consideration of the fate of the human body. 
Secondly, I suggested that there was something problematic associated with the way in 
which biopolitics took account of the unknown, or ‘contingency’. In my discussion of 
the body, I suggested that there was something important about the political practices 
which determined the emergence of a space of perception within which the work of 
politics could take place. These practices were often obscured by discourses which took 
for granted the political work that they carried out. However, this has implications for 
the way in which we think about the body which takes on a kind of dual consistency. 
On the one hand, the body is governed by certain regulatory social practices. On the 
other hand, ultimately we do not know what the body is independently of these. I 
developed this notion throughout the thesis, especially in chapters 5 and 6, and 
expanded on the idea that there was an ethical importance to this unknown, and 
unknowable character of the body. 
In this sense, the problem with biopolitics is twofold. It accounts too fully for the 
unknown or ‘contingent’ character of life, and it does not account fully enough for the 
specific ways in which bodies are disciplined and created in certain ways. These 
perceived deficiencies are troubling because incorporating the unknown into discourses 
of security seems to threaten to divest it of its ethical and critical import. This is to say, 
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the unknown no longer appears from outside dominant paradigms of security and 
possesses the ability to destabilise them. Secondly, the fact that bodies are not 
considered referent objects for analysis is interesting, as I have suggested that the image 
of ‘the body’ as object is a very partial and a-political one. However, the fact that they 
do not feature in the analysis at all means that it is very difficult to account for the 
subjective impressions, fleeting emotions and sensations which make up our political 
lives. In other words, although I am suspicious of the notion of ‘personhood’ as being 
too totalising and itself a form of discipline, I want to suggest that we must pay 
attention to the practices through which persons and subjects emerge if we are to see 
ourselves in our theories.  
My conclusions are concerned with both the organised and the disorganised body. In 
one sense, war may be considered to be a social institution through which we make 
sense. For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is social5 and ‘produces reality’,6 and 
institutions are the way in which we make sense of our desires, the way in which they 
are given a particular form.7 From this I conclude firstly that when we are talking about 
images or understandings of war we are always talking about an investment of desire 
which animates these images. Even the most depopulated images of war are images that 
have been constructed and sustained by the investment of desire. In this respect, it is not 
so much the case that it is difficult to make sense of war, since war is part of the 
apparatus through which we, as individual subjects with organised bodies, make sense. 
It is present in the formation of interests and preferences. This creates a problem for 
thinking critically about war, because it forms such a part of the world in which we live 
that we cannot easily think about its conditions of possibility. Just as the investment of 
desire somehow brings war into being, so it brings us into being, and this complicit co-
emergence makes it difficult to bring to light the political conditions enabling war, and 
to mount an effective critique.  
Just war as a social institution of war organises the body, however, so the body sustains 
and supports the integrity of this institution. I suggest that this means that reactions to 
war which take the form of confusion, a sense of dislocation, identity loss, and 
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‘disembodiment’ or ‘war neuroses’ have to be taken seriously as vectors for 
understanding war. In other words, these bodily responses to war are not an issue for 
clinical medicine or psychiatry alone, but rather they are of the utmost social and 
political importance. Because the body is both socially produced and productive of 
society, bodily disorder both indicates something about that society, and has an effect 
on it. Deleuze says that ‘[d]esire never resists oppression, however local and tiny the 
resistance, without the challenge being communicated to the capitalist system as a 
whole, and playing its part in bursting it open’.8 So war neuroses and the bodily 
affective responses associated with war have to be understood as being ‘revolutionary’ 
in that they challenge the purported ability of the social system to regulate desire and to 
organise the body in a certain way. The dualism at work here suggests that the body is 
being socially constructed as something that we can know, but that it is always evading 
and escaping this organisation: part of it always remains stubbornly unknown.  
The unknown nature of the body means that we have to take account of what we might 
call the double-structure of knowledge. On the one hand, the body is organised and 
disciplined in conformity with certain general principles of knowledge we have about it. 
This is to say, my argument has not been that categories for the description of bodies 
such as man, woman, soldier, and so on, are illusory or chimerical. On the contrary, I 
have argued for their potency in constructing a certain kind of body. However, I have 
tried to show that these foundations for knowledge do not exhaust the dimension of the 
body which is unknown, and therefore that they are provisional knowledges based on 
particular sets of circumstances. I would argue that the central distinction made in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work is between different modes of knowledge, which are 
reflected in the difference between ‘being’ and ‘becoming’. This distinction is reflected 
in a variety of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts. For example, Deleuze and Guattari 
discuss the ‘order-word’, which is an instruction which demarcates the parameters of 
social reality9. For example, Moira Gatens says that ‘[t]he order-word expresses a 
possible world as if it were the only and inevitable world’.10 In this sense the order 
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word imposes a certain regulatory understanding on the world, and acts as a kind of 
‘prohibition of transformation’11 or a ‘social prohibition... against metamorphosis’.12 
However, Deleuze and Guattari say that ‘the order word is also something else, 
inseparably connected: it is like a warning cry or a message to flee. It would be over-
simplifying to say that flight is a reaction against the order-word; rather, it is included in 
it, as its other face in a complex assemblage, its other component’.13 This is to say that 
the process of regulation or determination produces at the same time the conditions for 
escape and becoming. This double-structure exists throughout Deleuze and Guattari’s 
work. For example, the organised body is always accompanied by the body-in-
becoming. They say that ‘[w]e are oedipalized, we are castrated...[and] We are all 
schizos! We are all perverts! We are all libidos that are too viscous and too fluid’.14 
What this means for the body is that the known aspects, the regularised features of 
social organisation, and the unknown aspects are co-present. Therefore it does not really 
make sense that we should choose between being or becoming, since both are aspects of 
reality. In this sense, my purpose in the thesis has been to argue that what we know 
about the body is not everything that we could know, and that is not because our 
scientific apparatuses are too primitive, but rather it is because the unknown is the 
eternal companion of the known.  
In this sense, it is not a simple matter of choosing between two structures of knowledge 
which we might classify as being concerned with being and becoming, or the singular 
or the general, since both are co-features of a certain moment. Rather, it is a case of 
making an ethical decision as to which we choose to emphasise or develop. Michel 
Foucault alludes to this in his introduction to Anti-Oedipus, in which he says that Anti-
Oedipus is a book of ethics15 whose ‘strategic adversary is fascism... not only historical 
fascism... but also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behaviour’.16 
He also lists as the book’s ‘enemy number one’ ‘the sad militants, the terrorists of 
theory, those who would preserve the pure order of politics and political discourse. 
Bureaucrats of the revolution and civil servants of Truth’.17 I understand this to mean 
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that any theory or mode of understanding which aspires to general applicability is to be 
objected to on the grounds that it must be to a degree hostile to difference and 
becoming. This is the case in the sense that generality must rely on stable concepts and 
identities, and the preservation of these must dismiss or repress flights or becomings, or 
classify them under the sign of deviance. This relates to the distinction I made in 
chapter 5 between history and becoming, and between chronos and aion, whereby the 
former refers to the relationships between bodies and the latter to the becoming of 
bodies.18 I want to argue that there is something at stake here beyond a semantic or 
discursive (in the limited senses of the words) point.  
In my introduction I suggested that thinking from the perspective of the body might 
militate towards thinking in singular terms, rather than in general or systematic ones. I 
want here to clarify what is might be meant by ‘singular thought’ in the context of the 
ground covered by the thesis. What it does not mean is thinking in a particular context, 
rather than having some abstract notion of how things are, because context may be 
thought of as a framework of familiarising markers or signs. On the contrary, the kind 
of thinking that I have been trying to propose is if anything an exercise in 
defamiliarisation. Massumi says that ‘[p]hilosophy is a labor of decontextualization’.19 
Thus involves a heightened attention to the unusual, non-generic and disorientating in 
any situation. Discussing the work of performance artist Stelarc, Massumi says that his 
‘project is to invent an indeterminate bodily future, in an uncommon intensity of 
sensation packing more multiplicity into bodily singularity’.20 What this means is that 
the performance involves expressing and experiencing the body as a non-generic thing. 
Stelarc may dramatise this through the hung or suspended body.21 I have tried to do it 
through the body at war to sharpen our attention to the war that is always already taking 
place over bodies between the singular and the general.  
I have suggested that the body is a privileged site from which to argue for a singular 
mode of thought, because of the extent to which the body is unknown, or rather, 
plunges us into the unknown. I have suggested that this exploration in the unknown, or 
this openness to the future, is what constitutes ethics in Deleuze’s Spinozist reading. 
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Deleuze refers to the work of ‘bearing witness to “an inhumanity immediately 
experienced in the body as such”’.22 This is because the idea of ‘humanity’ involves a 
given (general) system of knowledge about what a body is and can do. The ‘inhuman’, 
on the other hand, suffers no such constraint. But to argue for the centrality of the body 
is problematic in the sense that it is not immediately clear the body is being 
distinguished from, in other words, what is not the body. To give any positive answer 
seems to endanger the commitment to openness on the question of what the capabilities 
and limitations of the body are. In the thesis I have referred to the body relatively 
unproblematically as standing for this unknown which intrudes onto, and disrupts 
systems of knowledge: it is in this way that I have sought to use the body at war to call 
into question what we know about the body, and what and how we know more 
generally. Rather than subscribe to generalised modes of thought, I have argued for a 
more incremental, singular mode of knowledge that takes the unknown as a provocation 
for thought, rather than as something in need of calculation and domestication.  
I have argued for an understanding of the body as a politically constructed and 
contested entity which at the same time actively participates in the social conditions of 
its organisation through the investment of desire. This does not mean that we can 
‘know’ the degree to which desire is invested, because this takes place on an 
unconscious level,23 but it does mean that desire can alter the conditions of knowing 
through escaping from these investments. It is this simultaneous movement of 
capture/escape which means that the body is both socially organised and in a constant 
state of becoming which is essentially unknown. This journey that the body makes 
through the unknown, through affect and sensation, disturbs our settled patterns of 
knowing so that the principles of identity, which might be thought of as units of 
knowledge, are unsettled. John Mullarkey suggests that we should ‘not ask how the 
subject gains its experience but how experience gives us a subject’.24 I have argued for 
a repositioning of the body at the heart of politics through Deleuze and Guattari’s 
insistence on the sociality of desire. According to this position, desire directly invests 
the social world, and the impression that it does not is the consequence of certain 
disciplinary measures exemplified by Oedipus. But what this means is that the 
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organised, private body identified as mine is itself the result of a political intervention 
which cauterises desire at the level of the ‘personal’.  
In this way, the thesis makes a contribution to the literature which seeks to assert the 
importance of the body for thinking about politics and society. This has often taken 
place in the light of a perceived alignment between ‘reason’ and ‘masculinity’ and 
between ‘body’ and ‘femininity’,25 and this has meant that the impetus for the inclusion 
of the body has frequently come from feminist thinkers. Claire Colebrook argues that 
there is a distinction between positions such as those of Moira Gatens, Genevieve Lloyd 
and Elizabeth Grosz, who try to think through the body in its materiality, and that of 
Judith Butler, who Colebrook suggests sustains the distinction between discourse and 
the body and thereby reinforces the ultimately inaccessible nature of the material.26 In 
the thesis I have avoided a direct engagement with these debates, and have used 
Butler’s insights concerning the essentially political and discursive nature of our 
knowledge of the body. However, one contribution made by the thesis is the implicit 
refusal of the distinction between modes of knowledge and objects of knowledge, or 
‘discourse’ and ‘materiality’. Indeed, I have sought to show that the positing of such a 
distinction is itself political.  
This is not to say that the appearance of a distinction does not exist. As Eugene Holland 
says, ‘the two spheres [of representation: psychoanalysis and political economy] don’t 
just appear separate; under capitalism, they are in fact separate… [however] [e]ven 
though capitalism segregates reproduction from social life, it nevertheless delegates to 
the nuclear family the task of forming subjectivity in its own image’.27 However, it is to 
insist, with Maja Zehfuss, that the demarcation of the material from the social is itself a 
political act which is effaced in the supposition that this distinction ‘naturally’ exists.28 I 
have sought to focus on the distinction between being and becoming (or 
territorialisation and deterritorialisation) whether these tendencies are found in bodies, 
literature, or forms of social organisation. Therefore I have focused on the distinction 
between forms of organisation rather than the substance that is organised. In this sense, 
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the anxiety about how we are to access the material world falls away. Despite not 
engaging directly with these debates, and notwithstanding my acceptance of Butler’s 
work, this thesis contributes to these literatures most importantly by refusing the 
discourse/materiality distinction and by repositioning the body as a focus for attention.  
In the thesis I situate the body as being something undetermined which does not have 
fixed boundaries or a ‘natural’ set of characteristics. For Deleuze and Guattari, this 
mutability is as far as they will go in permitting a definition of ‘humanity’. They say 
that the way to think ‘man’ is ‘[n]ot man as the king of creation, but rather as the being 
who is in intimate contact with the profound life of all forms or all types of being’.29 I 
sought to expose the limitations of labels such as ‘humanity’, ‘man’, ‘soldier’ and so 
on, as I argued that all such categories represented attempts to define and thus limit the 
capacities of the body. Moreover, I argued that it is erroneous to be fearful of the effects 
of technology on the body, as technology is always being constituted in certain ways by 
the body, and because the body has no natural form or stable boundary that could be 
imperilled by the arrival of technology. In this sense, the thesis is a contribution to, and 
a critique of, those literatures which see something intensely and intrinsically 
threatening in the increasing sophistication of technology.30 In addition, the thesis is 
intended as a contribution to those who have seen something emancipating in the arrival 
of the greater intimacy between man and machine.31 The thesis tempers predictions that 
new hybrid forms of subjectivity may produce a new and more inclusive politics, in that 
it refuses the notion that technology can have any inevitable effect. Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that ‘a schizophrenic taste for the tool moves it away from work and 
toward free action, a schizophrenic taste for the weapon turns it into a means for 
peace’.32 Results are never given in advance, and the categories ‘humanity’ and 
‘technology’ cannot determine the outcome of encounters between bodies. One cannot 
‘technologise’ oneself out of an ethical dilemma.   
I have argued that the body is an important focus for ethics by virtue of the 
impossibility of determining in advance what it is capable of. In other words, it is the 
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unknown, and unknowable dimension of the body which accounts for its ethical 
centrality. This insistence is in part intended to counter the violent effects of strategies 
of knowing which tends to produce a marginalisation or suppression of that which 
cannot be assimilated into a certain framework of knowledge. This includes not only 
bodies of a certain type, but also the impulses, affects and tendencies within bodies 
which elude control. Contrary to this, I have highlighted the way in which Deleuze and 
Guattari focus on a politics of becoming, which emphasises risky and open-ended 
experimentation over certainty.33 Deleuze and Guattari define a body by its affects,34 
and affects are never given in advance but are the consequences of the encounters that 
the body has and the journey that it makes. I have shown that their ‘revolutionary’ 
politics entails making space for the unknown within society, so that a properly 
‘democratic’ politics is not understood as one that reifies particular identities through a 
politics of representation, but rather is one which is open to a politics of the ‘to come’.35 
This entails a receptivity to emergent forms of life, which are not organised through 
identification or representation. Nor are they the objects for calculation or apprehended 
as a coming security risk, as appears to be the case with the biopolitical imaginary. 
Rather, they are encountered on their own terms and apprehended as having the 
capacity to transform existing social relations and political boundaries. I have sought to 
show, through my discussion on shell shock, for example, that there are multiple 
moments of opportunity for this politics of the to-come brought about by the immanent 
instability and unpredictability of the body.  
This argument has some affinity with that made by Brian Massumi who argues from a 
Deleuzian perspective for ‘a radical politics equal to the “radicality” of the expanded 
empirical field itself. Radical politics is an inherently risky undertaking because it 
cannot predict the outcome of its actions with certainty’.36 This argument comes 
through an exploration of the undetermined and excessive nature of the body from a 
Deleuzian-Spinozist perspective.37 William Connolly has also described a ‘politics of 
becoming’38 which ‘emerges out of the energies, suffering, and lines of flight available 
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to culturally defined differences’.39 Jean-Luc Nancy has argued for a privileging of 
becoming (or the to-come) over being in conceptions of community, and for the 
ungrounded, undetermined ‘foundation’ for all being,40 and Giorgio Agamben writes of 
the coming community and of singularity as a focus for ethical encounter.41 The brevity 
of these sketched postures suffice only to allude to the existence of a ‘body’ of literature 
concerned to rescue the unknown from denigration and to position it as a positive 
ethico-political principle which can effectively critique the violence done by forms of 
knowledge/power which seek to control the parameters of social change and to ‘secure’ 
identities, albeit sometimes under the guise of ‘representative democracy’.  
I align myself with this project (if it can be classified thus) in the sense that I too have 
sought to emphasise the unknown character of the body whose ‘identity’ may be 
understood as being a retroactive attempt to make sense of this unknowability. 
Moreover, I have ethically privileged the unknown body over the organised social body 
which has attributed to it a certain identity and set of functions. When Deleuze says that 
Spinoza’s conviction that ‘We do not even know what a body can do’ is the most ethical 
statement possible ,42 this is because it refrains from foreclosing the possibilities of the 
body by determining in advance what the body can do and therefore seeks to avoid any 
life-limiting restrictions on what the body can be, become and encounter. But it is 
arguably also because ethics, in this understanding, is immanent to the process of 
encounter and change itself. In other words, ethics is not a thing, or a set of criteria for 
the judgement of certain actions according to which they may be determined as being 
ethically sound or not. Rather, ethics is a process.43  
September 11th 2001 saw a surge of interest in the ‘unknown’ as a problem for security. 
Donald Rumsfeld said in 2002 that ‘[o]ur challenge in this new century is a difficult 
one: to defend our nation against the unknown, the unseen, and unexpected… [to] deter 
and defeat adversaries that have not yet emerged to challenge us’.44 He has also insisted 
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that ‘one cannot ‘wait for threats to emerge and be validated’45 before taking action 
against them, given the demonstrably devastating results of doing so. What this signals 
is a shift in perceptions of the role of the military and security forces from protecting 
against entities which are known to be threatening to pre-empting, preventing or 
precluding46 the emergence of those which may become threatening. This leads Mikkel 
Vedby Rasmussen, following Ulrich Beck, to diagnose the ‘colonisation of the 
future’.47 US security priorities after September 11th seem to indicate that the military 
and security establishments have begun to take seriously the importance of the 
unknown to the extent that they have introduced it as a central platform for 
contemporary security doctrine.48 This is problematic because I have sought to argue 
for the ethical significance of the unknown and its potential capacity to unsettle or 
subvert established social norms. 
This is a vexing issue which I do not claim the ability to be able to satisfactorily settle. 
However, there are two possible responses arising from the thesis which constitute a 
contribution to the literature on the ‘security’ of the unknown, as well as the 
‘poststructuralist’ work which seeks to claim for it a special ethico-political 
significance. Firstly, in my introduction I suggested that the approach taken in this 
thesis with respect to the unknown could be distinguished from that taken by the 
literature on ‘biopolitics’. I suggested that this difference lay in determining the 
calculability of the unknown in the form of contingency. In this sense, knowledge 
regulates the mutability of life through the advancing powers of scientific calculation: 
our knowledge of the unknown frames the unknown, qua contingency. I quoted Nikolas 
Rose: ‘Biopolitics was inextricably bound up with the rise of the life sciences, the 
human sciences, clinical medicine’.49 According to the biopolitical accounts, the new 
sciences of complexity are active in determining our understanding of the unknown and 
its function within the social world. In this way, new frameworks for knowledge create 
new objects for securitisation. This is the inverse of the way in which I conceived of the 
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political function of the unknown, which I saw as impacting on frameworks of 
knowledge and possibly interrupting or unsettling their operation. In this sense, I drew a 
tentative distinction between contingency and unknown, whereby I presented the 
former as a field for calculability and the latter as an event which defied calculation. 
Secondly, I wish to qualify this claim and to suggest that ethics is not inherent to any 
particular theoretical framework. In other words, I want to suggest that it is not possible 
to conceive of two distinct concepts (call them ‘the unknown’ and ‘contingency’) to 
ascribe to the former an ethical function and to the latter a security one, and then to take 
comfort in the fact that we have ‘sorted out’ these troubling questions of ethical action, 
and have reclaimed a liberating concept from the jaws of militarisation. This would be 
to misunderstand the function of theory, in Deleuze’s sense. Deleuze says that theory is 
‘exactly like a tool box’,50 and the tool in itself does not lend itself to a particular task: 
‘a schizophrenic taste for the tool moves it away from work and toward free action, a 
schizophrenic taste for the weapon turns it into a means for peace’.51 What this means it 
that we should not be dismayed that the Israeli Defence Force can find much of use in A 
Thousand Plateaus,52 and nor should we expect to be able to determine a priori 
between contingency and the unknown. To do so would be a question of judgement. 
However, I have tried to argue that we are in fact committed to a work of ethics 
according to which we cannot make such distinctions in advance or once and for all. 
Rather, ethical work is a matter of the risky, incremental experimentation in which we 
must determine on a case-by-case basis the possibilities for becoming and the ethical 
possibilities of the unknown. In this sense, my contribution is to suggest that we limit 
our expectation when it comes to theory and politics, and to insist that the ethical work 
immanent to reading, thinking, writing and acting our way through these can never be 
deferred or evaded.  
Against Objections  
I argued at the start that certain discourses on war exclude the body from consideration. 
However, the restricted scope of strategic studies literature on war is acknowledged in 
the literature itself, which occasionally laments its inability to account satisfactorily for 
                                                          
50 Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault ‘Intellectuals and Power’ p. 208 
51 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p. 444 
52 Eyal Weizman ‘The Art of War: Deleuze, Guattari, Debord, and the Israeli Defence Force’ at  
http://info.interactivist.net/node/5324 Accessed 09/07/09 
223 
 
the lives lived and lost in war, but presents this as being an evil necessary to allow the 
clear-headed analysis of war.53 In addition, the boundaries of ‘strategic studies’ bleed 
into military history and other forms of writing about war which are more concerned 
with the experiences of those who fight it. Therefore, it would be possible to object 
firstly that I take to task strategic studies for not doing something which it never 
purports to be able to do—indeed, which it expressly denies being able to do. The same 
objection could be made to my argument with respect to other branches of writing about 
war, for example, those which strive to challenge the callous logic of strategy,54 and 
those which seek to oppose the utility of war on the grounds that it disregards the death 
and destruction intrinsic to war.55 These positions are crafted with a certain strategic 
enemy in mind, and therefore to lambast them on the grounds that they stage their 
assault on the clearest grounds they can find seems to miss the point.  
At this stage my defence would be quite straightforward: my use of these discourses did 
not take the form of a critique. My purpose was to expose the way in which the body 
may be understood as a passive object of political will, or as an immutably material 
thing outside of political construction. However, I did not mean to suggest that these 
discourses were uniquely culpable in constructing the body thus. Nor was it particularly 
to condemn these modes of engaging (or not) with the body. I aimed simply to draw 
attention to them and, in so doing, amplify the extent to which they are political and 
contestable even when they purport to be otherwise. However, it is possible to level a 
more serious criticism of the thesis on the grounds that the argument that I make is not a 
logical one. In other words, the various discourses of war which I analyse are not shown 
to require the reading of the body that I go on to provide in order to be internally 
coherent. I do not demonstrate some contradiction in the purpose or position of a 
discourse and then furnish a solution in the form of a new mode of conceiving of the 
problem. On the contrary, I start out with an understanding of the body (as political and 
non-natural) which is clearly incompatible with that presented in a number of 
discourses I subsequently address.  
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However, my purpose was slightly different. I aimed to read this ‘non-natural’ body 
through these discourses of war in order to create the space within them for the 
destabilising of their position on the body. I then wanted to read the Deleuzo-Guattarian 
body back into understandings of war in order to suggest possible alternative modes of 
engagement with the problem of war and the body. In this sense, my project was an 
ethical one from the start concerned with widening and dramatising this space of the 
unknown which was concealed in many of these ways of writing about war. It was for 
this reason that I was so taken with the apparent tension between literatures on war 
which claimed that everything could be known, and those which focused on the extent 
to which war presented a challenge to knowledge. From here I sought to show that all 
knowledge is provisional to the extent that it cannot secure itself in some irreducible 
material ground. In this sense, my rejoinder to the above criticism would be that it is not 
legitimate for any mode of knowledge to absent itself of the need to take account of the 
contestability of the body on the practical grounds that it needs to focus on other things. 
This would serve to reinforce the impression that the body is a natural object that one 
can either discuss or omit depending on the methodological focus of the enquiry in 
question. On the contrary, I have tried to show that this is not possible; that the body is 
always in play, both in the way in which desire invests the image of war in question, 
and in the way that its construction-as-excludable is always contained within the 
discourse as a concealed political gesture.  
A further potential criticism is the way in which the thesis made use of a variety of 
different bodies at war to illuminate the discussion. I ranged across a number of wars 
spanning the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and took account of a variety of 
different experiences from soldiers and civilians of many different kinds. It would be 
possible to suggest, therefore, that the thesis is not sufficiently systematic and that it 
takes a broad and unrepresentative survey of experience from across the historical 
spectrum which fails to add up to anything substantive. These criticisms would be 
appropriate if this were a thesis with ambitions to be representative or to present a 
survey of experience or a generalised way of thinking about bodies and war. However, I 
aim to interact with and respond to writing about bodies and war in a way which 
emphasises the singular moments of becoming, and the way in which these were 
effaced or ‘reorganised’ in accordance with the needs of instrumentalism and clarity. 
The use of multiple ‘examples’ would be problematic if they were intended to serve as 
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examples of some general principle. This was not the case, however. Rather, I sought to 
expose the ways in which ‘general principles’ could be constructed out of the fluid and 
the irregular. I used multiple expressions of bodies at war, rather than focusing on a 
single example, because I did not intend my expositions of bodies at war to serve as 
examples of anything, but as provocations for a different way of thinking.  
The thesis marshalled a variety of different genres of literature in order to illuminate my 
thinking about the body and war. Though I hesitate to make the comparison, this 
eclecticism mirrors Deleuze and Guattari’s own method, whereby they ‘steal from other 
disciplines’56 and use a wide variety of sources from mathematics to literature to 
ethnology to fiction to psychoanalysis. In part, the intention behind this is to set up a 
kind of equivalence between forms of literature. For example, Deleuze and Guattari 
would deny that Karl Marx is a political thinker, but Franz Kafka is not, or that 
Immanuel Kant is a philosopher but William Burroughs is not.57 In other words, the use 
of different genres of literature is intended to unsettle the claim to authority made by 
any particular hegemonic mode of discourse, and thereby to create the space for 
different forms of ‘truth telling’ in order ultimately to challenge the possibility of there 
being a truth about the body and war. For example, in the thesis I used strategic studies, 
history, psychoanalysis, fiction (novels and poetry), and a variety of other literatures. I 
did so in the hope that this would undermine the claims to be the authoritative voice on 
‘war’ implied by certain discourses. In his introduction to Anti-Oedipus Foucault writes 
that ‘Deleuze and Guattari care so little for power that they have tried to neutralize the 
effects of power linked to their own discourse’.58 Therefore surely writing in the spirit 
of Deleuze and Guattari ought to strive to do the same.  
Finally, there are a number of potential ethical criticisms that could be made of the 
thesis. The first arises in the context of the suspicion that bringing the body to bear on 
politics is a dangerous move which can all too easily act to expose the body to the 
violence of sovereign power. This seems to have been Hannah Arendt’s concern when 
she says that ‘a whole host of modern scientific experiments in social engineering, 
biochemistry, brain surgery, etc... [may act so as to] kill man, not necessarily as a living 
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organism, but qua man’.59 Concerns about the possible implications of sovereign power 
taking bodily life itself as its object60 may tend to produce the conclusion that the 
exclusion of the body from politics is a necessary condition for the existence of a 
meaningful politics at all. However, I have tried to suggest that excluding the body from 
politics and conjuring the vision of a rational, cerebral political space itself does harm. I 
have argued that the body is not simply ‘excluded’ from politics, as though it were an 
object which could be placed inside or outside a zone of concern, but that it must first 
be construed as an object which can be thus manipulated. It is this imaginary of the 
body as the passive object of will which is the potential adjunct to violence, and it is 
this which I have attempted to counter in my insistence on the body’s dynamism and 
vitality.  
The second potential point of objection is the way in which I have sometimes tended to 
portray bodies in pain in what might be regarded as positive light. It could be argued 
that this indicates a disregard for the suffering of the bodies in question, and that I am 
enacting my own instrumentalisation by tethering these suffering bodies to my own 
purpose in illustrating the malleability and fluidity of the body. In this sense, it could be 
argued that the body at war serves as a useful point at which to bring to bear a 
Deleuzian approach precisely because it stands as the exemplar of the damaged body, 
and that in this sense the enterprise is an unethical exploitation of historic pain. 
Although this is a difficult area, I would defend myself on two counts. Firstly, the 
bodies at war which I have sought to give expression to have not been confined to 
suffering bodies, or bodies in pain. Indeed, I have sought to challenge the impression 
that the body at war can be understood primarily through the framework of suffering 
and abjection, instead insisting upon active bodily engagement with war, and the 
possibility of feelings of euphoria, purpose and pleasure. Secondly, when I have 
considered the distressed body, I have not primarily done so in terms of its subjective 
impact on the sufferer, but rather in order to indicate the ways in which certain bodily 
affects can undermine the hold of personhood, identity and ego. Deleuze frequently 
refers to masochism, for example, as something which is less to do with the infliction of 
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suffering, and more associated with the desire to break the bonds of personhood.61 In 
this thesis, I have sought to take the suffering body seriously as a political entity which 
has implications for social organisation and is not merely a matter for personal 
negotiation.  
Implications for International Relations 
Julian Reid points out that Deleuze and Guattari have not been much used within the 
field of International Relations (IR).62 One of the exceptions to this has been his own 
work, which has tended to focus on the concept of the ‘war machine’.63 Reid uses the 
concept of the war machine to speak to a preoccupation within IR concerning the 
relationship between politics, war and forms of governance. He argues that Deleuze and 
Guattari can provide a useful supplement, or corrective, to Foucault’s thinking about 
war and politics. Foucault is concerned with the ‘genealogy of military-strategic theory 
and liberal forms of power’.64 But he never calls into question the relationship between 
the state and war. For Deleuze and Guattari, however, the war machine is exterior and 
irreducible to the state. So while the war machine may be captured by the state and used 
as a tool by it, this relationship is never stable as the war machine remains outside the 
state and excessive of it. Reid says that this enables the concept to ‘offer...an account of 
state power as conditioned by its appropriation of war and its institutionalisation of war 
in the form of military force and violence... [and also] an account of resistance to the 
state through the invocation of the power of war against its capture and appropriation by 
the state’.65 This enables us to rethink Clausewitz and Foucault on the relationship 
between war and power. Whereas for them strategy enables a new mode of the 
application of power, following Deleuze and Guattari this mode of power may be 
driving and usurping the state rather than serving it.  
Reid says that the war machine is ‘one of the most generally under-researched aspects 
of Deleuze’s thought’.66 This may be in part because of the difficulty of the concept, to 
the extent that Paul Patton suggests that ‘there are reasons to doubt that the war 
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machine concept is likely to be effective in the form in which it is presented, [although] 
the idea of a type of assemblage which has an affinity with processes of 
deterritorialisation may still turn out to be useful’.67 One reason why the war machine is 
such a problematic concept is the complex relation it has to war. The war machine is 
not reducible to the military industrial complex,68 and nor does it refer simply to system 
of governance or a framework of regulatory power: it also refers to the possibilities for 
subverting or escaping from this system. Deleuze and Guattari say with respect to the 
war machine that ‘the very conditions that make the State or World war machine 
possible... continually recreate unexpected possibilities for counterattack, unforeseen 
initiatives determining revolutionary, popular, minority, mutant machines’.69 So as with 
many of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts, the ‘war machine’ is immanently doubled in 
a way which seems to promise much but which acts to inhibit appropriations for IR.  
I have been interested in trying to make the concept of the war machine speak to IR, but 
with certain reservations which can be set out in the context of this thesis. In the first 
place, it seems to me essential that we do not become so enamoured of the possibility of 
setting Deleuze and Guattari into conversation with the field of IR that we give 
everything away to the terms established by that field. Of course, it is always 
problematic to speak of a scholarly field in such general terms, and never more so as 
with a field as unwieldy and ill-defined as IR. But there is a danger that in order to be 
taken seriously in a discourse in which states, war and the international/global system 
are crucial units for analysis and objects for consideration we take from Deleuze and 
Guattari what they have to say on these matters alone, and leave the rest. This would be 
a mistake, because it is the dual nature of these concepts which gives them their ethical 
import. This is to say, we are never determined by systems of power, we always have a 
choice in the application of theory. Where one ‘pole’ of the concept of the war machine 
concerns global norms of power and war, the other is associated with ‘the drawing of a 
creative line of flight, the composition of a smooth space and of the movement of 
people in that space’.70 Power and counter-power are co-emergent.  
I want to suggest that the concept of the war machine has the potential to offer 
something to contemporary anxieties about war and security. As I have mentioned, in 
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the aftermath of September 11th 2001, a range of security practices were introduced 
which seemed to involve an internalisation of the problem of the unknown into the 
security discourse itself. This move was also seen in the biopolitics literature which 
took contingency as an object for calculability for the new strategies of securitisation. I 
suggested that this was problematic because I wanted to conceive of the unknown as 
something which came from outside the prevailing frameworks of political power and 
had the potential to challenge or unsettle them, thus creating the space for new forms of 
emergence which were unsecured and incalculable. In other words, the internalisation 
of the unknown seems to undermine any faith we might have in the critical or 
insurrectionary potential it has. However, through the concept of the war machine it 
may be possible to see our way through these issues, albeit in ways I have yet to fully 
think through. As I have suggested, the war machine is irreducible to the state: it is 
fundamentally exterior to it, although they may serve the same purpose for a time. What 
this means is that the war machine is not amenable to the forms of knowing that the 
state enforces, which attend to principles of identity and the stability of being. In other 
words, the strategies of power of the war machine might look very much like those 
described by the US National Security Strategy 2002.  
However, this does not mean that we should merely use the war machine concept to 
augment the impression that there has been a change in practices of security/war with 
respect to the unknown. As I have suggested, Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts tend to 
be doubled and bipolar, and the same goes for the war machine. The war machine is 
used to refer to literature,71 modes of thought and forms of subjectivity. It has ‘many 
varied meanings’.72 Ultimately what it refers to is a vector of deterritorialisation: it is 
the ‘deterritorialized par excellence’.73 It is precisely because it is ‘not uniformly 
defined’74 which means that the apparent identity of contemporary security practices 
with the deterritorialised strategy of power associated with the war machine should not 
cause despair. It is not the case that the unknown emerges from without and counters 
established power relations, though Deleuze and Guattari suggest that this was once the 
case, when the war machine stood for an ‘outside’ and was not yet global. It is rather 
the case that mutation and change are immanent to the war machine itself and can come 
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from anywhere: ‘an “ideological”, scientific, or artistic movement can be a potential 
war machine’.75  
Deleuze and Guattari refer to ‘two kinds of war machine’ that confront each other.76 I 
would suggest that this way of thinking about the war machine has something to offer 
the current concern that modes of security are becoming immanent to modes of life, and 
therefore that the emergence of the unknown no longer has the political impact it once 
did. Rather, this challenge is being waged immanently to the war machine. How exactly 
this might work in terms of an engagement with developments in war and security has 
yet to be fully worked out, but it must depend absolutely on a commitment to what 
Deleuze and Guattari call ‘revolutionary politics’. This is to say, the relevance of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the war machine, and their work more generally, has 
the potential to bring to IR an insistence on the ethical unknown that exists at the heart 
of every theory, and which feeds directly into the practice of international relations 
itself. In other words, no concept developed here can on its own critique, diagnose or 
support any development in the international system. Not only does this notion suspend 
the ethical obligation of the scholar/activist to determine the work done by the 
theoretical tool, but it imposes an artificial distinction between scholar and activist, 
between theory and world. Rather, as Deleuze says, ‘[t]here is only action, the action of 
theory, the action of praxis, in the relation of relays and networks’.77  
I have suggested that the body may be able to offer us an alternative mode of knowing 
and thinking which does not depend on categorical judgements or general claims to 
truth: that rather than being an object for thought, the body may productively be 
considered as a cipher for it. This is a kind of knowing that does not depend on identity 
but rather exists alongside it, attentive to the slippages and the sensations which do not 
‘add up’ to a coherent or organised whole. I referred to the indefinable sense of unease 
or horror which may be generative of a variety of political affects. For example, in 
Brian Massumi’s essay on the US Homeland Security colour-coding threat system, he 
says that ‘[t]he whole populations became a networked jumpiness...Jacked into the 
same modulation of feeling, bodies acted in unison without necessarily acting alike’.78 
Tim O’Brien’s fictional account of the way in which a sense of displaced unease 
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affected US soldiers in Vietnam differs in the sense that this unease had not been 
tethered to a meta-political cause and seemed to have no political import, or be 
amenable to being incorporated into existing frameworks for interpretation of the 
Vietnam War. But this, for me, is precisely the point. Rather than contributing to the 
vast assembled knowledge on ‘the Vietnam War’ as a geo-political event, bodily 
sensations such as those described by O’Brien serve to challenge the completeness of 
this mode of understanding the war, and to suggest multiple singular affective responses 
to the war which do not add up to a new understanding but rather insist upon the 
impossibility of ‘adding up’. In this sense the way in which knowledge gestures towards 
completion is always being deferred by the bodily unknown.  
While this form of ‘knowing’ may appear to be frustratingly contrary and insubstantial, 
I would insist that the point is precisely not to devise a system of knowledge which can 
complete with or stand alongside already existing systems. Rather, the point is to 
highlight the continual residuum of the unknown which exists alongside the most 
totalising systems of knowledge, and, indeed, is produced by them at the boundary of 
what they capture and define. The body is important for this task due to its ethical 
significance as something which cannot be foreclosed or predetermined. Referring to 
‘the body’ aims to capture the doubled emergence of the body as organised social 
organism, and the body as unknown: these bodies are always co-emergent. Elizabeth 
Grosz says that ‘[t]his capacity for becoming other, or simply becoming, is not 
something that culture simply imposes on an otherwise inert nature but is part of the 
nature of nature itself’.79 One does not have to place the ‘unknown’ aspects of the body 
on the side of nature and the organised and known dimensions on the side of society or 
culture. Instead of such a division, it is more productive to think of a line of becoming, 
of emergence, which is co-productive of the socially organised body and the unknown 
body. Therefore, situating the unknown body at the heart of the ethico-political project 
of rethinking thinking does not involve the anticipation of some distant political 
horizon. Rather, the‘unknown body’ is not an identifiable being-apart, but is the eternal 
companion of the organised, subjectified, identified body: it is immanent to us.  
The contention that the unknown is an important companion to the known, the 
exploration of which is an ethically significant task, has implications for how we 
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practice IR. One way in which this is the case is in terms of how we think about the 
events which tend to be the subjects of IR. Generally, events are used as material for the 
development and sustenance of certain theories from which they are formally distinct.  
Contestation emerges around the types of causes which are believed to be efficient in 
producing a particular outcome. James Der Derian says that ‘[i]n the current study... of 
international relations, events are neatly broken down into narrative accounts of 
cause/effect or rational models of independent/dependent variables’.80 Moreover, as a 
discipline, IR has tended to be preoccupied with striving to predict future occurrences 
based on a specific analysis of the past. John Lewis Gaddis says that ‘[t]heories provide 
a way of packaging patterns from the past in such a way as to make them usable in the 
present as guides to the future’.81 Hans Morgenthau claimed to have devised in Politics 
Among Nations a ‘science of international politics’.82 Generally, the focus for critique 
in such approaches is the ability of the theory to appropriately analyse and make sense 
of events in the world in order that it may predict future events.  
Generally left unexamined is the status of the empirical events themselves and the 
relationship they bear to a certain mode of reasoning. Nor, I would suggest, is the type 
of event we ought to be interested in called into question. It is assumed to be self-
evident that what should be of interest to IR are the relationships between states, 
exemplified by war, and that wars exist for analysis by various theoretical perspectives 
which are brought to bear on them. In this thesis, I discussed war as a general 
occurrence (I was not concerned with any one particular war) and as a singular one, in 
the sense that I was concerned to explore the non-generalisable aspects of war which 
were expressed through certain bodily affects. In the latter discussion, I deployed 
Deleuze’s concept of the event, which refers to something which cannot be 
accommodated by patterns of empirical causation or firmly located in time. Rather, 
Deleuze’s concept of the event unsettles the frameworks for conceptualising causation 
in the material world. This material causation does not unproblematically exist, for 
Deleuze, but it exists as the consequence of a particular mode of social and epistemic 
organisation which categorises objects or occurrences in specific ways, and regulates 
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the relationships between them. In other words, while it may look as though IR is 
merely reporting on events in the world, it was actually simultaneously constructing 
them, together with the particular understanding of the world in which they take place.  
The function of the concept of the event in Deleuze’s sense is precisely to call into 
question the naturalness and inevitablility of these social and empirical rules upon 
which IR (and other disciplines) seem only to be reporting. The problem with the way 
in which we in IR habitually think about events is that they presuppose continuity in the 
person who is doing the thinking. In other words, if I am theorising about the world, I 
am somehow placed outside it, and able to survey various occurrences and chart their 
impact without myself being transformed by them. This view depends on a radical faith 
in the identity of the thinking subject. For Deleuze, on the other hand, the event is 
something like a becoming: it is transformative, and it transforms the objects with 
which we thought we were dealing, as well as the causal relations between them. He 
says that ‘[i]t is not easy to think in terms of the event. All the harder since thought 
itself then becomes an event’.83 There is no a priori distinction between material events 
in the world and events of thought, since it is in the nature of the event to degrade such 
differences, which are themselves the consequence of a particular mode of contingent 
organisation.  
I would suggest that this indicates that IR should be attentive to different types of event 
in the world, and different modes of transformation. It might be suggested that I have 
written very much in conformity with IR orthodoxy in choosing to write about war. 
However, my intention has been to illustrate the double structure of events such as war. 
I have argued that the body is on the one hand an unknown, and on the other hand is 
socially organised in accordance with a certain framework of knowledge. Similarly, on 
the one hand war is an object of quasi-scientific knowledge with certain rules and 
principles, and on the other it destabilises and unsettles frameworks for knowing and 
transforms the parameters for thinking. In this sense, both war and the body are vectors 
of becoming as well as being objects for analysis. While it may be tempting to consider 
‘transformation’ in terms of a change from one identity to another, the types of 
transformation a Deleuzian approach foregrounds is a becoming: imperceptible, 
immanent, and founded on the extent to which we are always unknown to ourselves. In 
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this sense, it may be erroneous to suggest a ‘Deleuzian IR’, as this is too restrictive in 
terms of the type of insights that a Deleuzian approach potentially allows us to have. 
Rather than systematise a new way of thinking the world, a Deleuzian approach 
highlights the immanent materiality of thinking itself, and the extent that thinking may 
not just be something that I do, but something that happens to me.  
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